S3C2 Summit 2023-11: Industry Secure Supply Chain Summit

Nusrat Zahan, Yasemin Acar, Michel Cukier, William Enck, Christian Kästner, Alexandros Kapravelos, Dominik Wermke, Laurie A. WilliamsarXiv 2024 · DOI · arXiv

TL;DR

This paper summarizes the S3C2 Industry Secure Supply Chain Summit 2023, highlighting discussions among industry practitioners on critical challenges in securing software supply chains. It reveals a shared need for better SBOM adoption, vulnerability management, and fostering a security-conscious culture, emphasizing practical insights and ongoing struggles.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The increasing frequency and impact of cyberattacks targeting software supply chains, exemplified by incidents like SolarWinds and Log4j, pose a significant threat to businesses and their customers. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities within the complex ecosystem of dependencies, build processes, and tooling that constitute a software supply chain. Addressing this problem requires open dialogue and shared understanding among industry stakeholders to identify common challenges and develop effective solutions. This paper aims to capture these discussions from a summit focused on fostering such collaboration.

Methods

The paper's methodology is based on a summary of the S3C2 Industry Secure Supply Chain Summit held on November 16, 2023. The summit involved 13 industry practitioners from 11 companies and three researchers. It consisted of a keynote presentation and six panel discussions, each framed with open-ended questions. Prior to the summit, attendees voted on their preferred topics. Each panel discussion was led by 2-4 discussion leads who presented a 3-5 minute statement, followed by open discussion. The paper then summarizes the key takeaways from each panel.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • SBOM Adoption is a Struggle: While SBOMs are becoming more common, their practical adoption for both production and consumption is fraught with challenges. Companies are not yet fully prepared to systematically collect SBOMs from third parties, and there's a need for leadership in setting trends for making SBOMs public. The business and security benefits aren't always immediately obvious.
  • Vulnerability Management is "The Hardest": Despite reliance on enterprise tools, there's a preference for custom solutions, but integrating them often disrupts workflows. Identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities, especially in C/C++ dependencies and containers, remains difficult. The ability to assess reachability and exploitability is key but not widely available.
  • Malicious Commits are a Real Threat, but Commit Signing Isn't the Silver Bullet: While post-commit scanning is valuable for detecting malicious patterns, attendees are skeptical about the effectiveness of commit signing compared to other measures like MFA, gating ingestion, and restricting dependency sources.
  • Build Infrastructure Needs Standardization and Trust: Reproducible builds are a challenging but important goal for establishing trusted compilers. The focus is shifting towards developing robust build capabilities, including trusted builders and multi-stage attestations, with a strong emphasis on validating provenance.
  • Reducing Entire Classes of Vulnerabilities is Promising but Slow: Adopting memory-safe languages like Rust shows great potential for reducing memory-related vulnerabilities, but demonstrating business value and overcoming developer resistance are significant hurdles.
  • Culture is Paramount, Driven by Leadership and Co-Creation: Fostering a security-focused culture requires strong leadership support, employee engagement, and a collaborative approach (co-creation) where security is treated as a feature, not an afterthought. Executive Orders are driving some of these cultural shifts.

Key Results

The paper doesn't present quantitative results in the traditional sense. Instead, it offers qualitative findings derived from the discussions:

  • SBOMs: Many attendees are not yet prepared to systematically collect SBOMs from vendors. There's a need for leadership to establish trends for public SBOMs.
  • Vulnerable Dependencies: Vulnerability management is considered the most challenging aspect. Reachability and exploitability assessment capabilities are not widely available.
  • Malicious Commits: Attendees are skeptical about the value of commit signing compared to other measures.
  • Build Infrastructure: Reproducible builds are seen as a challenging but important goal. There's a focus on developing robust build capabilities.
  • Reducing Vulnerabilities at Scale: Memory-safe languages are highly effective but adoption is slow due to challenges in demonstrating business value and overcoming resistance.
  • Culture: Co-creation and leadership support are identified as key drivers for fostering a security-focused culture.

Limitations and Future Work

Limitations:

  • The findings are based on discussions from a single summit, representing a snapshot of industry perspectives at that time.
  • The paper summarizes takeaways, not a rigorous empirical study.
  • The "Chatham House Rules" ensure anonymity, which limits the ability to attribute specific insights to particular companies or individuals.

Future Work:

  • The paper implicitly suggests the need for continued research and development in areas like SBOM adoption, vulnerability prioritization tools, and standardized build infrastructure.
  • The ongoing work of the S3C2 center, which organizes these summits, aims to foster further research and collaboration in these critical areas.
  • The insights gained from these summits are intended to inform future research opportunities and collaborations between industry and academia.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@misc{zahan2024s,
  author = {Nusrat Zahan and Yasemin Acar and Michel Cukier and William Enck and Christian Kästner and Alexandros Kapravelos and Dominik Wermke and Laurie A. Williams},
  title = {{S3C2 Summit 2023-11: Industry Secure Supply Chain Summit}},
  year = {2024},
  eprint = {2408.16529},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.16529},
}
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