Relative performance evaluation for dynamic contracts in a large competitive market

Jinhui Han, Guiyuan Ma, Sheung Chi Phillip YamEur. J. Oper. Res 2022 · DOI · OpenReview

Abstract

Highlights•We develop a dynamic model to study the role of relative performance evaluation.•A Stackelberg-Nash game is designed to characterize our principal-agent problem.•We illustrate the tractable equilibrium status in a large competitive market.•Risk sharing and correlation lead to the inclusion of relative performance evaluation.•Incorporation of relative performance evaluation increases the systemic risk.
BibTeX
@article{han2022relative,
  author = {Jinhui Han and Guiyuan Ma and Sheung Chi Phillip Yam},
  title = {{Relative performance evaluation for dynamic contracts in a large competitive market}},
  journal = {Eur. J. Oper. Res.},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ejor.2022.01.017},
}

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