RESILAGENT: A Three-Pillar Architecture for Cyber-Physical Resilience in Electrical Power and Energy Systems

Nikolaos Kekatos, Georgios Koutidis, Konstantinos Antonakopoulos, Stylianos Basagiannis, Sokratis Katsikas, Georgios Kavallieratos, Alexios Lekidis, Tom Nianios, Elpiniki PapageorgiouarXiv 2026 · arXiv

TL;DR

RESILAGENT is a novel three-pillar architecture designed to protect electrical grids from "hybrid threats"—simultaneous cyberattacks, physical sabotage, and extreme weather. By integrating agentic AI, real-time Digital Twins, and a blockchain-based audit trail, it closes the gap between detection and response while ensuring regulatory compliance for critical infrastructure.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Modern Electrical Power and Energy Systems (EPES) are no longer just facing simple hackers; they are up against coordinated campaigns that combine digital intrusions with physical damage and climate-driven stress (like heatwaves or storms).

The authors argue that current security is too "siloed." A cyber alert in the IT department rarely reaches the grid operator's console, and weather warnings are often disconnected from security operations. Furthermore, new European regulations (like NIS2 and CER) require strict evidence of incident handling, which is currently a manual, spreadsheet-heavy process. There is a critical need for an integrated system that can detect, simulate, and respond to these complex, multi-modal threats in real-time.

Methods

The RESILAGENT framework is organized into three operational pillars, mediated by a cloud-based orchestrator:

  1. P1: Sensing & Data Intelligence (Observe): Uses modality-specific agents to monitor everything from SCADA data and PMU sensors to CCTV and weather feeds. A multimodal Large Language Model (LLM) fusion agent then binds these anomalies into a single "hybrid-event" hypothesis.
  2. P2: Resilience Analytics & Reporting (Simulate & Decide): Feeds the hypothesis into a real-time Digital Twin (DT). This allows the system to run "what-if" simulations (like N-1 contingency analysis) to see how a proposed attack or failure would actually impact the grid's stability.
  3. P3: Incident Response & Recovery (Act & Adapt): Generates explainable SOAR (Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response) playbooks using LLMs. High-impact actions require human approval, while every step is recorded on a permissioned blockchain anchor (Hyperledger Fabric) to create an immutable audit trail for regulators.
Fig. 1. RESILAGENT three-pillar architecture: P1 Sensing, P2 Analytics, P3 Response, mediated by a Cloud-based Orchestrator. Solid arrows trace one workflow cycle; the dashed arrow closes the loop.

The authors identify a "Minimum Viable Stack" of four irreducible technologies: multi-modal monitoring, a real-time Digital Twin, LLM-backed fusion, and a blockchain anchor.

Datasets

The framework was validated using an IEEE-bus micro-benchmark (specifically the IEEE 14, 30, and 118-bus cases). These are standard power system models used to simulate grid behavior. The authors used PANDAPOWER for static power-flow and HELICS for cyber-physical co-simulation. They also reference planned use of datasets like PNNL Electricity/Gas IDS and Copernicus weather feeds for upcoming pilot programs.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Physics-Awareness is Non-Negotiable: Purely "black-box" AI (like standard MLPs) struggles to detect stealthy False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA). By using the Digital Twin to calculate residuals (the difference between measured and expected physical values), detection accuracy improves significantly.
  • The "Fusion Lift": Combining cyber signals (like SCADA write-rates) with physical signals (grid residuals) provides a massive boost in detection reliability. In their tests, fusion lifted the Area Under the Curve (AUC) by 16.3 percentage points over cyber-only detection.
  • Blockchain is Fast Enough: A common critique of blockchain is latency. However, the authors demonstrate that anchoring 20,000 events takes only microseconds—orders of magnitude faster than the time required for a Digital Twin to solve a power flow or an LLM to generate a response.
  • Human-in-the-loop vs. Sub-second Control: The authors are realistic about LLM speeds. While LLMs are too slow for sub-second protection relaying, a ~17-second end-to-end loop is perfectly suited for the "human-in-the-loop" stage where operators must decide on high-level mitigations like load shedding.

Key Results

The researchers quantified the performance of each pillar through their micro-benchmark:

  • Detection (P1): The residual-aware detector reached an AUC of 0.82, significantly outperforming unsupervised models (0.75) and feature-blind neural networks (0.61).
  • Simulation (P2): On an IEEE 14-bus model, the Digital Twin successfully screened all 15 N-1 contingencies in approximately 250ms.
  • End-to-End Pipeline: In a full "storm" scenario, the entire chain—from weather alert to LLM-generated action plan—completed in about 17 seconds.
Fig. 4. P1 micro-benchmark on IEEE 14-bus: (a) ROC at α=2σ (2 buses, 800 snapshots); (b) per-sample inference latency; (c) stealth-boundary sweep, mean±std (3 seeds); (d) cyber–physical fusion AUC (5 seeds).

Limitations and Future Work

The primary limitation is that the current results are based on a "proxy evaluation" using simulated benchmarks rather than live operator telemetry. The authors acknowledge that while the 17-second latency fits a human-in-the-loop workflow, it is not suitable for autonomous, sub-second grid control.

Future work involves moving from the micro-benchmark to two real-world EU pilots: a national Transmission System Operator (TSO) facing a coordinated heatwave/sabotage scenario, and a Distribution System Operator (DSO) dealing with compromised solar inverter firmware during a storm. They also plan to explore Federated Learning, allowing different grid operators to share threat intelligence without sharing sensitive raw data.

Summary updated

Abstract

Electrical Power and Energy Systems face hybrid threats that combine cyber intrusions, physical sabotage and climate-driven stress, and routinely outpace today's siloed monitoring stacks. We present RESILAGENT, a concept architecture organised around three operational pillars, Sensing & Data Intelligence, Resilience Analytics & Reporting, and Incident Response & Recovery, mediated by a Cloud-based Orchestrator and exercised through a closed Detect-Simulate-Decide-Sign loop. The framework fuses agentic artificial intelligence and multimodal large language models for cross-modal detection, real-time digital twins for what-if simulation, and a permissioned blockchain anchor for tamper-evident threat intelligence and CER/NIS2-aligned evidence. We instantiate it on two scenarios, a transmission operator under coordinated cyber compromise, sabotage and heatwave, and a distribution operator under a supply-chain compromise during a storm, and report an IEEE-bus micro-benchmark that quantifies each pillar through false-data-injection attack detection, cyber-physical fusion lift, N-1 contingency screening and anchor cost.
BibTeX
@misc{kekatos2026resilagent,
  author = {Nikolaos Kekatos and Georgios Koutidis and Konstantinos Antonakopoulos and Stylianos Basagiannis and Sokratis Katsikas and Georgios Kavallieratos and Alexios Lekidis and Tom Nianios and Elpiniki Papageorgiou},
  title = {{RESILAGENT: A Three-Pillar Architecture for Cyber-Physical Resilience in Electrical Power and Energy Systems}},
  year = {2026},
  eprint = {2611.21480},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.21480},
}
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