Reject and Report: Forgery-Evident Undetectable Watermarks for Generative Image Models

Yihan Wang, Haochen Sun, Xi He, Yaoliang Yu, N. AsokanarXiv 2026 · arXiv

As generative AI models become capable of producing indistinguishable photorealistic images, the need for reliable provenance—proving an image came from a specific model—has moved from a research curiosity to a regulatory necessity. However, current watermarking techniques face a "forgery" problem: an attacker can take a watermarked image, extract its underlying noise pattern, and "transplant" it onto harmful content to frame the model owner.

In their paper, "Reject and Report: Forgery-Evident Undetectable Watermarks for Generative Image Models," Wang et al. introduce Tripwire-WM, a framework that turns watermarks into "tamper-evident seals."

TL;DR

Tripwire-WM is the first framework for "forgery-evident" undetectable watermarks, designed to not only reject forged AI images but actively flag them as malicious. By binding the semantic content of an image to the previously unused magnitudes of the model's initial latent noise, it ensures that any attempt to transplant a watermark to new content leaves behind positive evidence of forgery.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Most state-of-the-art watermarks for diffusion models are "undetectable," meaning an unauthorized party cannot distinguish a watermarked image from a natural one. While great for image quality and privacy, this design has a fatal flaw: forgery by inversion.

An adversary can "invert" a single watermarked image to recover its initial latent noise. They can then use that noise to:

  1. Reprompt: Generate entirely new, potentially harmful content that carries the original watermark.
  2. Imprint: Perturb a real photograph until it carries the watermark, making an authentic photo look AI-generated (the "liar's dividend").

Existing defenses often fail to distinguish between a "clean" unwatermarked image and a failed forgery. If a detector simply rejects a forgery as "unwatermarked," the attacker successfully hides their tracks. The authors argue that a robust system must Reject and Report: it should provide positive evidence that a forgery was attempted.

Methods

Tripwire-WM builds on top of existing sign-based watermarking schemes like Pseudorandom Code (PRC) or Gaussian Shading++ (GS++).

The "Empty Channel"

Standard undetectable watermarks only modify the signs of the initial latent noise. The magnitudes of that noise are typically left as random, unused data. Tripwire-WM uses these magnitudes as a "commitment" channel.

Semantic Commitment

The core idea is to store a 128-bit semantic hash of the image content within these magnitudes.

  • Two-Pass Generation: To avoid circularity (needing the image to create the hash, but needing the hash to generate the image), the model first generates a "draft" image.
  • Quantile Reflection: The hash of this draft is embedded into the latent magnitudes using a "measure-preserving quantile reflection." This technique flips magnitudes across the median in a way that perfectly preserves the original Gaussian distribution, maintaining the watermark's undetectability.
  • The "Tripwire": When a verifier checks an image, it extracts the commitment from the magnitudes and compares it to the hash of the query image. If the signs indicate a watermark is present but the commitment doesn't match the content, the "tripwire" is tripped, and the image is flagged as FORGED.
Figure 2: Overview. Left: the threat model: without the key, a forger holding one water- marked image and a surrogate model reprompts its latent into new content or imprints it onto a real photo, so that the result carries the watermark. Top right: generation: the signs carry the watermark as in PRC or GS++, and the semantic hash of a draft image is encoded and committed into the latent magnitudes, from which the released image is generated. Bot- tom right: detection, which ends in one of the four verdicts of Section 2.

