Privacy-preserving management of transactions' receipts for mobile environments

Federica Paci, Ning Shang, Sam Kerr, Kevin Steuer, Jungha Woo, Elisa Bertino2009 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel privacy-preserving system for managing electronic transaction receipts on mobile devices. It leverages cryptographic techniques like Pedersen commitments and Zero-Knowledge Proofs to allow users to prove they meet certain transaction criteria without revealing sensitive personal data, enhancing security in mobile commerce.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Mobile devices are increasingly used for transactions, storing valuable digital receipts. However, these receipts are vulnerable to various attacks, including device loss/theft, network interception (Wi-Fi, 3G, Bluetooth), and malware. This exposure of transaction details poses significant privacy risks. Furthermore, service providers need a way to verify user eligibility for benefits (like discounts) based on past transactions without compromising user privacy. Existing solutions often lack robust privacy guarantees or are overly complex for mobile environments.

Methods

The proposed approach centers around a privacy-preserving protocol for managing transaction receipts. Key cryptographic components include:

  • Pedersen Commitments: Used to commit to transaction attributes (like buyer, seller, price) without revealing their actual values. This allows for integrity checks and later proofs.
  • Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (ZKPK): Specifically, a Schnorr-based protocol is used to prove ownership of a transaction receipt by demonstrating knowledge of how to open a commitment (specifically for the BUYER attribute) without revealing the buyer's identity.
  • Oblivious Commitment-Based Envelope (OCBE) Protocols: These protocols enable a service provider (sender) to enforce access control policies based on transaction attributes without learning the user's (receiver) actual attribute values. The paper details EQ-OCBE (for equality predicates) and GE-OCBE (for greater-than predicates), and mentions extensions for other comparison operators.
  • Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme: To protect the random secret r used in Pedersen commitments on mobile devices, it's split into shares and distributed across different secure locations (internal memory, external memory, secure element, PC). This ensures that reconstructing r requires a certain number of shares, enhancing security against device compromise.

The overall protocol involves four phases: integrity verification of receipt attributes, secret sharing reconstruction on the mobile phone, proof of receipt ownership, and verification of conditions on receipts using OCBE.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Privacy-by-Design for Mobile Receipts: The core idea is to shift from storing raw transaction data to using cryptographic commitments, enabling verification without direct disclosure. This is crucial for mobile environments where data is highly vulnerable.
  • Layered Security for Secrets: Using Shamir's Secret Sharing to protect the random secret r adds a significant layer of security. Distributing shares across different storage locations on the device and even externally makes it much harder for an attacker to compromise the secret.
  • Flexible Policy Enforcement: OCBE protocols allow service providers to define granular policies (e.g., "spent more than $X," "bought from Y") and verify them against user receipts without learning sensitive details about the transaction itself.
  • Bridging ZKPK and OCBE: The paper effectively combines ZKPK for proving identity/ownership and OCBE for proving attribute satisfaction, creating a comprehensive privacy-preserving framework.

Key Results

The paper presents an implementation on Nokia 6131 NFC mobile phones and evaluates its performance.

  • Receipt Ownership Verification: The MIDLet (mobile application) takes an average of 0.042 seconds, and the service provider application takes 0.0311 seconds for this phase.
  • Verification of Conditions:
    • For equality conditions (using EQ-OCBE), the MIDLet takes 1.126 seconds, and the service provider takes 0.0409 seconds (envelope creation).
  • For inequality conditions (using GE-OCBE), the MIDLet takes 11.963 seconds (total execution time), and the service provider takes 0.165 seconds (envelope creation) when l=5.
  • The execution time for inequality conditions increases linearly with the parameter l (which determines the number of commitments in the GE-OCBE protocol), highlighting a performance bottleneck for complex conditions.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Performance of Inequality Conditions: The paper acknowledges that verifying inequality conditions is computationally more expensive than equality conditions, particularly due to the parameter l. Future work includes testing on more capable phones (Nokia 6212 NFC with JSR-177 APIs) and optimizing the implementation.
  • Secret Sharing Implementation: The secret sharing phase implementation was under development at the time of writing.
  • Completeness of OCBE: The verification module currently supports EQ-OCBE and GE-OCBE. Future work aims to support other comparison predicates like <, >, and ≠.
  • PKI Requirements: While the protocol aims to reduce PKI requirements for users, service providers still need PKI certificates for signing receipts.

Summary updated

Abstract

Users increasingly use their mobile devices for electronic transactions to store related information, such as digital receipts. However, such information can be target of several attacks. There are some security issues related to M-commerce: the loss or theft of mobile devices results in a exposure of transaction information; transaction receipts that are send over WI-FI or 3G networks can be easily intercepted; transaction receipts can also be captured via Bluetooth connections without the user's consent; and mobile viruses, worms and Trojan horses can access the transaction information stored on mobile devices if this information is not protected by passwords or PIN numbers. Therefore, assuring privacy and security of transactions' information, as well as of any sensitive information stored on mobile devices is crucial. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving approach to manage electronic transaction receipts on mobile devices. The approach is based on the notion of transaction receipts issued by service providers upon a successful transaction and combines Pedersen commitment and Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (ZKPK) techniques and Oblivious Commitment-Based Envelope (OCBE) protocols. We have developed a version of such protocol for Near Field Communication (NFC) enabled cellular phones.
BibTeX
@misc{paci2009privacy,
  author = {Federica Paci and Ning Shang and Sam Kerr and Kevin Steuer and Jungha Woo and Elisa Bertino},
  title = {{Privacy-preserving management of transactions' receipts for mobile environments}},
  year = {2009},
  doi = {10.1145/1527017.1527027},
}
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