Networks, Property, and the Division of Labor
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Abstract
We use a simulation-based method to consider the effect of different network structures on the propensity for economic producers to develop a complementary division of labor. We use a graph-coloring game, in which nodes are given incentives to find a color that does not match their nearest neighbors, to represent the interdependent coordination problems inherent to the division of labor. We find that a decentralized development of a division of labor is difficult, particularly when too many specializations are chosen. Counterintuitively, a division of labor is more likely to evolve when the ability of agents to specialize is more constrained. The ability to store property also facilitates the development of a division of labor.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{erikson2021networks,
author = {Emily Erikson and Hirokazu Shirado},
title = {{Networks, Property, and the Division of Labor}},
booktitle = {American},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.1177/00031224211027893},
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