Local Computation Mechanism Design

Avinatan Hassidim, Yishay Mansour, Shai VardiACM Trans. Economics and Comput 2016 · OpenReview

TL;DR

This paper introduces "local computation mechanism design," a new framework for creating game-theoretic mechanisms that are incredibly efficient, running in polylogarithmic time and space. They demonstrate how to apply this to problems like stable matching and job scheduling, ensuring truthful behavior from participants while handling massive datasets.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Imagine trying to run an auction for millions of buyers and items, or schedule millions of jobs across thousands of computers. Traditional algorithms might struggle with the sheer scale of such problems, even if they run in linear time. The challenge is to design mechanisms that can provide answers to specific queries (like "what did I win?" or "which job is assigned to this machine?") quickly and efficiently, without needing to compute the entire global solution. Furthermore, these mechanisms must incentivize participants (buyers, machines, etc.) to act truthfully about their preferences or capabilities, even when dealing with massive, distributed datasets. This is the core problem addressed by local computation mechanism design.

Methods

The authors introduce a formal model for "local computation mechanism design," which combines the ideas of local computation algorithms (LCAs) and algorithmic mechanism design. An LCA allows for quick, localized responses to queries, while mechanism design ensures truthful reporting. Their approach involves designing mechanisms where both the allocation of resources and any associated payments can be computed in polylogarithmic time and space per query. They achieve this by:

  • Formalizing the LCA Mechanism Model: Defining what it means for a mechanism (allocation + payments) to be "local."
  • Developing LCAs for Specific Problems: Creating local computation algorithms for stable matching, job scheduling on related machines, combinatorial auctions, and random serial dictatorship.
  • Leveraging Existing LCA Techniques: Adapting techniques from prior LCA work, such as query trees, to their mechanism design context.
  • Designing Truthful Payment Schemes: Ensuring that participants are incentivized to reveal their true preferences or valuations.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper focuses on theoretical models and algorithmic design rather than empirical evaluation on specific datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The Power of "Local": The core insight is that for many large-scale problems, we don't need the entire solution at once. By focusing on local queries and ensuring consistency, we can achieve efficiency gains that are impossible with global computation.
  • Bridging Game Theory and Big Data: This work elegantly bridges the gap between theoretical game theory (incentive compatibility, truthfulness) and the practical challenges of modern large-scale systems.
  • Stable Matching Breakthrough: The paper presents a significant result for stable matching, showing that even if a perfect stable matching isn't locally computable, they can achieve an arbitrarily good approximation by truncating the Gale-Shapley algorithm, and that this can be implemented as a local mechanism.
  • Impossibility Results: The authors highlight that not all problems are amenable to local computation mechanisms, specifically demonstrating that exact maximum matching is not locally computable. This underscores the importance of approximation and careful problem formulation.

Key Results

  • Local Computation Mechanisms: The paper introduces and formalizes the concept of local computation mechanisms.
  • Stable Matching: An LCA for stable matching is presented that matches all but an arbitrarily small fraction of participants, with the matching being stable for the matched individuals. This mechanism is shown to be ex-ante truthful.
  • Job Scheduling: Local mechanisms are developed for scheduling on related machines, providing an O(log log n)-approximation to the optimal makespan and achieving truthfulness in expectation.
  • Combinatorial Auctions: Universally truthful local mechanisms are presented for unit-demand and k-minded bidders, offering approximations to optimal social welfare.
  • Random Serial Dictatorship: The paper shows that the Random Serial Dictatorship algorithm can be implemented as an LCA.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Assumptions on Distributions: Some results rely on assumptions about the distribution of bidders' preferences or item interests (e.g., uniform or binomial distributions). The authors pose an open question about how restrictive this assumption is and how far it can be relaxed.
  • Approximation Ratios: While LCAs are provided, the approximation ratios for some problems (like maximal matching) are not optimal, leading to open questions about achieving better approximations.
  • Truthfulness Guarantees: The paper explores different levels of truthfulness (in expectation, universally truthful, ex-ante truthful). Further research is suggested to explore the trade-offs and possibilities for achieving stronger truthfulness guarantees.
  • Computational Complexity: While polylogarithmic time and space are achieved per query, the overall complexity for some mechanisms might involve multiple LCA calls (e.g., for payments), which could be a practical consideration.
  • Open Questions: The paper concludes with several open questions, including exploring the restrictiveness of the local computation setting, the existence of truthful local mechanisms for more complex auction settings, and improving approximation ratios for matching problems.

Summary updated

Abstract

We introduce the notion of local computation mechanism design—designing game-theoretic mechanisms that run in polylogarithmic time and space. Local computation mechanisms reply to each query in polylogarithmic time and space, and the replies to different queries are consistent with the same global feasible solution. When the mechanism employs payments, the computation of the payments is also done in polylogarithmic time and space. Furthermore, the mechanism needs to maintain incentive compatibility with respect to the allocation and payments. We present local computation mechanisms for two classical game-theoretical problems: stable matching and job scheduling. For stable matching, some of our techniques may have implications to the global (non-LCA (Local Computation Algorithm)) setting. Specifically, we show that when the men’s preference lists are bounded, we can achieve an arbitrarily good approximation to the stable matching within a fixed number of iterations of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
BibTeX
@article{hassidim2016local,
  author = {Avinatan Hassidim and Yishay Mansour and Shai Vardi},
  title = {{Local Computation Mechanism Design}},
  journal = {ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.},
  year = {2016},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=PLTURdajBYm},
}
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