Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness

Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim, Ron Lavi, Moshe TennenholtzThe B E Journal of Theoretical Economics 2010 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel "Generalized Position Auction" that effectively incorporates private budget constraints into online advertising auctions, a crucial element missing in prior models. The proposed auction guarantees Pareto-efficient and envy-free outcomes in equilibrium and is shown to be the unique mechanism achieving these properties under reasonable assumptions, even when only budgets are private.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Online advertising platforms like Google and Yahoo! generate substantial revenue through position auctions, where advertisers bid for placement on search results pages. While existing theoretical models have successfully analyzed these auctions, they largely ignore a critical real-world constraint: bidders' budgets. In reality, advertisers have a maximum amount they are willing to spend, which significantly impacts their bidding behavior and the auction's outcome. Previous attempts to incorporate budgets often led to complex issues, breaking desirable properties like efficiency and fairness. This paper aims to bridge this gap by designing an auction mechanism that is both theoretically sound and practically relevant, accommodating private values and private budget constraints while preserving desirable economic properties.

Methods

The authors propose a "Generalized Position Auction" that is a careful modification of the Generalized English Auction. Instead of a single ascending price trajectory, their mechanism employs k concurrent price trajectories, one for each slot. This allows for a more nuanced bidding process where players can dynamically adjust their bids based on their budget constraints and the prices of multiple slots simultaneously. The mechanism is described in both an indirect (bidding prices) and a direct (reporting types) version. The core of their analysis relies on proving the existence of an ex-post equilibrium, demonstrating that the proposed auction achieves Pareto-efficiency and envy-freeness, and establishing a strong uniqueness result: any other mechanism satisfying these properties and not making positive transfers must yield the same outcome.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical evaluation on datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Budgets Matter: The paper convincingly demonstrates that simply extending existing auction models to include budgets is insufficient. Budgets fundamentally alter the strategic landscape, breaking the equilibrium properties of prior mechanisms.
  • Concurrent Price Trajectories: The novel approach of using multiple, concurrently ascending price trajectories is key to handling budget constraints. This allows for a more dynamic and realistic bidding process.
  • Uniqueness with Private Budgets: A significant finding is that the proposed mechanism is unique in achieving Pareto-efficiency and envy-freeness, even when only budgets are private information. This suggests that the budget constraint, rather than private values, is the primary driver of this uniqueness.
  • Robustness to Assumptions: The uniqueness result holds even when values are fixed and known, highlighting the power of the budget constraint in shaping auction outcomes.

Key Results

  • The paper designs a "Generalized Position Auction" that is a careful modification of the Generalized English Auction to accommodate private values and private budget constraints.
  • This auction guarantees a unique ex-post equilibrium outcome that is both Pareto-efficient and envy-free.
  • A strong uniqueness result is proven: any other position auction satisfying these properties and not making positive transfers must yield the same outcome as the proposed mechanism, even if only budgets are private.
  • The mechanism is shown to be truthful in ex-post equilibrium.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Distinct Budgets Assumption: The uniqueness result holds for distinct budgets. The paper briefly discusses how to handle identical budgets in a discrete type space by introducing infinitesimal differences, but this is a technicality. The authors acknowledge that in the case of identical budgets, the mechanism might be canceled to avoid infeasible outcomes.
  • Tie-breaking: The paper notes that the uniqueness result relies on the absence of ties, which is ensured by assuming distinct types. The tie-breaking rules are designed to maintain ex-post individual rationality.
  • Future Work: The paper suggests that the analysis could be extended to more complex scenarios, such as considering different click-through rate models or exploring the implications of budgets in other auction settings. The authors also highlight the potential for further research into the interaction between budgets and mechanism design.

Summary updated

Abstract

We design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget constraints. Our mechanism is a careful modification of the Generalized English Auction of Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007). By enabling multiple price trajectories that ascent concurrently we are able to retrieve all the desired properties of the Generalized English Auction, that was not originally designed for players with budgets. In particular, the ex-post equilibrium outcome of our auction is Pareto-efficient and envy-free. Moreover, we show that any other position auction that satisfies these properties and does not make positive transfers must obtain in ex-post equilibrium the same outcome of our mechanism, for every tuple of distinct types. This uniqueness result holds even if the players' values are fixed and known to the seller, and only the budgets are private.
BibTeX
@article{ashlagi2010position,
  author = {Itai Ashlagi and Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim and Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  title = {{Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness}},
  journal = {The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics},
  year = {2010},
  doi = {10.2202/1935-1704.1648},
}
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