Joint Decision Model of Group Ticket Booking Limits and Individual Passenger Dynamic Pricing for the High-Speed Railway

Zhenying Yan, Pingting Zhang, Yujia Zhang, Hui Liu, Chenxi Feng, Xiaojuan LiSymmetry 2019 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper tackles the challenge of maximizing high-speed rail revenue by jointly optimizing group ticket discounts and dynamic pricing for individual passengers. They propose a dynamic programming model that dynamically controls group booking limits, showing it outperforms fixed limits and simple dynamic pricing, especially when individual demand is low.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

High-speed rail operators face a classic revenue management dilemma: how to balance discounted group tickets with dynamic pricing for individual travelers. While group discounts can stimulate demand, selling too many can cannibalize higher-paying individual customers. Conversely, not enough group sales mean missed revenue opportunities. The core problem is finding the optimal "symmetry point" where the expected revenue from accepting group bookings is balanced against reserving seats for potentially higher-paying individual passengers. This paper specifically addresses the need for a joint decision model that considers both group booking limits and dynamic pricing for individuals, a gap not fully explored in existing literature.

Methods

The authors employ a dynamic programming approach to model the joint decision-making process. They define a time-homogeneous model where orders arrive sequentially and can be either individual or group. For individual passengers, dynamic pricing is used to maximize revenue based on their willingness to pay. For group passengers, a fixed discount is applied, but the crucial innovation is the dynamic control of the booking limit for these group tickets. The model calculates the optimal price for individual tickets and the decision to accept or reject group bookings at each time step. An inverse recursive algorithm is developed to solve this dynamic programming model.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper relies on simulated data for numerical experiments.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The "Symmetry Point" is Key: The paper emphasizes finding a balance between group discounts and individual pricing, framing it as finding a "symmetry point" for expected revenue.
  • Dynamic Group Limits Outperform Fixed Limits: Dynamically adjusting the number of group tickets allowed is shown to be more effective than setting a fixed quota, allowing for greater revenue optimization.
  • Group Discounts Shine in Weak Demand: The proposed joint policy is particularly beneficial when individual passenger demand is low, as group discounts can effectively stimulate demand and fill seats that might otherwise go empty.
  • Individual Price is Tied to Group Decision: The optimal price for individual tickets is influenced by the decision to accept or reject group bookings, highlighting the interconnectedness of these strategies.

Key Results

Numerical experiments demonstrate that the proposed comprehensive model (CD) consistently outperforms a simple dynamic pricing model without group discounts (SD). The expected revenue of CD is higher than SD, especially when the overall arrival probability ($\alpha$) is low and the proportion of group orders ($\beta$) is high. The paper also shows that dynamically adjusting group booking limits (CD) leads to higher expected revenue compared to a dynamic pricing model with fixed group inventory (DF). The results suggest that as the individual demand-supply ratio increases, the advantage of the joint model diminishes, and SD can become slightly superior.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge that the model assumes time-homogeneous arrival rates and that overbooking, no-shows, and refunds are not considered. Future work could explore more complex scenarios, such as multiple trains and stops, competitive factors, nonhomogeneous demand, and constrained information. Additionally, incorporating local or national conditions and analyzing the financial effects of specific policies (e.g., for unemployed or large families) are suggested avenues for future research.

Summary updated

Abstract

Rail operators in many countries discount group tickets to improve revenue by increasing price-driven demand. For individual passengers, dynamic pricing is beneficial for maximizing revenue based on the price discrimination principle. Usually, group fares are cheaper than individual fares. If too many group tickets are sold, there will not be enough tickets available to meet high-priced individual demand; by contrast, if not enough group tickets are sold and there is insufficient individual demand, the unsold seats will not have value once the train departs. Therefore, for railway operators, it is worth looking for a balance between group discounts and dynamic pricing to maximize benefits. Essentially, rail operators need to find the symmetry point of the expected revenue between accepting group bookings and reserving tickets for individuals when making decisions. In this study, we formulated a joint decision model of group ticket booking control and dynamic pricing and investigated the effect of the joint decision. The results of numerical experiments showed that incorporating group discounts into dynamic pricing can improve expected revenue when passenger demand is weak, and compared to setting fixed quantities for group tickets, dynamically controlling the limit of group bookings can effectively increase expected revenue. Further analysis of the impacts of time, number of tickets sold, and group demand was helpful to implement the proposed joint policy.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{yan2019joint,
  author = {Zhenying Yan and Pingting Zhang and Yujia Zhang and Hui Liu and Chenxi Feng and Xiaojuan Li},
  title = {{Joint Decision Model of Group Ticket Booking Limits and Individual Passenger Dynamic Pricing for the High-Speed Railway}},
  booktitle = {Symmetry},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.3390/sym11091128},
}
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