Abstract
Attributing malware to specific Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups is critical for cyber-intelligence, yet modern deep learning models are highly susceptible to adversarial "anti-attribution" techniques. We present RoMA (Robust Malware Attribution), a novel adversarial training framework that hardens models against byte-level manipulations. By employing a learned "global" perturbation strategy and consistency-based regularization, RoMA achieves over 80% accuracy against sophisticated attacks—more than double the performance of existing state-of-the-art methods—while significantly reducing training time.
Introduction
Malware attribution involves identifying the threat actor behind a malicious file, a task increasingly handled by deep learning models like MalConv that process raw bytes. However, these models are notoriously fragile. Attackers can perform functionality-preserving modifications, such as appending bytes to "slack space," causing model accuracy to drop from over 90% to near zero. Existing defenses often rely on multi-step adversarial training, which is computationally prohibitive and often fails to generalize against diverse malware manipulations.
The RoMA Framework
RoMA introduces a single-step adversarial training approach designed for both efficiency and robustness. The architecture is built around two core innovations:
1. Global Perturbation (GP) Strategy
Rather than generating stochastic noise for each sample, RoMA maintains a pool of learned perturbation patterns. A dedicated "Selection Head" identifies the most effective pattern for a given file during training. This allows the model to anticipate and defend against common structural strategies used by attackers to obfuscate malware identity.
2. Adversarial Consistency Regularization
To maintain stable predictions under attack, RoMA utilizes two specialized loss functions:
- Adversarial Contrastive Loss ($L_{AC}$): Ensures that "clean" and "attacked" versions of the same sample are mapped to similar regions in the latent representation space, while maximizing the distance between different APT groups.
- Adversarial Distribution Loss ($L_{AD}$): Enforces stability in the model's final probability distribution across threat groups, even when input bytes are perturbed.
Experimental Evaluation
The researchers evaluated RoMA using AMG18, a new benchmark dataset comprising 6,360 malware instances from 18 distinct APT groups. AMG18 provides a realistic testbed with verified samples and representative class imbalances.
Performance and Robustness
RoMA demonstrates superior resilience compared to seven baseline methods. Under a rigorous PGD-50 attack—a standard benchmark for adversarial robustness—RoMA maintained 80.13% accuracy, whereas the next best method (PGD-4-AT) achieved only 36.85%.
Efficiency and Generalization
Beyond robustness, RoMA is highly efficient. It completes training in approximately 2,378 minutes, nearly twice as fast as PGD-4-AT. Notably, RoMA also improves standard accuracy on clean data (91.00% vs. 90.06% for the baseline), indicating that its adversarial training serves as an effective regularizer.
Conclusion
RoMA addresses the critical vulnerability of malware attribution models to adversarial deception. By learning global perturbation patterns and enforcing consistency, it provides a robust and efficient defense mechanism. Future work will explore extending this approach to other file formats like ELF and Mach-O, and applying the framework to broader malware detection tasks.
Summary updated