TL;DR
This paper tackles the challenge of fairly dividing indivisible items among agents, specifically focusing on the "maximin share" (MMS) guarantee. The authors significantly improve existing theoretical bounds on when an MMS allocation is guaranteed to exist, showing that with more agents, a fair division is possible even with a larger number of items relative to the agent count.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
Fairly dividing indivisible items (like goods or chores) among multiple agents is a classic problem in economics and computer science. A desirable fairness criterion is the "maximin share" (MMS) guarantee. Informally, an MMS allocation ensures each agent receives items worth at least as much as they could guarantee themselves if they were to partition all items into bundles and pick one last. The problem is that such an allocation isn't always guaranteed to exist. Previous work established that MMS allocations are guaranteed if the number of items is at most $n+5$ (where $n$ is the number of agents). However, counterexamples show that this guarantee breaks down for slightly more items. This paper aims to shrink the gap between these upper bounds (where MMS is guaranteed) and lower bounds (where it's not).
Methods
The core of this paper is an inductive proof strategy that builds upon existing results and introduces new structural properties of "ordered instances" (where agents have the same preference order over items). Key techniques include:
- Valid Reductions: The authors leverage the concept of "valid reductions," which allow simplifying an instance by allocating some items to some agents while preserving the MMS guarantee for the remaining agents and items. Several known valid reduction techniques are used and extended.
- Domination Ordering: A novel partial ordering of item bundles is introduced. A bundle $B$ dominates $B'$ if $B$ contains items that are "better" than those in $B'$ in a way that holds regardless of specific agent valuations, especially in ordered instances. This ordering helps identify situations where bundles can be safely allocated.
- Structural Properties of MMS Partitions: The paper exploits specific structures guaranteed to exist in MMS partitions, particularly when the number of items is close to the number of agents ($m \approx n+c$). For instance, it's shown that for $m \le n+c$, the $n-c$ most valuable items for each agent often appear in bundles of size one in their MMS partitions.
- Inductive Proof: The main theorems are proven by induction on the constant $c$ (the excess number of items beyond $n$). Base cases are established using existing results (e.g., for $c < 5$ or $c=6$), and the inductive step uses the structural properties and valid reductions to show that if an MMS allocation exists for $c' < c$, it also exists for $c$.
Datasets
Not discussed in the paper.
Key Insights and Ideas
- The "sweet spot" for MMS existence: The paper demonstrates that as the number of agents ($n$) increases, the number of items ($m$) can also increase beyond $n+5$ while still guaranteeing an MMS allocation. This suggests that with more participants, fairness becomes more achievable.
- The power of ordered instances: The assumption of ordered instances (agents having the same preference ranking) is crucial. It allows for stronger structural guarantees about MMS partitions, which are then used to construct valid reductions.
- Domination as a tool for simplification: The introduction of the "domination ordering" for bundles is a novel way to formalize when one set of items is unambiguously better than another, facilitating the construction of valid reductions.
- Shrinking the gap: The paper successfully narrows the theoretical gap between the maximum number of items for which an MMS allocation is guaranteed and the minimum number for which it is not.
Key Results
- Theorem 1: For any integer $c > 0$, there exists a number of agents $n_c$ such that all instances with $n \ge n_c$ agents and at most $n+c$ items have an MMS allocation. The bound for $n_c$ is approximately $0.6597^c (c!)$. This significantly improves upon the previous $n+5$ bound.
- Theorem 2: For instances with $n \ne 3$ agents, an MMS allocation always exists if there are $m \le n+6$ items. This is a specific improvement for $c=6$.
- Theorem 3: A similar existence guarantee is proven for chores, with $n_c \le 0.7838^c (c!)$. The bounds are slightly worse for chores due to minor differences in reduction techniques.
Limitations and Future Work
- Exponential dependence on $c$: While the bounds are theoretically significant, the required number of agents $n_c$ grows exponentially with $c$. This means the results are most practically relevant for scenarios with a fixed, small number of agents or when $c$ is large relative to $n$.
- Chore bounds: The bounds for chores are slightly weaker than for goods, and the authors suggest further work could improve these.
- Improving bounds: The authors believe their domination-based approach can be further refined to obtain tighter bounds, potentially by better understanding the structure of MMS partitions and how quickly chains appear in the domination ordering.
- Real-world applicability: While the theoretical bounds are improved, translating these into practical algorithms for very large $c$ remains a challenge.
Summary updated