Revenue Enhancement via Asymmetric Signaling in Interdependent-Value Auctions

Zhuoshu Li, Sanmay DasAAAI 2019 · DOI

Introduction

Traditional auction theory often focuses on the "rules of the game"—designing mechanisms like first-price or second-price auctions to maximize revenue given a set of bidder beliefs. This paper explores a different lever: information design (or Bayesian persuasion). By strategically controlling what bidders know about the item's value, can an auctioneer increase revenue even when the auction rules are fixed?

The authors investigate this in the context of a second-price sealed-bid auction. While prior research often assumed symmetric signaling (where all bidders receive the same type of information), this work demonstrates that asymmetric signaling—providing different information to different bidders—can significantly boost the seller's bottom line in complex "interdependent-value" scenarios.

The Interdependent-Value Framework

The core of the paper's contribution lies in its analysis of interdependent-value auctions. Unlike simple common-value auctions where an item has a single objective value, interdependent-value models account for both shared and private factors. A classic example is a corporate merger, where a target firm's value depends on its inherent quality (common to all) and how well it integrates with a bidder's specific technology (private synergy).

The interdependent-value model illustrating dependencies between firm quality, bidder technology, and final valuations.

As shown in the model above, the valuation $v_i$ for bidder $i$ is a function of the target firm's quality ($w_0$), the bidder's own technology type ($t_i$), and the resulting synergy ($w_i$). This complexity creates an environment where strategic information disclosure can be highly effective.

Key Insights: Breaking Symmetry

The researchers found a "Common-Value Ceiling" in simpler settings: in pure common-value auctions, the seller cannot exceed the expected revenue of either full disclosure or no disclosure. However, in the interdependent-value model, asymmetry becomes a powerful tool.

By providing one bidder with information about the common attribute (firm quality) and another with information about their private attribute (synergy), the seller can exploit the "winner's curse." This asymmetric signal structure makes certain bidders less certain about their opponents' bids, forcing them to bid more aggressively to ensure a win. Interestingly, the optimal strategy often involves "strategic obfuscation"—providing noisy signals rather than perfect clarity—to drive up competition.

Quantitative Results

The theoretical proofs (Theorems 3 and 4) are supported by numerical simulations. In a simulated merger scenario where bidders have different underlying technology types, the authors demonstrate a clear revenue advantage for strategic signaling.

Expected revenue gains from strategic signaling compared to a baseline without signaling across different bidder type combinations.

As seen in the table, for certain type combinations (e.g., $t_h, t_l$), strategic signaling can increase expected revenue from 0.64 to 0.72, representing a 12.5% boost. A notable paradox identified by the authors is that the "better-informed" bidder often experiences lower utility; the very information they receive is designed to force them into paying a higher price upon winning.

Conclusion and Future Directions

This research highlights that information is as critical a tool for auctioneers as the auction rules themselves. By moving beyond symmetric disclosure, sellers can navigate the complexities of interdependent values to enhance revenue.

However, several challenges remain. The current proofs are limited to two-bidder scenarios, and scaling asymmetric signaling to $N$ bidders presents significant mathematical hurdles. Additionally, the model assumes risk-neutral bidders; risk aversion could fundamentally change how bidders respond to asymmetric information. Future work will likely focus on developing general algorithms to identify optimal signal structures in more diverse and large-scale auction environments.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@inproceedings{li2019revenue,
  author = {Zhuoshu Li and Sanmay Das},
  title = {{Revenue Enhancement via Asymmetric Signaling in Interdependent-Value Auctions}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012093},
}
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