Relative performance evaluation for dynamic contracts in a large competitive market
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Abstract
Highlights•We develop a dynamic model to study the role of relative performance evaluation.•A Stackelberg-Nash game is designed to characterize our principal-agent problem.•We illustrate the tractable equilibrium status in a large competitive market.•Risk sharing and correlation lead to the inclusion of relative performance evaluation.•Incorporation of relative performance evaluation increases the systemic risk.
BibTeX
@article{han2022relative,
author = {Jinhui Han and Guiyuan Ma and Sheung Chi Phillip Yam},
title = {{Relative performance evaluation for dynamic contracts in a large competitive market}},
journal = {Eur. J. Oper. Res.},
year = {2022},
doi = {10.1016/j.ejor.2022.01.017},
}Loading related content...