Preparing for Kyber in Securing Intelligent Transportation Systems Communications: A Case Study on Fault-Enabled Chosen-Ciphertext Attack

Kaiyuan Zhang, M. Sabbir Salek, Antian Wang, Mizanur Rahman, Mashrur Chowdhury, Yingjie LaoarXiv 2025 · arXiv · OpenReview

Abstract

Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) are characterized by wired or wireless communication among different entities, such as vehicles, roadside infrastructure, and traffic management infrastructure. These communications demand different levels of security, depending on how sensitive the data is. The national ITS reference architecture (ARC-IT) defines three security levels, i.e., high, moderate, and low-security levels, based on the different security requirements of ITS applications. In this study, we present a generalized approach to secure ITS communications using a standardized key encapsulation mechanism, known as Kyber, designed for post-quantum cryptography (PQC). We modified the encryption and decryption systems for ITS communications while mapping the security levels of ITS applications to the three versions of Kyber, i.e., Kyber-512, Kyber-768, and Kyber-1024. Then, we conducted a case study using a benchmark fault-enabled chosen-ciphertext attack to evaluate the security provided by the different Kyber versions. Our analyses show that higher security levels increase the time required for a successful attack, with Kyber-512 being breached in 183 seconds, Kyber-768 in 337 seconds, and Kyber-1024 in 615 seconds. The relationships among the different Kyber versions, and the respective attack requirements and performances underscore the ITS communication security Kyber could provide in the PQC era.

Introduction

As we move toward a world of connected vehicles, current encryption standards face a "quantum apocalypse." Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) rely on Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication to manage everything from traffic flow to safety-critical collision avoidance. While the cryptographic community has rallied around Kyber—a lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM)—as a quantum-resistant solution, theoretical mathematical security does not guarantee physical implementation security. This paper addresses the gap between theoretical security and physical hardware resilience, specifically investigating how an adversary could bypass Kyber’s defenses using hardware-level fault attacks.

Methodology

The researchers proposed a generalized approach to securing ITS by mapping ARC-IT security levels to the three versions of Kyber: Low Security to Kyber-512, Moderate Security to Kyber-768, and High Security to Kyber-1024. To evaluate these, they implemented a fault-enabled Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA).

Fault-Enabled Chosen-Ciphertext Attack

The attack targets the decapsulation process by exploiting the re-encryption check used to ensure ciphertext integrity. The workflow, illustrated in Figure 1, involves:

  1. Manipulating Ciphertext: The attacker flips a specific bit in a valid ciphertext.
  2. Inducing a Fault: During decryption, a hardware glitch (such as a clock or voltage spike) is used to skip the instruction that would normally detect the manipulation.
  3. Belief Propagation: By observing whether the system successfully decrypts or fails under these "glitched" conditions, the attacker generates a system of linear inequalities. A statistical belief propagation algorithm is then used to iteratively recover the secret key.
Workflow of the fault-enabled chosen-ciphertext attack on Kyber.

The attack specifically targets the comparison step in the decapsulation algorithm (shown in Figure 2), where the original ciphertext is compared against a re-encrypted version of the decrypted message to detect tampering.

Kyber decapsulation algorithm showing the re-encryption and comparison steps.

Experimental Setup and Data

The study utilized real-world data from the Tampa Hillsborough Expressway Authority (THEA) Connected Vehicle Pilot program. Basic Safety Messages (BSM)—including latitude, longitude, speed, and heading—served as the plaintext for encryption tests. The attacks were executed on an Intel Xeon Gold 6346 setup, testing the full NIST-standardized Kyber versions.

Results and Discussion

The authors successfully recovered secret keys for all three versions of Kyber. The success rate for these attacks was remarkably high, often exceeding 90-99% once the threshold number of inequalities was met.

  • Kyber-512: Breached in 183 seconds using 7,000 inequalities.
  • Kyber-768: Breached in 337 seconds using 8,000 inequalities.
  • Kyber-1024: Breached in 615 seconds using 11,000 inequalities.

An interesting "complexity paradox" was observed: while more inequalities initially help narrow down the secret key, exceeding a certain threshold actually increases computation time because the system becomes bogged down by redundant data. Furthermore, attack time instabilities were observed for Kyber-512, 768, and 1024 under 5,000, 6,000, and 8,000 inequalities, respectively.

Conclusion

This study provides a practical roadmap for ITS engineers, demonstrating that while Kyber-1024 triples the time an attacker needs to breach the system compared to Kyber-512, it remains vulnerable to physical attacks. The findings reinforce a critical cybersecurity truth: a "quantum-secure" algorithm can still be defeated by simple hardware glitches if the implementation is not hardened with countermeasures like shuffling or boolean masking. Future research will evaluate Kyber's resilience against multi-model attacks combining fault injection with power analysis.

Summary updated

Abstract

Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) are characterized by wired or wireless communication among different entities, such as vehicles, roadside infrastructure, and traffic management infrastructure. These communications demand different levels of security, depending on how sensitive the data is. The national ITS reference architecture (ARC-IT) defines three security levels, i.e., high, moderate, and low-security levels, based on the different security requirements of ITS applications. In this study, we present a generalized approach to secure ITS communications using a standardized key encapsulation mechanism, known as Kyber, designed for post-quantum cryptography (PQC). We modified the encryption and decryption systems for ITS communications while mapping the security levels of ITS applications to the three versions of Kyber, i.e., Kyber-512, Kyber-768, and Kyber-1024. Then, we conducted a case study using a benchmark fault-enabled chosen-ciphertext attack to evaluate the security provided by the different Kyber versions. The encryption and decryption times observed for different Kyber security levels and the total number of iterations required to recover the secret key using the chosen-ciphertext attack are presented. Our analyses show that higher security levels increase the time required for a successful attack, with Kyber-512 being breached in 183 seconds, Kyber-768 in 337 seconds, and Kyber-1024 in 615 seconds. In addition, attack time instabilities are observed for Kyber-512, 768, and 1024 under 5,000, 6,000, and 8,000 inequalities, respectively. The relationships among the different Kyber versions, and the respective attack requirements and performances underscore the ITS communication security Kyber could provide in the PQC era.
BibTeX
@misc{zhang2025preparing,
  author = {Kaiyuan Zhang and M. Sabbir Salek and Antian Wang and Mizanur Rahman and Mashrur Chowdhury and Yingjie Lao},
  title = {{Preparing for Kyber in Securing Intelligent Transportation Systems Communications: A Case Study on Fault-Enabled Chosen-Ciphertext Attack}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2502.01848},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.01848},
}
Figure