Quid Pro Quo CSR and Trade Liberalization in a Bilateral Monopoly

Shih-Shen Chen, Chien-Shu TsaiGames 2022 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper models a foreign manufacturer and a domestic retailer in a bilateral monopoly, showing how the manufacturer's "quid pro quo" Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can benefit consumers and improve social welfare. It further demonstrates that when governments implement strategic trade policies, a "win-win-win" scenario emerges, incentivizing firms to adopt CSR and potentially leading to reduced trade barriers.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The paper tackles the question of why firms, particularly foreign manufacturers, engage in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives, especially when these initiatives can be costly. While CSR is increasingly prevalent in globalized markets, its economic drivers and welfare implications, particularly in the context of international trade and market structures, are not fully understood. The authors aim to bridge this gap by analyzing CSR within a bilateral monopoly framework, where a single foreign upstream firm bargains with a single domestic downstream firm. This setup is relevant for markets with highly differentiated products, like specialized semiconductors, where a foreign supplier might hold significant market power.

Methods

The authors employ a dynamic game-theoretic model, specifically a bilateral monopoly, to analyze the bargaining process between a foreign manufacturer and a domestic retailer. They use backward induction to solve the game, starting with the retailer's pricing decision and then moving to the upstream-downstream bargaining over the wholesale price. The model incorporates the concept of "quid pro quo CSR," where the foreign firm's CSR initiatives are treated as a strategic choice that influences its bargaining power and market outcomes. The analysis extends to include government intervention through strategic trade policies, such as tariffs.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • CSR as a "Quid Pro Quo": The paper proposes that CSR can act as a strategic tool for foreign firms. By engaging in consumer-friendly actions, firms can gain leverage in negotiations with domestic retailers, leading to better outcomes for themselves and consumers.
  • Win-Win-Win Scenarios: The research highlights that CSR can create a "win-win-win" situation, benefiting the foreign firm (through potentially higher profits or reduced political hostility), consumers (through lower prices and higher surplus), and overall social welfare.
  • Government Intervention and CSR: The study suggests that governments can strategically use trade policies (tariffs or subsidies) to further enhance social welfare. Interestingly, a firm's CSR engagement can influence the government's policy choice, potentially leading to reduced trade barriers.
  • Costly CSR, but Beneficial Outcomes: While CSR initiatives are shown to be costly for the upstream firm, leading to reduced profits in a free trade scenario, the broader welfare effects (consumer surplus and social welfare) are positive. This suggests that the motivation for CSR might stem from factors beyond immediate profit, such as "warm glow" effects or long-term strategic advantages.
  • Bargaining Power Matters: The bargaining power of the foreign upstream firm plays a crucial role. When this power is high, the government may find it beneficial to implement tariffs to extract rent and improve social welfare.

Key Results

  • Free Trade: In a free trade scenario, a foreign firm's consumer-friendly CSR leads to higher consumer surplus and social welfare, despite reducing the firm's own profit. This suggests that CSR can be a source of social progress.
  • Strategic Trade Policy: When the government implements a strategic trade policy, a "win-win-win" outcome is possible, where the firm's profitability, consumer surplus, and social welfare all improve. This provides a stronger incentive for foreign firms to engage in CSR.
  • Tariff vs. Subsidy: The paper shows that the optimal trade policy (tariff or subsidy) depends on the firm's bargaining power and its CSR emphasis. For instance, a higher bargaining power might necessitate an import tariff to extract rent, while increased CSR can lead to lower trade barriers or even subsidies.
  • Mitigating Political Hostility: The consumer-friendly actions of foreign firms can lead to adequate consumer and social welfare, which in turn can mitigate the government's political hostility towards foreign firms.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge that their model assumes a simple bilateral monopoly. In reality, markets often involve multiple downstream firms competing in the final market. Future research could explore CSR initiatives and trade liberalization policies in a third-country model with multiple downstream firms and consider scenarios with cross-ownership between exporters and domestic investors. They also suggest examining how CSR firms affect the strategic trade policy adopted by the importing country in more complex market structures.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{chen2022quid,
  author = {Shih-Shen Chen and Chien-Shu Tsai and Chen Chen},
  title = {{Quid Pro Quo CSR and Trade Liberalization in a Bilateral Monopoly}},
  journal = {Games},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.3390/g13030038},
}
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