Modeling and game strategy analysis of suppressing IADS for multiple fighters’ cooperation

Qiuni Li, Rennong Yang, Haoliang Li, Huan Zhang, C. C. FengJournal of Systems Engineering and Electronics 2018 · DOI

Abstract

This paper addresses the suppression of Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) through the cooperative efforts of multiple fighters. Recognizing the dynamic nature of combat where node counts fluctuate, the authors develop a profit model incorporating mission costs for both offensive and defensive sides. A distributed virtual learning algorithm is proposed to solve for the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) in a high-dimensional strategy space. Simulation results demonstrate significant improvements in expected payoffs compared to traditional baseline algorithms.

Introduction

Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) is vital for modern aerial operations. Traditional approaches often treat SEAD as a static optimization problem, failing to account for the fluid reality of combat where aircraft and ground installations are destroyed. This research frames the conflict as a dynamic, non-cooperative game between an attacking force of fighters and a defending IADS network.

The operational scenario involving an attacking side (N) and a defending side (M).

Methodology

The conflict is modeled as an $n$-person, non-cooperative game. Both sides are represented as nodes in a multi-agent network, characterized by detection range, damage capacity, and communication links.

Payoff Function Modeling

The payoff function is the cornerstone of the strategy selection, integrating three key metrics:

  1. Comprehensive Threat: The estimated danger posed to the opposing side.
  2. Strategic Value: The inherent importance of specific nodes (e.g., command centers vs. individual sensors).
  3. Mission Cost: A dynamic factor representing the systemic impact of losing a node.

The authors categorize interactions into four mathematical cases based on spatial relationships (overlapping detection/attack zones) and the chosen action: Jamming ($E$), Attacking ($F$), or No Action ($O$).

Distributed Virtual Learning Algorithm

To find the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) without a centralized controller, a distributed virtual learning algorithm was developed. Each agent updates its strategy probabilities based on historical game data and local observations.

Flowchart of the distributed virtual learning algorithm for strategy optimization.

The algorithm iteratively updates the strategy vectors for the attacking and defending sides until the change between iterations falls below a threshold $\epsilon$. This allows the system to adapt as nodes are removed from the network due to combat attrition.

Results and Discussion

The proposed model and algorithm were evaluated in a simulation featuring 5 fighters against 15 IADS nodes. Key findings include:

  • Payoff Efficiency: The learning algorithm achieved a 35.84% higher average expected payoff and a 27.13% higher total expected payoff compared to a standard adjacent-node coordination algorithm.
  • Dynamic Adaptation: The model successfully captured "jump" phenomena in payoffs, which occur when critical enemy nodes are destroyed, fundamentally altering the strategic landscape.
  • Scalability: The distributed nature of the algorithm ensures it remains computationally viable as the number of agents increases.

Conclusion

By integrating dynamic node counts and a distributed learning framework, this research provides a robust model for cooperative fighter operations against complex IADS. Future work will focus on enhancing the model's resilience to communication jamming and incorporating more sophisticated defensive maneuvers into the strategy space.

Summary updated

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of suppression of the integrated air defense system (IADS) by multiple fighters' cooperation. Considering the dynamic changing of the number of the nodes in the operational process, a profit model for the influence of the mission's cost for the whole system is developed for both offense and defensive sides. The scenario analysis is given for the process of suppressing the IADS by multiple fighters. Based on this scenario analysis, the modeling method and the specific expression for the payoff function are proposed in four cases for each node. Moreover, a distributed virtual learning algorithm is designed for the n-person and n-strategy game, and the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) of this game can be solved from the n×m×3-dimensional profit space. Finally, the simulation examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model and the game algorithm.
BibTeX
@article{li2018modeling,
  author = {Qiuni Li and Rennong Yang and Haoliang Li and Huan Zhang and C. C. Feng and Chao FENG},
  title = {{Modeling and game strategy analysis of suppressing IADS for multiple fighters’ cooperation}},
  journal = {Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.21629/jsee.2018.02.10},
}
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