Priming Children’s Use of Intentions in Moral Judgement with Metacognitive Training

Katarina Gvozdic, Sylvain Moutier, Emmanuel Dupoux, Marine BuonFrontiers in Psychology 2016 · DOI

TL;DR

This study reveals that young children (5-8 years old) struggle to prioritize intentions over outcomes when judging accidental harm, a hallmark of mature moral reasoning. Crucially, a specific metacognitive training that includes "executive alarms" to inhibit automatic, outcome-focused responses significantly improves their ability to weigh intentions, suggesting inhibitory control is key to this developmental shift.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Moral judgment is complex, involving both intuitive, emotional responses and more deliberate, reasoned processes. While adults typically weigh an agent's intention heavily, even when accidental harm occurs, young children (especially those under 8-9) tend to focus more on the negative outcome. This developmental gap in prioritizing intentions over consequences in accidental harm scenarios is a significant puzzle in understanding moral development. The authors aim to pinpoint the cognitive mechanisms underlying this lag, specifically investigating whether it's due to a lack of understanding intentions or an inability to inhibit the more immediate, outcome-based emotional reactions.

Methods

The researchers employed a novel metacognitive training paradigm adapted from studies on logical reasoning. Children aged 5-8 years were first assessed on their moral judgments using video stimuli depicting different scenarios: coincidence, accidental harm, and aggression. These scenarios were carefully designed to isolate the influence of causal role versus intention. Following this pre-test, children were randomly assigned to one of three training groups:

  1. Control Reinforcement (CR): Received general instructions about considering different elements of the story.
  2. Mentalising Reinforcement (MR): Focused on reinforcing children's ability to consider the protagonist's mental states and intentions.
  3. Mentalising and Inhibitory Reinforcement (MIR): Included the MR components plus "executive alarms" designed to warn children against relying solely on the immediate negative outcome and to encourage them to inhibit this automatic response.

After the training, children underwent a post-test using the same stimuli to measure any changes in their moral judgments.

Datasets

The study utilized newly created, non-verbal cartoon videos depicting scenarios of coincidence, accidental harm, and aggression. These videos were designed to systematically vary either the protagonist's causal role or their intention to harm. The stimuli were validated in a pilot study with adult participants. No pre-existing datasets were used for training or evaluation.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Inhibition is Key for Intent-Based Judgment: The most striking finding is that simply being reminded of intentions (MR training) wasn't enough. Children needed explicit "executive alarms" (MIR training) to inhibit their immediate, outcome-focused emotional reactions to learn to prioritize intentions. This highlights that the developmental lag isn't necessarily a lack of understanding intentions, but an inability to suppress the more automatic, outcome-driven response.
  • Dual-Process Model in Action: The results strongly support dual-process models of moral judgment, suggesting that both intuitive/emotional and controlled/reasoning systems are at play. For young children, the intuitive system, heavily influenced by outcomes, often dominates unless inhibitory control is actively engaged.
  • Accidental Harm is the Crucial Hurdle: While children showed some sensitivity to intentions across scenarios, their difficulty in judging accidental harm leniently was particularly pronounced. This suggests that the conflict between a negative outcome and a neutral intention is the most challenging aspect for their developing moral reasoning.
  • Metacognition as a Lever: The study demonstrates that targeted metacognitive training, specifically incorporating inhibitory components, can effectively prime children to adopt more mature moral reasoning strategies. This suggests that teaching children how to think about their thinking can have a tangible impact on their moral judgments.

Key Results

  • Developmental Gap: In the pre-test, children (5-8 years) showed a tendency to weigh protagonists' causal roles more heavily than their intentions, whereas adults preferentially weighted intentions.
  • MIR Training Efficacy: Only the MIR training group showed a significant shift in moral judgment after the intervention. Specifically, these children moved from giving equal weight to causal roles and intentions (pre-test) to preferentially weighing intentions (post-test) in the intentional contrast.
  • No Effect for CR or MR: The control (CR) and mentalising-only (MR) training groups did not show significant changes in their moral judgments, indicating that the inhibitory component was crucial.
  • Adult-like Judgment Achieved: After MIR training, children's moral judgments on the intentional contrast became more aligned with adult patterns, suggesting they could integrate intention information more effectively.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Short-Term Effects: The study measured the immediate impact of the training. Future research should investigate the long-term retention and generalization of these learned strategies.
  • Task Specificity: The training and testing were both focused on accidental harm scenarios. Further studies are needed to explore whether this inhibitory training generalizes to other types of moral dilemmas or even non-moral reasoning tasks (far transfer).
  • Pure Inhibition vs. Metacognition: The study combined inhibitory alerts with mentalizing components. Future work could explore whether a "pure" inhibitory training, without explicit mentalizing instructions, would also be effective, and to what degree.
  • Generalizability of Inhibition: The authors suggest investigating the degree to which inhibitory control in this context is domain-specific or general. This would involve testing the impact of similar training on other cognitive tasks.
  • Rehabilitation Potential: The findings have implications for interventions with children exhibiting behavioral problems, particularly those with hostile attribution biases, suggesting that improving inhibitory control could be a target for therapeutic approaches.

Summary updated

Abstract

Typically, adults give a primary role to the agent's intention to harm when performing a moral judgment of accidental harm. By contrast, children often focus on outcomes, underestimating the actor's mental states when judging someone for his action, and rely on what we suppose to be intuitive and emotional processes. The present study explored the processes involved in the development of the capacity to integrate agents' intentions into their moral judgment of accidental harm in 5 to 8-year-old children. This was done by the use of different metacognitive trainings reinforcing different abilities involved in moral judgments (mentalising abilities, executive abilities, or no reinforcement), similar to a paradigm previously used in the field of deductive logic. Children's moral judgments were gathered before and after the training with non-verbal cartoons depicting agents whose actions differed only based on their causal role or their intention to harm. We demonstrated that a metacognitive training could induce an important shift in children's moral abilities, showing that only children who were explicitly instructed to "not focus too much" on the consequences of accidental harm, preferentially weighted the agents' intentions in their moral judgments. Our findings confirm that children between the ages of 5 and 8 are sensitive to the intention of agents, however, at that age, this ability is insufficient in order to give a "mature" moral judgment. Our experiment is the first that suggests the critical role of inhibitory resources in processing accidental harm.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{gvozdic2016priming,
  author = {Katarina Gvozdic and Sylvain Moutier and Emmanuel Dupoux and Marine Buon},
  title = {{Priming Children’s Use of Intentions in Moral Judgement with Metacognitive Training}},
  booktitle = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00190},
}
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