Pulse or Provenance? What rPPG-Based Deepfake Detectors Learn

Othmane Harraq, Tamer AldwairiarXiv 2026 · arXiv

TL;DR

Researchers have long claimed that deepfakes can be detected by looking for a "heartbeat" (rPPG) that synthesized faces lack. This paper reveals that these detectors aren't actually finding pulses; instead, they are picking up on high-frequency temporal "flicker" introduced by the image-to-video synthesis process itself.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Remote photoplethysmography (rPPG) is a technique that detects tiny, periodic color changes in skin caused by blood flow. In the deepfake detection community, the prevailing theory is that because AI-generated faces don't have blood flow, they won't have a valid rPPG signal. This provides a satisfying "mechanistic" argument for why these detectors work.

However, the authors of this paper noticed a puzzle: simple, "crude" chrominance detectors often outperform sophisticated, state-of-the-art rPPG extractors. They set out to investigate what these models are actually learning. Are they detecting biology, or are they just finding another "shortcut" in the data?

Methods

The authors employed a rigorous "matched sampling" protocol, ensuring every real and fake video contributed exactly one identically positioned 160-frame window to avoid length or frame-rate biases. They compared several signals:

  • CHROM & POS: Simple, classical color-space projections used for rPPG.
  • RhythmFormer: A state-of-the-art, deep-learning-based rPPG extractor.
  • Region Analysis: They extracted signals from the face, the background, and the full frame (no face detection).
  • Frequency Analysis: They filtered signals into specific bands: below 0.7 Hz, the "heart-rate" band (0.7–4 Hz), and a high-frequency band (4–12 Hz).
  • Interventions: They tested how the detectors reacted to frame shuffling, low-pass filtering, and the injection of synthetic pulses.
  • Controlled Reenactment: They used tools like LivePortrait to generate new fakes from real videos to see exactly when the "pulse" signal appears.

Datasets

The study primarily uses:

  • Celeb-DF++: A large-scale dataset featuring 22 different forgery methods.
  • FaceForensics++ (FF++): A standard benchmark for face manipulation.
  • YouTube-real: A collection of real videos used to test cross-dataset generalization.

The authors also highlight significant identity and content overlap in the official Celeb-DF splits and provide a more rigorous, identity-disjoint split for their own evaluations.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The "Heartbeat" in the Wallpaper: On fully synthesized forgeries, the "pulse" signal is just as strong in the background as it is on the face. If a detector finds a "heartbeat" in a static wall, it’s clearly not physiological.
  • The Signal is High-Frequency Flicker: The discriminative information lives primarily in the 4–12 Hz range—well above a human heart rate. Shuffling the frames destroys the signal, proving it is a temporal artifact.
  • Synthesis is the Source: By using controlled self-reenactment, the authors showed that animating a face from a single frame introduces this high-frequency flicker. However, reconstructing a video frame-by-frame from its own source does not create the signal. This suggests the artifact stems from the lack of temporal consistency when a generator creates a sequence from a static appearance.
  • Detecting "Provenance," Not "Fakeness": Models trained on Celeb-DF++ classify over 99% of real videos from the FF++ dataset as fake. This indicates the models are learning the specific "look" or "fingerprint" of a dataset's source videos rather than a general property of manipulation.
Figure 1: rPPG-style detectors perform just as well on backgrounds as on faces, and rely on frequencies above the heart-rate band.

Key Results

  • Near-Perfect Detection from Noise: A simple chrominance (CHROM) trace achieved an AUC of 0.998 on talking-face forgeries, significantly beating the dedicated rPPG extractor, RhythmFormer (0.87).
  • Flicker is the Key: Removing high-frequency content (low-passing at 8 Hz) made 97% of fake videos appear real to the detectors. Conversely, adding fake-level high-frequency noise to real videos made 99.8% of them appear fake.
  • The Heartbeat Doesn't Matter: Injecting a synthetic pulse into fake videos had almost no effect on the detectors, further proving they aren't looking for a heartbeat.
  • Evaluation Pitfalls: The authors found that reusing test identities or videos during training (a common flaw in some custom protocols) can inflate a weak detector's performance by as much as 0.30 AUC.
Figure 2: Power spectra show that real (black) and fake (blue) videos diverge significantly in the high-frequency range (above 4 Hz).

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge they cannot prove that every deepfake lacks a pulse, only that current rPPG-style detectors don't rely on one. They also note that the exact origin of the flicker—whether it's purely from the generator or partly from the encoding pipelines—requires further study with access to generator internals.

They conclude with a call to action for the research community: any future "physiological" detector should be required to pass a set of "sanity check" controls, such as testing on background regions and using frame-shuffle controls, to ensure they are actually measuring what they claim to measure.

Summary updated

Abstract

Remote photoplethysmography (rPPG) has been proposed as a physiological cue for deepfake detection, based on the premise that synthesized faces lack a genuine cardiac signal. We examine what rPPG-style detectors learn on Celeb-DF++ (22 forgery methods) and FaceForensics++ (FF++), using one identically sampled window per real and fake video. On talking-face forgeries, simple chrominance traces reach an AUC of 0.998, exceeding a dedicated rPPG extractor (0.87). Controlled experiments indicate that this signal is not physiological in origin. On fully synthesized forgeries, it is equally discriminative when extracted from background regions or from full frames without face detection, and it is concentrated above the 0.7 to 4 Hz heart-rate band. It is largely removed by shuffling frame order but persists after normalizing resolution, frame rate and encoding, and an independent reimplementation reproduces these findings. Removing high-frequency content makes most synthesized videos appear real, adding it makes real videos appear fake, and injecting a synthetic pulse has little effect. In controlled self-reenactment experiments with two generators, animating a face from a single frame introduces the same high-frequency signal, whereas reconstructing each frame from its own source does not. Face-based chrominance detectors trained on Celeb-DF++ classify over 99% of real FF++ videos as fake, indicating that they largely encode video source rather than manipulation, and a CLIP-based detector exhibits the same behavior. A frozen CLIP backbone matches or exceeds fusions of CLIP with rPPG and frequency features. Finally, we show that the official Celeb-DF and Celeb-DF++ splits share identities and source-video content between training and test, and that custom protocols reusing test videos and identities in training inflate weaker detectors by up to 0.30 AUC.
BibTeX
@misc{harraq2026pulse,
  author = {Othmane Harraq and Tamer Aldwairi},
  title = {{Pulse or Provenance? What rPPG-Based Deepfake Detectors Learn}},
  year = {2026},
  eprint = {2611.13992},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.13992},
}
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