Nash Equilibrium between Brokers and Traders

Álvaro Cartea, Sebastian Jaimungal, Leandro Sánchez-BetancourtarXiv 2024 · DOI · arXiv

Abstract

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients—an informed trader and an uninformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximize expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterize the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability, and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.

Introduction

In financial markets, brokers occupy a complex position. They provide liquidity to clients in the over-the-counter (OTC) market while simultaneously managing the resulting inventory by trading on public, or "lit," exchanges. This dual role creates a strategic conflict of interest. The broker must facilitate client trades while minimizing inventory risk—the danger of holding assets that lose value—and price impact, which is the tendency for their own large trades to move the market unfavorably.

While previous literature often examines this dynamic from a single perspective (e.g., optimizing a broker's strategy given a fixed order flow), this research characterizes the Nash equilibrium. In this framework, both the broker and the informed trader act strategically, accounting for each other's optimal responses in a continuous-time game.

The Strategic Framework

The model involves three primary participants:

  1. The Informed Trader: Possesses a private signal regarding future price movements and seeks to maximize profit.
  2. The Uninformed Trader: A non-strategic actor who sends random buy and sell orders to the broker, modeled via Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) processes.
  3. The Broker: Facilitates OTC trades and hedges inventory on a lit exchange characterized by instantaneous costs and transient price impact with exponential resilience.

Mathematical Methodology

To solve for the equilibrium, the authors employ several sophisticated mathematical tools:

  • Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (FBSDEs): The equilibrium is characterized by a coupled system of FBSDEs. The "forward" component tracks the evolution of inventories and prices, while the "backward" component determines the optimal trading speed based on future expectations.
  • Matrix Riccati Equations: The authors transform the FBSDEs into a matrix Riccati differential equation to find explicit solutions. They prove that a unique solution exists under specific conditions, particularly for shorter trading horizons.
  • Gâteaux Derivatives: These are used to demonstrate that the performance functionals for both the broker and the informed trader are strictly concave, ensuring that the identified strategies represent a true Nash equilibrium.

Key Strategic Insights

Toxic Inventory and Risk Externalization

A central challenge for the broker is managing "toxic inventory"—orders from informed traders that precede adverse price moves. The broker uses the lit exchange to "externalize" this risk, effectively passing the impact of the informed trade into the broader market.

"Riding" the Price Impact

The research identifies a fascinating phenomenon when price impact decays slowly (low resilience). In such cases, the informed trader may engage in a "pump-and-dump" style strategy. By exaggerating their initial trades to move the price, they can profit as the broker’s subsequent inventory-management trades push the price even further in the same direction.

The Value of Transparency

In this "perfect information" model, all parties are aware of each other's identities and strategies. A surprising result is that the informed trader gains more from understanding the broker's inventory position than the broker gains from knowing the trader's private signal. This suggests that in strategic OTC environments, the trader's knowledge of the intermediary's constraints is a more powerful tool than the intermediary's knowledge of the market signal.

Quantitative Results

The theoretical model was validated through extensive numerical simulations involving 1 million paths over a discretized trading window. Key findings include:

  • Profitability Shifts: In the Nash equilibrium, the informed trader’s profit increases by approximately 37 basis points (bps) compared to a non-strategic model. Conversely, the broker’s profit decreases by about 91 bps.
  • Inventory Neutrality: Despite the strategic friction and the complexity of the signals, both players successfully manage their risks to end the trading day with zero inventory.

Limitations and Future Research

While the paper provides a robust closed-form solution for the equilibrium, it notes a "Small T" constraint: the formal proof for a unique equilibrium currently requires a relatively short trading horizon. Additionally, the model assumes perfect information. In real-world scenarios, brokers must infer which clients are informed. Future work could extend this model to an "incomplete information" Nash equilibrium and explore fragmented markets where the broker has access to multiple execution venues.

Summary updated

Abstract

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability, and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.
BibTeX
@misc{cartea2024nash,
  author = {Álvaro Cartea and Sebastian Jaimungal and Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt},
  title = {{Nash Equilibrium between Brokers and Traders}},
  year = {2024},
  eprint = {2407.10561},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.10561},
}
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