Security Engineering of Patient-Centered Health Care Information Systems in Peer-to-Peer Environments: Systematic Review (Preprint)

Imrana Abdullahi Yari, Tobias Dehling, Felix Kluge, Juergen Geck, Ali Sunyaev, Bjoern M. Eskofier2020 · DOI

TL;DR

This systematic review identifies critical security challenges in patient-centered health information systems (PHSs) built on peer-to-peer (P2P) architectures. It highlights that while P2P offers flexibility and patient empowerment, the burden of security management on users creates significant vulnerabilities, necessitating robust engineering and architectural solutions for widespread adoption.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The paper tackles the growing need for patient-centered health information systems (PHSs) that empower individuals to manage their health data. While traditional systems often fall short, emerging P2P technologies offer promising alternatives, enabling decentralized control, scalability, and cost-effectiveness. However, a significant hurdle is the inherent security risk: P2P networks, by design, place the onus of information security largely on the individual user. This lack of centralized control and the complexity of managing security in a distributed environment create a fertile ground for various attacks, potentially undermining patient trust and the very benefits P2P PHSs aim to deliver. The authors aim to bridge this gap by systematically identifying these security issues and proposing solutions.

Methods

The authors employed a rigorous systematic literature review following the PRISMA guidelines. They searched major academic databases (IEEE Digital Library, PubMed, Science Direct, ACM Digital Library, Scopus, and Semantic Scholar) for articles published between 2008 and 2020. Thematic analysis was used to categorize and understand the identified security issues and the factors contributing to them. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) was utilized to guide the rating of security issues.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The study is a systematic review of existing literature and does not involve the creation or use of new datasets for training or evaluation.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The User is the Weakest Link: A recurring theme is that the decentralized nature of P2P PHSs, while empowering, places an immense security burden on the end-user. This "set-and-forget" nature of many P2P applications, combined with users' varying technical expertise, creates significant vulnerabilities.
  • "No Borders" is a Double-Edged Sword: The global reach of P2P networks means threats can originate anywhere, increasing the attack surface. While this also offers resilience, it complicates the implementation of consistent security policies.
  • Architecture Matters for Security: The paper strongly suggests that the architectural design of P2P PHSs significantly impacts their security posture. Centralized, hybrid, and decentralized architectures exhibit different vulnerabilities and require tailored security measures.
  • Beyond Technical: Human and Management Factors: Security in P2P PHSs isn't just about algorithms and encryption; it also involves user education, trust mechanisms, and effective management of access policies.

Key Results

The systematic review identified 8 key security issues associated with PHS implementation and deployment on P2P networks, along with 7 factors promoting these issues. These issues include:

  • Pollution: Modifying content to be misleading or of low quality.
  • Malware: Viruses, spyware, ransomware, and worms designed to compromise systems.
  • Social Engineering Attacks: Exploiting user trust and lack of awareness.
  • Poisoning the Network: Injecting false information into indexing or routing tables.
  • Sybil Attacks: Creating multiple fake identities to gain control or influence.
  • Eclipse Attacks: Isolating a node by surrounding it with malicious peers.
  • DDoS Attacks: Overwhelming the network with traffic to disrupt service.
  • P2P Traffic Blockade: ISPs imposing bandwidth limits or blocking P2P traffic.

The paper also proposes a hybrid, multi-tier P2P architecture that aims to balance decentralization with centralized elements (like super peers acting as index servers) to enhance security, scalability, and compliance.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge several limitations:

  • The study focuses solely on security engineering for P2P PHSs, excluding broader legal issues related to health care security management.
  • P2P PHSs are an emerging phenomenon, so the study lacks real-world experimental data or a review of past security incidents.
  • Analyses of bandwidth, computation, and storage costs, as well as detailed discussions on usability, deployability, and patient registration across multiple PHS providers, are beyond the scope of this work.

Future research directions include:

  • Developing improved security models, such as more robust identity authentication schemes (IAS), trust and reputation models (TRM), and intelligent agent-based intrusion detection systems (IDS).
  • Incorporating safety-related security requirements like emergency access and guardian support, while carefully managing the associated privacy concerns.
  • Exploring reliable patient-centered backup options and integrating identity authentication management for backup servers.
  • Conducting questionnaire-based studies with various P2P PHS stakeholders to gather insights on security and privacy concerns.
  • Developing a guideline for evaluating P2P PHSs based on information security standards.

Summary updated

Abstract

<sec> <title>BACKGROUND</title> Patient-centered health care information systems (PHSs) enable patients to take control and become knowledgeable about their own health, preferably in a secure environment. Current and emerging PHSs use either a centralized database, peer-to-peer (P2P) technology, or distributed ledger technology for PHS deployment. The evolving COVID-19 decentralized Bluetooth-based tracing systems are examples of disease-centric P2P PHSs. Although using P2P technology for the provision of PHSs can be flexible, scalable, resilient to a single point of failure, and inexpensive for patients, the use of health information on P2P networks poses major security issues as users must manage information security largely by themselves. </sec> <sec> <title>OBJECTIVE</title> This study aims to identify the inherent security issues for PHS deployment in P2P networks and how they can be overcome. In addition, this study reviews different P2P architectures and proposes a suitable architecture for P2P PHS deployment. </sec> <sec> <title>METHODS</title> A systematic literature review was conducted following PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) reporting guidelines. Thematic analysis was used for data analysis. We searched the following databases: IEEE Digital Library, PubMed, Science Direct, ACM Digital Library, Scopus, and Semantic Scholar. The search was conducted on articles published between 2008 and 2020. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System was used as a guide for rating security issues. </sec> <sec> <title>RESULTS</title> Our findings are consolidated into 8 key security issues associated with PHS implementation and deployment on P2P networks and 7 factors promoting them. Moreover, we propose a suitable architecture for P2P PHSs and guidelines for the provision of PHSs while maintaining information security. </sec> <sec> <title>CONCLUSIONS</title> Despite the clear advantages of P2P PHSs, the absence of centralized controls and inconsistent views of the network on some P2P systems have profound adverse impacts in terms of security. The security issues identified in this study need to be addressed to increase patients’ intention to use PHSs on P2P networks by making them safe to use. </sec>
BibTeX
@misc{yari2020security,
  author = {Imrana Abdullahi Yari and Tobias Dehling and Felix Kluge and Juergen Geck and Ali Sunyaev and Bjoern M. Eskofier},
  title = {{Security Engineering of Patient-Centered Health Care Information Systems in Peer-to-Peer Environments: Systematic Review (Preprint)}},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.2196/preprints.24460},
}
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