Abstract
The widespread use of browser extensions has introduced significant privacy leakage risks. While previous research focused on detecting private data transmission, the core challenge lies in determining the "rationality" of such transmissions—whether the data sent is necessary for the extension's function. This paper introduces a "Privacy Model" (PM) framework that establishes baseline permissions for sensitive information and authorized servers for each extension. By analyzing 34,095 extensions from three major Chinese browsers, we identified 2,983 instances of privacy leakage. Our results provide a comprehensive analysis of leakage types, malicious domains, and detection accuracy, offering a robust tool for securing the browser extension ecosystem.
Introduction
Browser extensions offer enhanced functionality but often demand broad permissions, creating a significant privacy surface. Traditional detection methods often flag any transmission of sensitive data as a leak. However, this approach fails to account for legitimate data needs—for instance, a mapping tool requires location data, whereas a simple game does not.
This research addresses the "rationality" problem by focusing on the under-studied Chinese browser market, specifically the QQ and 360 browsers. These platforms present unique challenges due to language barriers and distinct app store ecosystems. The goal is to distinguish between "Reasonable Transmission" and "Abnormal Transmission" by modeling the expected behavior of extensions based on their functional categories.
Methodology
The proposed dynamic detection framework moves beyond passive traffic monitoring to evaluate the intent and necessity of data transmissions.
The Detection Workflow
The framework operates through a multi-stage pipeline:
- Extension Classification: Using Natural Language Processing (jieba) and TF-IDF algorithms, extensions are categorized into 15 functional groups (e.g., Shopping Assistant, Crawler, Fun).
- Privacy Model (PM) Construction: For each extension, a model is built defining the sensitive data types permitted and the authorized destination servers.
- Dynamic Detection: The researchers modified the Chromium source code to capture plaintext network traffic directly from internal browser functions, bypassing protections like HSTS.
- Traffic Analysis: A recursive decoder handles Base64 and XOR encryption to uncover hidden URLs or system metadata.
Data and Environment
The study utilized a dataset of 34,095 extensions collected between November 2019 and August 2020. To trigger extension behaviors, the framework visited 10 representative Chinese websites, including Baidu, Taobao, and Weibo, alongside a custom login page designed to detect credential theft.
The Privacy Model and Leakage Judgment
The core of the framework is the interaction between captured network traffic and the established Privacy Model.
The system identifies five specific leakage types: History (HL), Location (LL), Browser (BL), OS (OL), and Network address (NL). By mapping these types to functional categories, the system can flag an extension even if it has technical permission to access data, provided that data is irrelevant to its purpose.
Results and Analysis
The framework identified 2,983 leaking extensions. Key findings include:
- High Precision: The system achieved nearly 100% precision and recall for Location, OS, and Network address leakage. History leakage recall was slightly lower (93-95%) due to sophisticated custom encryption.
- Category Trends: "Enhancement" extensions were the most frequent leakers by volume (62.6%), while "Web page history" and "Crawler" categories had the highest internal percentage of malicious actors.
- Fingerprinting: Most leaks involved system metadata (screen resolution, OS version) used for user fingerprinting rather than direct password theft.
- Malicious Infrastructure: Several domains, such as
starwebnet.comanddatarating.com, were identified as central hubs for collecting data from hundreds of disparate extensions.
Conclusion
The "Privacy Model" approach effectively bridges the gap between technical detection and behavioral rationality. The study reveals a significant "contaminated library" effect, where developers likely reuse code containing tracking bugs across different ecosystems. Future work will focus on automating rationality judgments using machine learning and advocating for stricter privacy policy mandates in browser extension stores.
Summary updated