Abstract: Recent measurements of the Windows code-signing certificate ecosystem have highlighted various forms of abuse that allow malware authors to produce malicious code carrying valid digital signatures. However, the underground trade that allows miscreants to acquire such certificates is not well understood. In this paper, we illuminate two aspects of this trade. First, we investigate 4 leading vendors of Authenticode certificates, we document how they conduct business, and we estimate their market share. Second, we collect a data set of recently signed malware and we use it to study the relationships among malware developers, malware families and the certificates. We also use information from the black market to fingerprint the certificates traded and to identify when the are likely used to sign malware in the wild. Using these methods, we document a shift in the methods that malware authors employ to obtain valid digital signatures. While prior studies have reported the use of code-signing certificates that had been compromised or obtained directly from legitimate Certification Authorities, we observe that, in 2017, these methods have become secondary to purchasing certificates from underground vendors. We also find that the need to bypass platform protections such as Microsoft Defender SmartScreen plays a growing role in driving the demand for Authenticode certificates. Together, these findings suggest that the trade in certificates issued for abuse represents an emerging segment of the underground economy.
Introduction
Digital signatures serve as the bedrock of trust in the Windows ecosystem through Authenticode. A valid signature signals to the operating system that a program originates from a known publisher and has not been tampered with. For malware authors, these signatures act as a "get out of jail free" card, helping their malicious payloads bypass anti-virus scanners and platform protections like Microsoft Defender SmartScreen.
Historically, research suggested that most abused certificates were stolen from legitimate developers—the so-called "Stuxnet model." However, this paper identifies a significant shift: a professionalized market where fresh certificates are manufactured specifically for malicious use. Malware authors have moved from stealing credentials to purchasing new certificates from specialized underground vendors who utilize shell companies to bypass Certificate Authority (CA) vetting.
Methodology
The researchers employed a dual-perspective approach to map this illicit ecosystem, analyzing both the supply and demand sides of the market.
Supply-side Analysis
The team performed an extensive crawl of 28 underground forums, dark web marketplaces, and link directories. They identified four major vendors (labeled A through D) and monitored their activity. Notably, they "shadowed" an e-shop called Codesigning Guru by monitoring its payment widget to track stock levels and sales without alerting the vendor.
Demand-side Analysis
On the demand side, the researchers collected over 14,000 signed malware samples from VirusTotal. They developed a multi-step pipeline to filter, analyze, and cluster these samples to understand the relationships between malware families and the certificates they use.
By comparing certificate issuance dates to the first time they were observed signing malware (the "issue-to-abuse" interval), the authors could infer whether a certificate was likely stolen (older) or "issued for abuse" (brand new).
Datasets
The study relied on several comprehensive datasets:
- Underground Sources: Data from 28 forums (e.g., Hackforums, Antichat), 4 general marketplaces, and 6 link directories.
- Malware Samples: 14,221 correctly signed malware samples filtered from a larger pool of 2.1 million files.
- Certificates & Identities: 1,163 unique certificates extracted from the malware dataset, representing 788 unique publisher identities (PIs) identified through clustering techniques.
Key Insights
The Shift to "Issued for Abuse"
The most significant finding is the documented shift in tactics. In 2017, the majority of abused certificates were used within the first month of issuance. This rapid timeline is inconsistent with theft and strongly suggests a stable market where certificates are purchased "fresh" for the sole purpose of signing malware.
SmartScreen as a Market Driver
Standard certificates no longer grant immediate trust in Windows 10; they must build "reputation" within Microsoft Defender SmartScreen. Vendors have adapted by selling high-end Extended Validation (EV) certificates—which provide an immediate reputation boost—or providing instructions on how to "warm up" a standard certificate to build reputation quickly.
Shell Company Vetting
Vendors often use young, UK-based shell companies to pass CA identity verification. Many of these companies were found to be incorporated just a month before the certificate was issued, highlighting a weakness in the current vetting process.
Market Results and Pricing
The underground market is diverse, with vendors offering various tiers of products based on the level of trust and reputation required by the buyer.
- Market Share: Vendor B (Codesigning Guru) was the most active, generating approximately $16,150 in revenue over a 104-day observation period, selling roughly 11.8 certificates per month.
- Pricing: Standard certificates (Comodo, Thawte) trade for $350–$600. In contrast, high-end EV certificates can fetch up to $3,000 due to their ability to bypass SmartScreen warnings immediately.
- Abuse Velocity: Roughly 45% of abused certificates are used to sign malware within the first month of their issuance. In tightly-knit clusters of Russian and Ukrainian publishers, this number jumps to 60%.
Conclusion
This research demonstrates that the trade in certificates issued for abuse is a growing and professionalized segment of the underground economy. While the revenue estimates provided are likely conservative lower bounds due to private sales channels, the trend is clear: the "stolen certificate" model is being replaced by a supply chain of manufactured trust.
To combat this, the authors suggest that CAs must implement more rigorous vetting processes. Furthermore, the industry should move toward a standardized publisher naming format to make it easier for security researchers to track and revoke certificates issued to bogus identities across different CAs.
Summary updated