Rethinking Security of Web-Based System Applications

Martin Georgiev, Suman Jana, Vitaly ShmatikovWWW 2015 · OpenReview

Abstract

Many modern desktop and mobile platforms, including Ubuntu, Google Chrome, Windows, and Firefox OS, support so called Web-based system applications that run outside the Web browser and enjoy direct access to native objects such as files, camera, and geolocation. We show that the access-control models of these platforms are (a) incompatible and (b) prone to unintended delegation of native-access rights: when applications request native access for their own code, they unintentionally enable it for untrusted third-party code, too. This enables malicious ads and other third-party content to steal users' OAuth authentication credentials, access camera on their devices, etc. We then design, implement, and evaluate PowerGate, a new access-control mechanism for Web-based system applications. It solves two key problems plaguing all existing platforms: security and consistency. First, unlike the existing platforms, PowerGate correctly protects native objects from unauthorized access. Second, PowerGate provides uniform access-control semantics across all platforms and is 100% backward compatible. PowerGate enables application developers to write well-defined native-object access policies with explicit principals such as "application's own local code" and "third-party Web code," is easy to configure, and incurs negligible performance overhead.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{georgiev2015rethinking,
  author = {Martin Georgiev and Suman Jana and Vitaly Shmatikov},
  title = {{Rethinking Security of Web-Based System Applications}},
  booktitle = {The Web Conference},
  year = {2015},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=BJERcG-ObS},
}

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