Intrusion Detection with Neural Networks

Jake Ryan, Meng-Jang Lin, Risto MiikkulainenNeurIPS 1997 · OpenReview

As computer networks expand, security and unauthorized access prevention have become increasingly critical. Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) generally fall into two categories: misuse detection (searching for known "signatures" of attacks) and anomaly detection (flagging behavior that deviates from a user's established norm).

However, traditional anomaly detection faces significant hurdles. Hand-coding rules for "normal" behavior is labor-intensive and practically impossible to maintain. Furthermore, many systems attempt to predict the sequence of commands in real-time. Because the order in which a user opens a mail client, runs a compiler, or checks a directory is highly variable, sequence prediction is computationally expensive and prone to high error rates.

To address these challenges, researchers introduced NNID (Neural Network Intrusion Detector). By shifting the focus from real-time sequence prediction to offline statistical distributions, NNID successfully identifies computer users by their "command fingerprints," achieving high accuracy with minimal false alarms.

The NNID Approach: Distribution Over Sequence

The core insight of NNID is that what a user does is a much more stable identifier than the order in which they do it. For instance, a programmer will consistently use gcc and make, while an administrator might frequently use su and chmod.

To capture this, the authors proposed an offline approach using a standard three-layer backpropagation neural network. Instead of tracking when a command was typed, the system aggregates how often it was used over a 24-hour period to build a "User Vector."

The 100 most frequently used commands selected to form the input user vectors.

Constructing the User Vector: * Feature Selection: The system tracks the 100 most common commands on the system (e.g., ls, gcc, emacs, mail). * Non-linear Scaling: To prevent high-frequency commands from overwhelming the model, command counts are mapped into 11 non-linear intervals. For example, the difference between using a command 0 times versus 2 times is more "telling" than the difference between 500 and 502 times. These intervals are represented as values from 0.0 to 1.0. * Network Architecture: The NNID utilizes 100 input units (one for each tracked command), 30 hidden units, and 10 output units (one for each authorized user on the test system).

Because the model only looks at command names and frequencies—ignoring arguments like filenames or email recipients—it provides a robust layer of security without invasive monitoring of private data.

Experimental Setup and the "Digital Print"

The study utilized real-world data collected over 12 days from a NetBSD machine at the University of Texas at Austin. The dataset comprised 10 users, ranging from heavy daily users to intermittent ones, totaling 89 "user-days" of data. Because the system was "clean" (containing no actual intrusions), the authors generated 100 random user vectors to simulate anomalous behavior. These vectors maintained the same first-order statistics as the real data but lacked the specific correlations of a real user's fingerprint.

The authors liken user behavior to a thumbprint left at a crime scene. You don't need to watch a person leave the print to know they were there; you just need to recognize the pattern they left behind. At the end of each day, the system administrator runs the logs through NNID.

Visualization of the neural network's output layer, illustrating the distinct activation 'fingerprints' used to classify the 10 different users.

If the network cannot confidently match the day's activity to the authorized user's established output profile, or if it strongly suggests the wrong user, it flags a potential security breach.

Key Results

The NNID demonstrated that user profiles are highly distinct and learnable by a neural network:

  • High Anomaly Detection: The system rejected 63% of random vectors outright. When factoring in the low probability (1/10) of an intruder accidentally mimicking a specific user perfectly, the overall anomaly detection rate reached 96%.
  • Accurate Identification: The model correctly identified legitimate users 93% of the time.
  • Low False Alarms: The system maintained a 7% false alarm rate. Notably, almost all false alarms were triggered by a single user who only had three days of training data, highlighting that the model's accuracy is directly tied to the consistency and depth of the training history.

Limitations and Future Work

While highly effective on a small scale, the authors note a few limitations:

  1. Scalability: The experiment was conducted with only 10 users. In a corporate environment with thousands of users, the network would need to make much finer distinctions, which could increase the false alarm rate or require a more complex architecture.
  2. Behavioral Drift: User behavior naturally changes over time. A student might spend a month coding heavily and the next month writing a thesis. To combat this, the model requires periodic retraining—a task that takes only about 90 seconds on their test system.
  3. Infrequent Users: Users with very little data are difficult to profile accurately, posing a challenge for "guest" accounts or occasional collaborators.

Ultimately, NNID proves that learning offline statistical user profiles is a highly effective, privacy-respecting method for detecting network intrusions.

Summary updated

Abstract

With the rapid expansion of computer networks during the past few years, security has become a crucial issue for modern computer systems. A good way to detect illegitimate use is through monitoring unusual user activity. Methods of intrusion detection based on hand-coded rule sets or predicting commands on-line are laborous to build or not very reliable. This paper proposes a new way of applying neural networks to detect intrusions. We believe that a user leaves a 'print' when using the system; a neural network can be used to learn this print and identify each user much like detectives use thumbprints to place people at crime scenes. If a user's behavior does not match hislher print, the system administrator can be alerted of a possible security breech. A backpropagation neural network called NNID (Neural Network Intrusion Detector) was trained in the identification task and tested experimentally on a system of 10 users. The system was 96% accurate in detecting unusual activity, with 7% false alarm rate. These results suggest that learning user profiles is an effective way for detecting intrusions.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{ryan1997intrusion,
  author = {Jake Ryan and Meng-Jang Lin and Risto Miikkulainen},
  title = {{Intrusion Detection with Neural Networks}},
  booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems},
  year = {1997},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=HkW0kD-dZr},
}

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