Datasets

The authors evaluated Tripwire-WM using:

  • MS-COCO 2017: Used for standard image generation and quality benchmarks.
  • Stable-Diffusion-Prompts (SDP): Used for out-of-distribution evaluation.
  • Inappropriate Image Prompts (I2P): Used to simulate "harmful" reprompting forgeries.
  • DVIDS: Public-domain military photographs used as targets for imprinting forgeries.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Positive Evidence vs. Absence of Signal: A forgery isn't just a missing watermark; it's a valid watermark attached to the wrong content. By treating a mismatch as "positive evidence," the system can alert model owners to active attacks.
  • Four-Way Verdicts: Instead of a binary "Yes/No," the detector provides four labels: Watermarked (Genuine), Unwatermarked (Natural), Forged (Malicious attempt), and Unverified (Too distorted to tell).
  • Distribution Preservation is Key: The use of quantile reflection is a clever mathematical trick to ensure that adding the "commitment" doesn't make the latent noise look "non-random" to statistical tests, preserving the "undetectable" property.
Visual examples of the four verdicts. Note how forged images are explicitly flagged in red.

Key Results

Tripwire-WM significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art defenses like SemBind:

  • Forgery Rejection: On MS-COCO, Tripwire-WM accepted 0% of imprinting forgeries (where SemBind accepted up to 55%). For reprompting, it accepted only 1.8% (vs. 46.2% for SemBind).
  • Reporting Power: It successfully flagged 94.3% to 100% of forgery attempts as "Forged."
  • Reliability: It maintained a high True Positive Rate (99%+) for genuine images at a very low False Positive Rate ($10^{-6}$).
  • Robustness: The scheme remains effective even after common image processing like JPEG compression, blurring, and resizing, matching the robustness of the underlying sign-based watermarks.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Computational Overhead: The two-pass generation process roughly doubles the time it takes to generate an image (from ~3s to ~6s on an NVIDIA L40S).
  • Semantic Granularity: The current 128-bit hash is prompt-level. It can distinguish a cat from a dog, but might struggle to distinguish two very similar scenes with different individuals.
  • Secret Hashing Network: The security of the semantic check relies on the weights of the hashing network remaining secret. If the network is leaked, an adaptive adversary could potentially craft forgeries that bypass the check.

Overall, Tripwire-WM represents a significant step forward in making AI provenance systems not just detectable, but defensible against active adversarial manipulation.

Summary updated

Abstract

Provenance schemes such as those based on content watermarks let images from a generative model be traced back to it. A practical watermarking scheme must be accurate at a low false-positive rate (FPR), robust under content-preserving processing, and undetectable. In addition, it must resist forgery; otherwise, even from a single watermarked image and a surrogate model, an adversary can imprint the watermark onto an arbitrary image or regenerate new content that carries it, falsely attributing harmful content to a model or making authentic photographs appear AI-generated. We argue that a watermarking scheme should not only reject forgeries but also report them: a forgery rejected as unwatermarked leaves no trace of the attempt. State-of-the-art forgery-resilient undetectable watermarking schemes, such as SemBind, fall short on both counts. External anomaly detectors that do report forgeries either miss most of them or falsely flag genuine images after common processing. We propose Tripwire-WM, the first forgery-evident framework for undetectable watermarks. It commits the semantics of the generated image to the magnitudes of the initial latent noise, which the sign-based watermarks leave unused, through a distribution-preserving embedding; a forged image carries a valid watermark but with a commitment that does not match its content, so the detector both rejects it and reports it as forged. Built on the pseudorandom code (PRC) watermark and Gaussian Shading++, Tripwire-WM provably preserves their undetectability. On MS-COCO, with the owner's own model as the surrogate, it accepts no imprinting forgery, compared with up to 55.0% for SemBind, and reports all of them as forged; it also accepts at most 1.8% of reprompting forgeries, against up to 46.2% for SemBind. Meanwhile, it accepts at least 99% of genuine watermarked images at 10^{-6} FPR and matches the robustness of the base schemes.
BibTeX
@misc{wang2026reject,
  author = {Yihan Wang and Haochen Sun and Xi He and Yaoliang Yu and N. Asokan},
  title = {{Reject and Report: Forgery-Evident Undetectable Watermarks for Generative Image Models}},
  year = {2026},
  eprint = {2611.25226},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.25226},
}
Figure