Optimal Incentive Contracts under Agents’ Self-interested Behavior

Zeming ChenIndustrial 2013

Abstract

The optimal contract theory holds that the well-designed compensation contracts can help mitigate agency conflicts caused by the self-interested behavior of managers.In fact,agents can increase the personal utility not only by reducing the level of effort,but also by transferring corporate resources to their own expenditure.On the one hand,managers can abuse their power to appropriate company resources.In addition,managers can enjoy excessively in-office expense.Is agent’s self-interested behavior a self-incentived or purely opportunistic behavior? What is the effect of self-interested behavior on incentive contracts? Introducing agents’ self-interested behavior into the linear contract principal-agent framework,this study analyzes the effect of agents’ self-interested behavior on the optimal incentive contract design from the two perspectives of hidden income and perks. Firstly,this paper introduces agent’s hidden income behavior and the corresponding cost into the linear contract principal-agent framework.The analysis shows that the greater the real output transferred by the agent,the smaller the coefficient of pay performance sensibility is.When an agent has a self-interested motive,the level of effort will be higher than the normal level.With the help of numerical simulation,we find that if an agent has a self-interested motive,the coefficient of pay performance sensibility will be less than the normal level in the optimal incentive contracts.Thus,the incentive for an agent should be reduced.In addition,an agent with the hidden income behavior improves his/her own effort. Secondly,this paper introduces perks and corporate resource cost into the linear contract principal-agent framework.The analysis shows that when an agent enjoys excessive in-office expense he/she will improve efforts.The greater an agent enjoys in-office expense,the bigger the coefficient of pay performance sensibility is.So the incentive for an agent should be improved.With the help of numerical simulation,we find that if an agent enjoys excessive in-office expense he/she can improve effort.The greater an agent enjoys in-office expense,the bigger the coefficient of pay performance sensibility and his/her own effort is. It shows that the optimal incentive contracts provided by the principal depends on an agent’s self-interested behavior.In addition,agents’ self-interested behavior improves the level of their own effort to varying degrees.The findings of this study can help study the consequences of compensation incentive distortion in our current enterprises and compensation system reform in the future.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{chen2013optimal,
  author = {Zeming Chen},
  title = {{Optimal Incentive Contracts under Agents’ Self-interested Behavior}},
  booktitle = {Industrial},
  year = {2013},
}

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