Ordinal Tax To Sustain a Digital Economy

Nate Dwyer, Sandro Claudio Lera, Alex PentlandarXiv 2019 · DOI · arXiv

Abstract

Recently, the French Senate approved a law that imposes a 3% tax on revenue generated from digital services by companies above a certain size. While there is a lot of political debate about economic consequences of this action, it is actually interesting to reverse the question: We consider the long-term implications of an economy with no such digital tax. More generally, we can think of digital services as a special case of products with low or zero cost of transportation. With basic economic models we show that a market with no transportation costs is prone to monopolization as minuscule, random differences in quality are rewarded disproportionally. We then propose a distance-based tax to counter-balance the tendencies of random centralisation. Unlike a tax that scales with physical (cardinal) distance, a ranked (ordinal) distance tax leverages the benefits of digitalization while maintaining a stable economy.

The Problem: The Vanishing Cost of Distance

Traditional economic models, such as Isard’s gravity model of trade, have long assumed that trade activity is inversely proportional to physical distance. However, the digital revolution has effectively "killed" distance. For digital goods like software and streaming, or physical goods supported by hyper-efficient logistics, the cost of reaching a customer is nearly zero regardless of geography.

This "vanishing distance" creates a dangerous economic instability. In a world with zero transportation costs, a firm that is only 1% more efficient than its rival doesn't just gain a marginal edge—it can capture a disproportionately massive share of the market profit. This leads to "random centralization," where monopolies form not because one company is vastly superior, but because tiny, random advantages are rewarded so heavily that competitors are driven out of business before they can innovate.

Modeling the Digital Market

To study this phenomenon, the authors employed a game-theoretic simulation. They modeled a geography consisting of two firms and 12 buyers placed on a one-dimensional "ring" (a circle of length $\ell=1$) with periodic boundary conditions. This setup ensures that no participant is disadvantaged by being "at the edge" of the map.

The circular market model used for simulation, featuring two firms and twelve buyer locations.

The simulation uses a two-stage Nash equilibrium model where firms first decide on production quantity and then set prices based on buyer locations and tax implications. The study compared three distinct scenarios:

  1. No Tax: Representing zero transportation or transaction costs.
  2. Cardinal Tax: A tax scaling with physical distance (similar to a carbon tax).
  3. Ordinal Tax (The Proposal): A tax based on rank. For any buyer, the closest firm has a distance rank of 0 (no tax), the second closest is rank 1, and so on.

Key Results and the Ordinal Solution

The simulations revealed that when transportation costs are removed entirely, the market becomes highly unstable. A firm with a marginal 1% cost advantage sees its profit difference jump to a staggering 33% compared to its rival. This excess profit creates a "death spiral" for competition, as the leader can reinvest to further undercut the rival.

While physical distance (cardinal) taxes can prevent these monopolies, they have a significant drawback: they punish "remote" buyers and suppress total market revenue.

Comparison of relative differences in profit and total revenue across various cost and tax scenarios.

The proposed ordinal tax offers a middle ground. By taxing based on rank rather than miles, the system preserves a "local" advantage regardless of physical distance. Key findings include:

  • Stability: The ordinal tax reigns in the profit imbalance caused by tiny cost differences, mirroring the stability of a physical economy.
  • Revenue Preservation: Unlike cardinal taxes, the ordinal tax maintains total market revenue at levels similar to a no-tax economy because the closest firm is always untaxed ($D=0$), regardless of its absolute distance.
  • Rewarding Merit: The system does not stifle true excellence. As shown in the results, a firm with a significant 20% cost advantage can still generate 50 times higher revenue than its peer, ensuring that genuine innovation is still rewarded.

Conclusion

The ordinal tax provides a framework to stabilize digital economies against random monopolization without sacrificing the benefits of globalization. While implementing a "distance rank" tax in a complex, multi-firm world presents practical challenges, it offers a theoretical path toward a fairer digital marketplace that filters out noise-based monopolies while continuing to reward true competitive advantages.

Summary updated

Abstract

Recently, the French Senate approved a law that imposes a 3% tax on revenue generated from digital services by companies above a certain size. While there is a lot of political debate about economic consequences of this action, it is actually interesting to reverse the question: We consider the long-term implications of an economy with no such digital tax. More generally, we can think of digital services as a special case of products with low or zero cost of transportation. With basic economic models we show that a market with no transportation costs is prone to monopolization as minuscule, random differences in quality are rewarded disproportionally. We then propose a distance-based tax to counter-balance the tendencies of random centralisation. Unlike a tax that scales with physical (cardinal) distance, a ranked (ordinal) distance tax leverages the benefits of digitalization while maintaining a stable economy.
BibTeX
@misc{dwyer2019ordinal,
  author = {Nate Dwyer and Sandro Claudio Lera and Alex Pentland},
  title = {{Ordinal Tax To Sustain a Digital Economy}},
  year = {2019},
  eprint = {1908.03287},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.03287},
}
Figure