PLC Systems Under the Presence of a Malicious Wireless Communication Device: Physical Layer Security Analyses

Ândrei Camponogara, H. Vincent Poor, Moisés Vidal RibeiroIEEE Syst. J 2020 · DOI

Abstract

This article investigates the physical layer security (PLS) of broadband in-home power line communication (PLC) systems vulnerable to wireless eavesdropping. Using real-world channel and noise data, the study quantifies the security risks when unshielded power cables act as unintentional antennas. Results indicate significant vulnerability, particularly when the eavesdropper is close to the transmitter, suggesting a need for improved PLC system designs or shielded infrastructure.

The Problem: Unintentional Antennas

Power Line Communication (PLC) leverages existing electrical wiring for high-speed data transfer. However, most residential grids utilize unshielded cables. These cables were never intended for high-frequency data and consequently act as unintentional antennas, radiating electromagnetic fields that carry sensitive information.

Physical setup showing Alice and Bob communicating over power lines while Eve eavesdrops wirelessly.

This creates a unique security challenge: Physical Layer Security (PLS). A malicious wireless device (Eve) can intercept these signals without any physical connection to the network. This "hybrid wiretap channel" model allows an eavesdropper to remain completely passive and undetectable by traditional network security measures.

Methodology and Real-World Data

The researchers modeled the system as a hybrid wiretap channel consisting of a main wired link (Alice to Bob) and a wireless leakage link (Alice to Eve). To ensure practical relevance, the study utilized a dataset of channel frequency responses (CFR) and additive noise measurements from residential facilities in Brazil, covering the 1.7 MHz to 86 MHz range.

Two primary metrics were evaluated:

  1. Achievable Secrecy Rate ($R_s$): The maximum rate of secure information transfer.
  2. Secrecy Outage Probability ($P_s$): The likelihood that secure communication falls below a target threshold.

The study also compared Uniform Allocation (UA) and Optimal Allocation (OA) (water-filling) strategies to see if sophisticated power management could mitigate the leakage.

Key Results: Quantifying the Risk

The analysis revealed that distance is the most critical factor. In "Short-Path" (SP) scenarios where Eve is close to the transmitter and Bob is further away, the system's security is severely compromised.

Ergodic achievable secrecy rate vs. transmission power for different channel conditions.

As shown in the results, the achievable secrecy rate drops significantly in high-leakage environments (the SP cases). In many scenarios, the secrecy outage probability reached nearly 1.0, meaning secure communication at the physical layer was virtually impossible regardless of the transmission power ($P_T$). Interestingly, while optimal power allocation improves general efficiency, it provides minimal protection against a nearby eavesdropper in this hybrid context.

Conclusion and Future Directions

The findings underscore a fundamental vulnerability in broadband in-home PLC systems. Because the leakage is a physical property of the infrastructure, software-level encryption may not be sufficient for all privacy needs.

Future work may explore active countermeasures such as Artificial Noise (AN) injection to jam potential eavesdroppers. However, the immediate takeaway is clear: the industry must reconsider the use of unshielded cables or innovate new physical layer protocols to ensure robust privacy in PLC-enabled homes.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{camponogara2020plc,
  author = {Ândrei Camponogara and H. Vincent Poor and Moisés Vidal Ribeiro},
  title = {{PLC Systems Under the Presence of a Malicious Wireless Communication Device: Physical Layer Security Analyses}},
  journal = {IEEE Syst. J.},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.1109/jsyst.2020.2969044},
}
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