Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools

Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Joshua D. Angrist, Yusuke Narita, Parag A. Pathak, Román Andrés ZárateAmerican 2017 · DOI

Abstract

Many school and college admission systems use centralized mechanisms to allocate seats based on applicant preferences and school priorities. When tie-breaking uses non-randomly assigned criteria like distance or a test score, applicants with the same preferences and priorities are not directly comparable. The non-lottery setting does generate a kind of local random assignment that opens the door to regression discontinuity designs. This paper introduces a hybrid RD/propensity score empirical strategy that exploits quasi-experiments embedded in serial dictatorship, a mechanism widely used for college and selective K-12 school admissions. We use our approach to estimate achievement effects of Chicago's exam schools.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{abdulkadiroglu2017regression,
  author = {Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Joshua D. Angrist and Yusuke Narita and Parag A. Pathak and Román Andrés Zárate},
  title = {{Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools}},
  booktitle = {American},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.p20171111},
}

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