TL;DR
This paper investigates how manufacturers' concerns about fair profit distribution (fairness concerns) impact green closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs), especially when they invest in sales efforts. They found that these concerns negatively affect product greenness, sales effort, and recycling rates, but a profit-sharing contract can effectively mitigate these issues and improve overall CLSC performance.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
The modern world is awash in electronic waste, particularly from rapidly updated smartphones. Green closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) are crucial for managing this waste, promoting sustainability, and reducing environmental pollution. However, the real-world operation of CLSCs is complex. Manufacturers invest heavily in making products "green" and in sales efforts (like advertising) to boost sales. A key challenge is how profits are distributed among supply chain members. This paper highlights that manufacturers, despite their investments, often see retailers taking a larger share of the profits. This perceived unfairness can lead to "fairness concerns," where manufacturers prioritize equitable profit distribution, potentially at the expense of other CLSC objectives like product greenness or sales effort. The paper aims to understand how these manufacturer fairness concerns, combined with their sales efforts, affect CLSC decisions and to propose a mechanism to coordinate the supply chain for better outcomes.
Methods
The authors employ game theory, specifically the Stackelberg game model, to analyze the CLSC. They construct and compare three models:
- Centralized Model: Assumes both the manufacturer (M) and retailer (R) act as a single entity to maximize the total CLSC profit. This serves as a benchmark for optimal performance.
- Decentralized Model with Fairness Neutrality: M and R make decisions independently to maximize their own profits, with no consideration for fairness in profit distribution.
- Decentralized Model with Fairness Concerns: M makes decisions to maximize its utility, which includes a penalty for perceived unfair profit distribution. R still aims to maximize its own profit.
They then design a profit-sharing contract as a coordination mechanism for the decentralized model with fairness concerns. This contract involves R sharing a portion of its sales profit with M, aiming to align their interests and improve overall CLSC performance. Numerical simulations are used to validate the theoretical findings.
Datasets
Not discussed in the paper. The numerical simulations use parameter values from existing literature.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Fairness is a Double-Edged Sword: While fairness concerns are intended to ensure equitable profit distribution, they can paradoxically harm the overall CLSC. Manufacturers, driven by fairness, might reduce product greenness and sales effort, leading to lower recycling rates and a less sustainable system.
- Decentralization Hurts: Independent decision-making in decentralized models, especially when fairness concerns are present, leads to "double marginalization" and reduced efficiency compared to a centralized, cooperative approach.
- The Power of Contracts: A well-designed profit-sharing contract can effectively mitigate the negative impacts of fairness concerns. By incentivizing cooperation and aligning profit motives, it can bring CLSC performance closer to the optimal centralized outcome.
- Manufacturer's Bargaining Power: As a manufacturer's fairness concerns increase, its bargaining power within the supply chain also tends to increase, potentially allowing it to secure a larger share of the profit-sharing.
Key Results
- Centralized is Best: The centralized model consistently yields the highest product green degree, sales effort, recycling rate, market demand, and overall system profit.
- Fairness Concerns Harm Performance: In decentralized models, increasing manufacturer fairness concerns leads to:
- Lower product green degree, sales effort, and recycling rates.
- Higher retail prices and lower service levels from retailers.
- Reduced profits for both the manufacturer, retailer, and the entire system.
- Profit-Sharing Contract Effectiveness: When the profit-sharing proportion is set within a specific range, the contract can significantly improve CLSC efficiency. It can bring key performance indicators (like retail price and service level) closer to the optimal centralized levels, even when fairness concerns are present.
- Quantitative Impact: Numerical simulations show that as fairness concerns increase, key metrics like product greenness and recycling rate decrease substantially in the decentralized model. The profit-sharing contract helps to recover a significant portion of this loss.
Limitations and Future Work
- Data Limitations: The numerical simulations rely on parameter values from existing literature, not real-world enterprise data. Future research could use actual data for more realistic guidance.
- Social Aspects Ignored: The current model does not consider social factors. Future work could incorporate these to study a more comprehensive sustainable green CLSC.
- Focus on Manufacturer Fairness: The study primarily focuses on the manufacturer's fairness concerns. Future research could explore the impact of retailer fairness concerns or dual fairness concerns.
Summary updated