NOVO MERCADO DE GÁS NO BRASIL: DESVERTICALIZANDO PARA A CONCORRÊNCIA

César MattosLivros 2022 · DOI

Brazil’s natural gas sector is currently undergoing its most significant structural transformation in decades. In his research, "Novo Mercado de Gás no Brasil: Desverticalizando para a Concorrência" (New Gas Market in Brazil: Unbundling for Competition), César Mattos provides a comprehensive analysis of the regulatory and economic logic driving the country's shift from a state-led monopoly to an open, competitive marketplace. The paper argues that "unbundling" (desverticalização)—the separation of ownership across the value chain—is the critical catalyst required to lower energy costs and attract private infrastructure investment.

The Problem: Vertical Integration and Market Bottlenecks

For years, Brazil has been an international outlier, with natural gas prices significantly higher than those in North America and Europe. Mattos identifies the root cause as extreme vertical integration: the state-owned giant, Petrobras, historically controlled the entire value chain, from offshore exploration and production to transport pipelines and stakes in local distribution companies.

This structure created a "bottleneck" effect. Because Petrobras owned the "essential facilities" (pipelines and processing plants), it had little incentive to grant access to competitors. For a third-party producer, attempting to get gas to market was akin to driving on a highway owned by their primary rival. This lack of competition kept prices high and stifled industrial growth.

Theoretical diagram showing how market power can be leveraged from upstream to downstream in a vertically integrated monopoly.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The paper employs a mix of Transaction Cost Economics and Industrial Organization theory to evaluate the Brazilian reforms. Mattos specifically utilizes the "Essential Facilities Doctrine" to explain why infrastructure segments like pipelines must be regulated differently than competitive segments like gas trading.

By conducting a comparative policy analysis of unbundling trajectories in the UK, USA, and the European Union, the author evaluates the effectiveness of "soft" unbundling (separate accounting) versus "hard" unbundling (structural separation of ownership). The research assesses recent legislative milestones, including the CNPE guidelines, CADE (antitrust) agreements, and the landmark New Gas Law (Lei 14.134/2021).

Key Insights: Structural vs. Behavioral Regulation

A central insight of the paper is the inherent incentive for a vertically integrated monopolist to discriminate. Even with regulated tariffs, an owner can degrade the quality of access for rivals to maintain dominance. International experience suggests that behavioral fixes—simply telling a company to "be fair"—rarely work. True competition usually requires structural separation, where the pipeline operator has no financial interest in the gas being sold.

Furthermore, the New Gas Law introduces a major shift from a "concession" model (government-led bidding) to an "authorization" model for new pipelines. This allows private players to propose and build infrastructure based on market demand rather than waiting for state-led auctions.

Empirical Evidence and Results

The necessity of these reforms is underscored by the stark price disparities identified in the study. In 2019, Brazil’s natural gas price was approximately **US$ 16.3/MBtu**, nearly four times higher than in the US (US$ 3.8) or Canada (US$ 3.1).

Natural gas price comparison (2019) showing Brazil's high costs relative to international peers.

At the time of the study, Petrobras accounted for 95.1% of Brazil's gas production. The paper concludes that the New Gas Law successfully codifies "hard" unbundling by preventing gas transporters from having corporate links with producers or traders, aligning Brazil with the best practices of the European Third Energy Package.

Conclusion and Future Outlook

While the New Gas Law is a significant victory, Mattos acknowledges that the transition to a competitive market is a long-term process. International cases show it can take over a decade to develop liquid trading hubs. A critical risk remains regulatory autonomy; for the new market to succeed, the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) must remain independent of political pressures and artificial price controls. Future success will depend on how effectively state-level distribution regulations harmonize with this new national federal framework.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@inproceedings{mattos2022novo,
  author = {César Mattos},
  title = {{NOVO MERCADO DE GÁS NO BRASIL: DESVERTICALIZANDO PARA A CONCORRÊNCIA}},
  booktitle = {Livros},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.38116/978-65-5635-040-0/capitulo14},
}
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