Obfuscating the Interconnects: Low-Cost and Resilient Full-Chip Layout Camouflaging

Satwik Patnaik, Mohammed Ashraf, Ozgur Sinanoglu, Johann KnechtelIEEE TCAD 2020 · DOI · OpenReview

Abstract

Layout camouflaging can protect the intellectual property of modern circuits. Most prior art, however, incurs excessive layout overheads and necessitates customization of active-device manufacturing processes, i.e., the front-end-of-line (FEOL). As a result, camouflaging has typically been applied selectively, which can ultimately undermine its resilience. Here, we propose a low-cost and generic scheme---full-chip camouflaging can be finally realized without reservations. Our scheme is based on obfuscating the interconnects, i.e., the back-end-of-line (BEOL), through design-time handling for real and dummy wires and vias. To that end, we implement custom, BEOL-centric obfuscation cells, and develop a CAD flow using industrial tools. Our scheme can be applied to any design and technology node without FEOL-level modifications. Considering its BEOL-centric nature, we advocate applying our scheme in conjunction with split manufacturing, to furthermore protect against untrusted fabs. We evaluate our scheme for various designs at the physical, DRC-clean layout level. Our scheme incurs a significantly lower cost than most of the prior art. Notably, for fully camouflaged layouts, we observe average power, performance, and area overheads of 24.96%, 19.06%, and 32.55%, respectively. We conduct a thorough security study addressing the threats (attacks) related to untrustworthy FEOL fabs (proximity attacks) and malicious end-users (SAT-based attacks). An empirical key finding is that only large-scale camouflaging schemes like ours are practically secure against powerful SAT-based attacks. Another key finding is that our scheme hinders both placement- and routing-centric proximity attacks; correct connections are reduced by 7.47X, and complexity is increased by 24.15X, respectively, for such attacks.

Introduction

The globalization of Integrated Circuit (IC) design has introduced significant security risks, primarily Intellectual Property (IP) piracy by end-users and design theft or Trojan insertion by untrusted foundries. Traditional Layout Camouflaging (LC) attempts to mitigate these risks by making logic gates appear identical to reverse-engineers. However, most existing LC techniques target the Front-End-of-Line (FEOL), requiring expensive custom manufacturing and incurring massive Power, Performance, and Area (PPA) overheads. Consequently, these methods are often applied selectively, leaving the design vulnerable to modern Boolean satisfiability (SAT) based attacks.

Proposed BEOL-Centric Camouflaging

This work proposes a shift from FEOL to Back-End-of-Line (BEOL) centric obfuscation. By focusing on the interconnect layers rather than the transistors, the scheme achieves full-chip protection with significantly reduced overhead.

$n:1$ Input Mapping and Stealthy Vias

The core of the approach is an $n:1$ input mapping for every gate. Each input is provided with $n$ possible wires, but only one carries the actual signal while the others are dummies. This is implemented using "obfuscating cells" within the metal layers. To ensure these connections are indistinguishable under electron microscopy, the researchers utilize a material-based approach: real vias are composed of conductive Magnesium (Mg), while dummy vias are non-conductive Magnesium Oxide (MgO).

Conceptual diagram of the n:1 input mapping logic in the obfuscated BEOL.

Synergy with Split Manufacturing

The BEOL-centric nature of this scheme makes it ideal for split manufacturing. The FEOL and lower metal layers can be fabricated at an untrusted, high-volume foundry, while the obfuscated upper metal layers are added at a trusted facility. This separation ensures that even if the FEOL fab is compromised, the true logic of the circuit remains hidden within the trusted BEOL layers.

Implementation of BEOL-centric camouflaging across trusted and untrusted fabs using Mg/MgO vias.

Netlist Transformations and CAD Flow

To prevent attackers from filtering out dummy wires that carry constant values, the design transforms standard buffers and inverters into camouflaged gates. This "intertwines" the obfuscation with the circuit's logic. The entire process is integrated into an industrial CAD flow (using Cadence Innovus), ensuring that the resulting layouts are DRC-clean and ready for fabrication.

Experimental Evaluation

The scheme was evaluated using standard benchmark suites, including ISCAS-85, ITC-99, and EPFL. The results demonstrate that the proposed method is both efficient and highly resilient.

  • PPA Overheads: For 100% camouflaged layouts, the average overheads were 24.96% for power, 19.06% for delay, and 32.55% for area. This is a substantial improvement over FEOL methods, which can exceed 400% area overhead.
  • SAT Resilience: While local camouflaging is often broken in seconds, the full-chip approach consistently caused SAT solvers to time out after 48 hours, demonstrating that scale is a critical defense.
  • Proximity Attack Resistance: The scheme increased the complexity of proximity attacks by 24.15X and reduced the rate of correct connections by 7.47X.

Conclusion

By moving layout camouflaging to the BEOL and leveraging material-based stealthy vias, this research provides a low-cost, scalable, and highly secure solution for protecting IC designs. The ability to obfuscate the entire chip renders powerful SAT-based attacks impractical, while the compatibility with split manufacturing addresses the risks posed by untrusted foundries.

Summary updated

Abstract

Layout camouflaging can protect the intellectual property of modern circuits. Most prior art, however, incurs excessive layout overheads and necessitates customization of active-device manufacturing processes, i.e., the front-end-of-line (FEOL). As a result, camouflaging has typically been applied selectively, which can ultimately undermine its resilience. Here, we propose a low-cost and generic scheme---full-chip camouflaging can be finally realized without reservations. Our scheme is based on obfuscating the interconnects, i.e., the back-end-of-line (BEOL), through design-time handling for real and dummy wires and vias. To that end, we implement custom, BEOL-centric obfuscation cells, and develop a CAD flow using industrial tools. Our scheme can be applied to any design and technology node without FEOL-level modifications. Considering its BEOL-centric nature, we advocate applying our scheme in conjunction with split manufacturing, to furthermore protect against untrusted fabs. We evaluate our scheme for various designs at the physical, DRC-clean layout level. Our scheme incurs a significantly lower cost than most of the prior art. Notably, for fully camouflaged layouts, we observe average power, performance, and area overheads of 24.96%, 19.06%, and 32.55%, respectively. We conduct a thorough security study addressing the threats (attacks) related to untrustworthy FEOL fabs (proximity attacks) and malicious end-users (SAT-based attacks). An empirical key finding is that only large-scale camouflaging schemes like ours are practically secure against powerful SAT-based attacks. Another key finding is that our scheme hinders both placement- and routing-centric proximity attacks; correct connections are reduced by 7.47X, and complexity is increased by 24.15X, respectively, for such attacks.
BibTeX
@article{patnaik2020obfuscating,
  author = {Satwik Patnaik and Mohammed Ashraf and Ozgur Sinanoglu and Johann Knechtel},
  title = {{Obfuscating the Interconnects: Low-Cost and Resilient Full-Chip Layout Camouflaging}},
  journal = {IEEE Trans. Comput. Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst.},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.1109/tcad.2020.2981034},
}
Figure