Managing ride-sourcing drivers at transportation terminals: a lottery-based queueing approach

Tianming Liu, Yafeng Yin, Vijay SubramanianarXiv 2025 · DOI · arXiv

Abstract

Transportation terminals such as airports often experience persistent oversupply of idle ride-sourcing drivers, resulting in long driver waiting times and inducing externalities such as curbside congestion. While platforms now employ virtual queues with control levers like dynamic pricing, information provision, and direct admission control to manage this issue, all existing levers involve significant trade-offs and side effects. This limitation highlights the need for an alternative management approach. Methodology/results: We develop a queueing-theoretic framework to model ride-sourcing operations at terminals and propose a novel lottery-based control mechanism for the virtual queue. This non-monetary strategy works by probabilistically assigning a driver's entry position. By directly influencing their expected waiting time, the mechanism in turn shapes their decision to join the queue. We reformulate the resulting infinite-dimensional, non-smooth optimization into a tractable bi-level program by leveraging the threshold structure of the equilibrium. Theoretically, we prove that the lottery mechanism can achieve higher or equal social welfare than FIFO-queue-based dynamic pricing. Numerical experiments in unconstrained markets show that in profit maximization, our approach only narrowly trails dynamic pricing and significantly outperforms static pricing. Furthermore, it is shown that under commission fee caps, the lottery mechanism can surpass dynamic pricing in profitability. Implications: This study introduces a new, non-monetary lever for managing idle ride-sourcing drivers at transportation terminals. By aligning operational practices with queue-based dynamics, the proposed lottery mechanism offers a robust and implementable alternative to pricing-based approaches, with advantages in both unconstrained and regulated markets.

Introduction

Transportation terminals, such as airports, frequently face a persistent oversupply of idle ride-sourcing drivers. This imbalance leads to prolonged driver waiting times and significant negative externalities, including curbside congestion and environmental impact. While platforms currently utilize virtual queues and levers like dynamic pricing or admission control, these methods often involve trade-offs regarding fairness, transparency, or physical spillover effects. This paper proposes a novel, non-monetary alternative: a lottery-based queueing mechanism.

The Lottery-Based Queueing Mechanism

The core innovation presented is the Entry Position Lottery. Unlike a standard First-In-First-Out (FIFO) queue where new arrivals are always placed at the end, this mechanism uses a probability distribution to assign a driver’s starting position within the virtual queue.

The Entry Position Lottery mechanism: a new driver is inserted at a probabilistically determined position $l$.

By probabilistically controlling the expected wait time, the platform can influence a driver's decision to join the queue. This allows for granular control over supply without the "monetary friction" associated with changing commission rates or the bluntness of hard entry caps.

Methodology and Modeling

The researchers developed a queueing-theoretic framework to model these operations, accounting for heterogeneous drivers with varying valuations of time and money. The system is modeled as a queue with state-dependent arrival rates, where drivers make rational "join or balk" decisions based on their expected waiting time.

State transition diagram of the queueing system with state-dependent arrival rates.

To solve for the optimal lottery distribution, the authors addressed an infinite-dimensional, non-smooth optimization problem. They leveraged the threshold structure of the equilibrium—where drivers join only if the queue is below a certain capacity—to reformulate the problem into a tractable bi-level program solved via a Genetic Algorithm.

The model was validated using an operational dataset from a major Chinese metropolitan airport, featuring passenger arrival rates of approximately 46 orders per hour and trip revenues between 80–90 CNY. Drivers were categorized into "voluntary" (those driving specifically for airport fares) and "involuntary" (those arriving after a drop-off).

Key Results and Insights

The study yields several critical insights:

  • Social Welfare: Theoretically, the lottery mechanism can achieve social welfare levels equal to or higher than FIFO-based dynamic pricing by more effectively minimizing system-wide idle costs.
  • Profitability in Regulated Markets: In unconstrained markets, the lottery nearly matches dynamic pricing and outperforms static pricing by 11%. Crucially, under commission fee caps, the lottery mechanism surpasses dynamic pricing because it retains a control lever (queue position) that pricing loses.
  • Wait Time Reduction: Under social welfare maximization, the lottery significantly reduces average waiting times compared to traditional methods as the demand-supply ratio increases.
  • Constant Wait Strategy: For profit maximization, the optimal lottery often maintains a constant expected wait time regardless of queue length, allowing the platform to set the highest acceptable commission.

Conclusion and Future Directions

The lottery-based mechanism offers a robust, implementable alternative to pricing-based management of ride-sourcing queues. It is particularly effective in regulated environments where price levers are restricted. Future research could expand this model to include passenger-side dynamics, driver reneging behavior, and the user experience challenges of implementing a randomized queueing system.

Summary updated

Abstract

Problem definition: Transportation terminals such as airports often experience persistent oversupply of idle ride-sourcing drivers, resulting in long driver waiting times and inducing externalities such as curbside congestion. While platforms now employ virtual queues with control levers like dynamic pricing, information provision, and direct admission control to manage this issue, all existing levers involve significant trade-offs and side effects. This limitation highlights the need for an alternative management approach. Methodology/results: We develop a queueing-theoretic framework to model ride-sourcing operations at terminals and propose a novel lottery-based control mechanism for the virtual queue. This non-monetary strategy works by probabilistically assigning a driver's entry position. By directly influencing their expected waiting time, the mechanism in turn shapes their decision to join the queue. We reformulate the resulting infinite-dimensional, non-smooth optimization into a tractable bi-level program by leveraging the threshold structure of the equilibrium. Theoretically, we prove that the lottery mechanism can achieve higher or equal social welfare than FIFO-queue-based dynamic pricing. Numerical experiments in unconstrained markets show that in profit maximization, our approach only narrowly trails dynamic pricing and significantly outperforms static pricing. Furthermore, it is shown that under commission fee caps, the lottery mechanism can surpass dynamic pricing in profitability. Implications: This study introduces a new, non-monetary lever for managing idle ride-sourcing drivers at transportation terminals. By aligning operational practices with queue-based dynamics, the proposed lottery mechanism offers a robust and implementable alternative to pricing-based approaches, with advantages in both unconstrained and regulated markets.
BibTeX
@misc{liu2025managing,
  author = {Tianming Liu and Yafeng Yin and Vijay Subramanian},
  title = {{Managing ride-sourcing drivers at transportation terminals: a lottery-based queueing approach}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2509.25071},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.25071},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
}

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