Protecting Against Untrusted Relays: An Information Self-encrypted Approach

Hao Niu, Yao Sun, Kaoru SezakiarXiv 2017 · arXiv

Introduction

Wireless communication often relies on intermediate relay nodes to extend coverage and overcome signal fading. However, a significant security challenge arises when these relays are "honest-but-curious." While they fulfill their service-level obligation to forward data, they may also attempt to intercept the information they handle. Traditional Physical Layer Security (PLS) methods, which rely on the "secrecy capacity" difference between legitimate and eavesdropping channels, often fail if a relay possesses a superior channel to the destination.

This paper proposes a lightweight "information self-encryption" scheme designed to secure communications even in the presence of collusive, untrusted relays. By shifting the security focus from channel capacity to packet accumulation rates, the authors demonstrate a robust defense mechanism with minimal computational overhead.

System Model and Coding Scheme

The proposed framework considers a source (S) transmitting data to a destination (D) via a cluster of untrusted relays (R).

Figure 1: System model featuring a source, a cluster of untrusted relays, and a destination.

The core of the defense is a novel linear coding approach. For a block of $N$ original packets, the source generates $N$ processed packets. Each processed packet $P_n$ is constructed as the bit-wise XOR sum of all original packets except the $n$-th one. This creates an "all-or-nothing" property: a receiver must accumulate at least $N-1$ processed packets to recover any information about the original data. This scheme maintains $O(N)$ complexity, making it significantly more efficient than traditional high-level cryptographic algorithms.

Protocol Integration and Destination-Based Jamming

The effectiveness of self-encryption is evaluated across several relaying protocols:

  • Direct Transmission (DT): Communication without relay assistance.
  • Decode-and-Forward (DF) and Amplify-and-Forward (AF): Standard relaying where nodes decode or amplify signals before re-transmission.
  • Destination-Based Jamming (DBJ): A strategic approach where the destination node transmits artificial noise while the source sends data. The destination can cancel its own noise to decode the source's signal, but the relays are left with a degraded signal.

The research highlights that while self-encryption provides security for single-relay scenarios, its effectiveness diminishes as the number of relays ($K$) increases due to diversity gains for the eavesdroppers. The "silver bullet" is the combination of self-encryption with DBJ, which suppresses the relays' ability to accumulate packets effectively.

Key Results: Exponential Security

The primary metric for success is the "intercept probability"—the likelihood that an untrusted relay successfully decodes the message.

Figure 2: Intercept probability versus the number of packets (N) for the Destination-Based Jamming (DBJ) scheme across different relay counts (K).

As shown in Figure 2, the intercept probability decreases exponentially as the number of packets ($N$) in the self-encryption block increases. This exponential decay holds true even as the number of relays ($K$) grows, provided that DBJ is employed. For instance, increasing $N$ from 2 to 10 can reduce the intercept probability by several orders of magnitude. This demonstrates that security can be "scaled up" simply by increasing the buffer size of the self-encryption scheme.

Conclusion

Information self-encryption offers a promising, low-complexity path toward securing wireless networks against internal threats. By leveraging the synergy between XOR-based coding and destination-based jamming, the scheme ensures that untrusted relays cannot accumulate enough information to breach data privacy. Future work may involve integrating this coding with adaptive power allocation and beamforming to further enhance the security gap between legitimate and untrusted nodes.

Summary updated

Abstract

The reliability and transmission distance are generally limited for the wireless communications due to the severe channel fading. As an effective way to resist the channel fading, cooperative relaying is usually adopted in wireless networks where neighbouring nodes act as relays to help the transmission between the source and the destination. Most research works simply regard these cooperative nodes trustworthy, which may be not practical in some cases especially when transmitting confidential information. In this paper, we consider the issue of untrusted relays in cooperative communications and propose an information self-encrypted approach to protect against these relays. Specifically, the original packets of the information are used to encrypt each other as the secret keys such that the information cannot be recovered before all of the encrypted packets have been received. The information is intercepted only when the relays obtain all of these encrypted packets. It is proved that the intercept probability is reduced to zero exponentially with the number of the original packets. However, the security performance is still not satisfactory for a large number of relays. Therefore, the combination of destination-based jamming is further adopted to confuse the relays, which makes the security performance acceptable even for a large number of relays. Finally, the simulation results are provided to confirm the theoretical analysis and the superiority of the proposed scheme.
BibTeX
@misc{niu2017protecting,
  author = {Hao Niu and Yao Sun and Kaoru Sezaki},
  title = {{Protecting Against Untrusted Relays: An Information Self-encrypted Approach}},
  year = {2017},
  eprint = {1705.06477},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.06477},
}
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