Mental Disorders as Failures of Attention

Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong, Laura K. Soter, Jesse S. SummersCrítica 2024 · DOI

Abstract

The DSM–5 characterizes mental disorders as significant disturbances in cognition, emotion, or behavior. But what might unite the disturbances on this list? We hypothesize that mental disorders can all be meaningfully characterized as failures of attention. We understand these as failures to distribute attention in the way one has most reason to, and we include both failures of tendency and of ability. We discuss six examples of mental disorders and offer a preliminary gloss of how to recast each as centrally involving a failure of attention. We close by highlighting theoretical and practical upshots of our proposal.

Introduction: The Search for a Unified Mechanism

The gold standard for psychiatric diagnosis, the DSM–5–TR, defines mental disorders as significant disturbances across three domains: cognition, emotion, and behavior. However, this definition has long faced criticism for being a descriptive list of symptoms rather than a cohesive theory. It fails to explain why these three disparate domains are consistently linked or what common mechanism underlies such a diverse range of conditions.

While newer frameworks, such as the NIMH’s Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), incorporate attention, they typically treat it as one isolated "cognitive system" among many. We propose a different view: attention is the "glue" that unifies mental dysfunction. By characterizing mental disorders as fundamental failures of attention, we can bridge the gap between cognitive, emotional, and behavioral symptoms through a single, explanatory mechanism.

The Theoretical Framework: Selection for Action

Our proposal draws on the work of Wayne Wu, viewing attention as "selection for action." In this model, attention is the mechanism that selects specific information to produce a response. When attention is properly aligned with an agent's goals and reasons, the resulting actions, emotions, and thoughts are coherent. A mental disorder arises when there is a systematic failure to distribute focus according to one's best reasons.

Crucially, this "reason constraint" distinguishes a clinical disorder from mere distraction. A failure of attention involves failing to attend to what one has the most reason to attend to. This includes both subjective reasons (personal goals) and objective reasons (e.g., a depressed individual has an objective reason to value their life, even if they currently lack the subjective feeling of that value). We further distinguish between failures of tendency—repeatedly failing to exercise an attentional ability one possesses—and failures of ability, where there is a genuine incapacity to control focus.

A Taxonomy of Attentional Failures

To demonstrate the utility of this framework, we develop a taxonomy based on two dimensions: the direction of the failure and the domain of the disturbance.

1. Direction of Failure

  • Failure to Sustain: The inability to maintain focus on an object or task that one has reason to attend to.
  • Failure to Shift: The inability to move focus away from an object or thought that one has reason to ignore.

2. Domain of Disturbance

We map these failures across the three DSM categories: Behavior, Emotion, and Cognition. This creates a 2x3 matrix that allows us to reclassify major disorders within a single framework:

Domain Failure to Sustain Failure to Shift
Behavior ADHD: Inability to sustain focus on tasks. Anorexia Nervosa: Inability to shift focus away from body shape/food.
Emotion Depression: Inability to sustain focus on positive life aspects. Phobias: Inability to shift focus away from a feared object.
Cognition Delusions: Inability to sustain focus on counter-evidence. Narcissism: Inability to shift focus away from the self.

Case Studies in Attentional Dysfunction

This framework provides significant explanatory power for complex conditions. For instance, Depression is often characterized by rumination—a failure to shift attention away from internal distress—and a concurrent failure to sustain attention on external activities that might provide relief.

Similarly, Delusions are often viewed as a failure of logic or evidence. However, we argue they persist because the individual fails to attend to counter-evidence long enough for it to override the delusional belief. In the case of Anorexia Nervosa, the disorder is recast as a behavioral failure to shift attention away from specific physical metrics, despite having overwhelming reason to prioritize general health.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

One of the primary advantages of this model is its ability to explain the interplay between "top-down" and "bottom-up" processes. Mental disorders often involve failures of top-down (intentional) control because bottom-up (involuntary) salience—such as the intrusive thought of a germ or the presence of a phobic stimulus—becomes too powerful to override.

Practically, this shift in perspective suggests new avenues for treatment. If the core of a disorder is attentional, then "attention training" should be a clinical priority. Interventions like mindfulness, biofeedback, and cognitive bias modification—which specifically strengthen attentional control—could be applied more broadly across the diagnostic spectrum.

Limitations and Future Directions

While this framework offers a promising "proof of concept," it is not without limitations. The 2x3 matrix is a simplification; in reality, most disorders (such as OCD or addiction) involve a complex interplay of behavior, emotion, and cognition. Furthermore, this proposal is descriptive rather than etiological—it explains what a disorder is (a failure of attention) rather than the underlying biological or social why.

Future work must involve empirical testing to determine if these disorders are as tightly linked to measurable attentional control as we claim. By moving toward a unified theory of psychopathology, we can better understand the common threads that bind disparate mental health challenges together.

Summary updated

Abstract

The DSM–5 characterizes mental disorders as significant disturbances in cognition, emotion, or behavior. But what might unite the disturbances on this list? We hypothesize that mental disorders can all be meaningfully characterized as failures of attention. We understand these as failures to distribute attention in the way one has most reason to, and we include both failures of tendency and of ability. We discuss six examples of mental disorders and offer a preliminary gloss of how to recast each as centrally involving a failure of attention. We close by highlighting theoretical and practical upshots of our proposal.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{sinnottarmstrong2024mental,
  author = {Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong and Laura K. Soter and Jesse S. Summers},
  title = {{Mental Disorders as Failures of Attention}},
  booktitle = {Crítica},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2024.1528},
}
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