Introduction
Traditional online advertising auctions, such as those operated by Google or Meta, typically treat Click-Through Rate (CTR) and Conversion Rate (CVR) as static parameters. In these systems, the platform's role is passive: it selects winners based on submitted bids and pre-calculated relevance scores. However, this approach ignores the platform's potential to actively influence user behavior.
This paper introduces a novel auction mechanism that integrates the Law of Demand into auction theory. By offering coupons to users, the platform can lower the effective price of products, thereby increasing the likelihood of clicks and conversions. The core challenge lies in jointly optimizing coupon values and ad placement to maximize platform revenue while maintaining advertiser incentives for truthful bidding.
Mechanism Design
The researchers developed a new class of mechanisms that incorporate a coupon function alongside standard allocation and payment rules. This framework ensures that the auction remains Incentive Compatible (IC) and Individually Rational (IR), meaning advertisers are best served by bidding their true valuations and are guaranteed not to lose money by participating.
The Modified Virtual Value
Building on Myerson’s classic auction theory, the authors defined a modified virtual value function. Unlike traditional virtual values that only consider advertiser bids and valuation distributions, this new function accounts for:
- The advertiser's bid.
- The direct cost of the coupon to the platform.
- The expected boost in CTR and CVR resulting from the coupon.
In an optimal setup, the platform offers a coupon where the marginal cost of increasing the coupon value exactly equals the marginal revenue gain from the increased conversion probability. To handle real-world "irregular" data distributions, the authors adapted the "ironing" technique to ensure the mechanism remains robust and truthful.
Experimental Evaluation
The mechanism was evaluated using both synthetic and industrial datasets:
- Synthetic Data: 100,000 simulated auctions with 8 advertisers using log-normal valuation distributions.
- Industrial Data: A dataset of 300,000 records from Kuaishou, a major short-form video platform. A neural network was trained on this data to predict CVR responses to varying coupon values.
Key Results
The proposed mechanism significantly outperformed standard Myerson auctions and baselines using constant (CCV) or randomized (RCV) coupon values. On synthetic data, the mechanism increased revenue by 19.76% and advertiser utility by 32.58%.
As shown in the table above, the results on industrial data were even more pronounced. Compared to the Myerson baseline, the coupon-based mechanism increased revenue by 28%, social welfare by 67%, and advertiser utility by a staggering 313%.
Discussion and Future Work
This research demonstrates a rare "win-win-win" scenario in auction design. By treating CTR and CVR as dynamic variables, the platform creates value for users (lower prices) and increases volume for advertisers, which ultimately drives higher platform revenue.
While the results are promising, the authors identify several areas for future research. The mechanism currently assumes the platform can perfectly predict the "demand curve" (how users respond to coupons). Additionally, extending the model from single-slot auctions to multi-slot scenarios and incorporating advertiser budget constraints remain important challenges for real-world deployment.
Summary updated