On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: From discrete to continuous time
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Abstract
Motivated by recent path-breaking contributions in the theory of repeated games in continuous time, this paper presents a family of discrete-time games which provides a consistent discrete-time approximation of the continuous-time limit game. Using probabilistic arguments, we prove that continuous-time games can be defined as the limit of a sequence of discrete-time games. Our convergence analysis reveals various intricacies of continuous-time games. First, we demonstrate the importance of correlated strategies in continuous-time. Second, we attach a precise meaning to the statement that a sequence of discrete-time games can be used to approximate a continuous-time game.
BibTeX
@article{staudigl2016repeated,
author = {Mathias Staudigl and Jan-Henrik Steg},
title = {{On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: From discrete to continuous time}},
journal = {Journal of Dynamics and Games},
year = {2016},
doi = {10.3934/jdg.2017001},
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