Abstract
With the increasing use of the internet we are always in reach of a browser and a website. Users are continuously feeding sensitive information (such as passwords, personal and credit card information) to websites. These browsers and websites are susceptible to attacks from compromised clientside code, the browser and the operating system itself. Such threats emanate from Man-in-the-Browser (MitB) malware and form grabbers that are able to steal information from HTML forms and manipulate the forms at the cost of the user, resulting in the loss of sensitive information and financial costs. Whilst defensive techniques such as detection and prevention have their own merits, an out-of-band system can have superior security and user experience benefits. In this paper we explore the idea of circumventing the threats through a mobile phone-based system that can protect the user from compromised browsers and form grabbers. We build on the work of deeID, a blockchain-based and out-of-band identification and authentication system. Our contributions are the design of an out-of-band system dubbed FormL3SS, a standardised messaging for information request and the novel combination of existing techniques with a blockchainbased identity system. Our implementation of FormL3SS demonstrates the capabilities of sending data securely to a trusted server.
Introduction
The modern web relies on a chain of trust that is increasingly fragile. Even when a website employs HTTPS, user data remains vulnerable if the environment before encryption is compromised. Two primary threats dominate this landscape: Man-in-the-Browser (MitB) Trojans and form grabbers. MitB malware, such as ZeuS or SpyEye, infects the operating system or browser to intercept data as it is typed. Form grabbers, often malicious JavaScript injected via compromised third-party libraries, scrape data directly from HTML forms. A prominent example is the 2018 British Airways breach, where 22 lines of malicious code in a common library (modernizr.js) compromised the payment details of 380,000 customers.
Once a user's machine is infected, the browser cannot effectively protect the data. This paper proposes that the only way to secure such transactions is to bypass the compromised device entirely using an "out-of-band" (OOB) secondary device—the smartphone.
The FormL3SS Architecture
The authors introduce FormL3SS, an OOB data submission system built upon the deeID blockchain-based identity and authentication framework. FormL3SS ensures that sensitive data, such as credit card numbers, never touches the untrusted client-side environment of a PC browser.
System Workflow
The FormL3SS process involves several key steps to ensure data integrity and authenticity:
- Server-Side Initiation: When a user needs to submit sensitive data, the trusted web server generates a JSON data structure containing a unique session ID, the type of information requested, and a cryptographic signature.
- QR Code Bridge: The server sends this data to the browser, which displays it as a QR code. This acts as the secure "handover" mechanism from the untrusted PC to the trusted mobile device.
- Mobile Verification: The user scans the QR code with the deeID mobile app. To mitigate phishing, the user manually types the domain name they intend to visit into the app. The app then cross-references this with the website’s public keys stored on the deeID blockchain contract to verify the signature.
- Secure Submission: Once verified, the user enters the data (or selects pre-stored information) on their phone. The phone sends this data directly to the server via a secure WebSocket connection, completely bypassing the PC's browser and OS.
Key Insights and Innovations
FormL3SS leverages several novel techniques to enhance security:
- Blockchain as a Decentralized PKI: By using the deeID blockchain contract to store domain public keys, the mobile app can independently verify a website's identity without relying on the PC's potentially compromised certificate store.
- Standardized Messaging: The system introduces a standard for form requests (e.g.,
card_info,pers_info). This reduces communication overhead; the server only needs to send a "type" tag that the mobile app understands and renders locally. - Phishing Mitigation: Requiring manual domain entry in the app ensures that even if a malicious site generates a "valid-looking" QR code, the app will detect the discrepancy between the user's intent and the signed data.
Implementation and Results
The authors developed a proof-of-concept implementation using the Flask web framework for the server and an extension of the deeID application for mobile functionalities. The system successfully demonstrated the ability to handle both standardized payment forms and custom forms (e.g., secret questions) using a simple JSON-based array of required fields.
Security analysis shows that FormL3SS effectively circumvents attacks like the British Airways breach. Because sensitive information is never entered into the browser's HTML fields, malicious scripts have no data to "grab." Furthermore, the integration with deeID allows for "one-tap" form filling, potentially improving user experience over manual typing on a PC.
Conclusion and Future Work
While FormL3SS provides robust protection, it introduces some user friction by requiring a second device. It is most suitable for high-value transactions or security-conscious users. Future work includes refining the messaging standard, implementing more robust end-to-end encryption for the phone-to-server transmission, and encouraging broader adoption of the FormL3SS/deeID standard by web service providers.
Summary updated