Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values

Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-CohenACM Trans. Economics and Comput 2016 · DOI · OpenReview

Abstract

We study interdependent value settings and extend several results from the well-studied independent private values model to these settings. For revenue-optimal mechanism design, we give conditions under which Myerson's virtual value-based mechanism remains optimal with interdependent values. One of these conditions is robustness of the truthfulness and individual rationality guarantees, in the sense that they are required to hold ex-post. We then consider an even more robust class of mechanisms called “prior independent” (“detail free”), and show that, by simply using one of the bidders to set a reserve price, it is possible to extract near-optimal revenue in an interdependent values setting. This shows that a considerable level of robustness is achievable for interdependent values in single-parameter environments.
BibTeX
@article{roughgarden2016optimal,
  author = {Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen},
  title = {{Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values}},
  journal = {ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.1145/2910577},
}

Loading related content...

Figure