Introduction
In the burgeoning sharing economy, platforms like Airbnb and TaskRabbit rely on individual sellers to provide assets or services. A critical decision for these sellers is how much information to disclose. While detailed photos and descriptions can attract buyers, they also incur privacy costs and expose sellers to intense price competition. This paper presents the first analytical framework to model this strategic tension, uncovering why full transparency is rarely an equilibrium and how factors like buyer uncertainty and seller capacity influence disclosure strategies.
Methodology: A Two-Stage Game
The authors model the market interaction as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In the first stage, sellers act as leaders, simultaneously determining their information disclosure levels ($\alpha$) and prices ($p$) to maximize expected profits. In the second stage, buyers act as followers, observing these signals and choosing the seller that maximizes their expected payoff based on their prior beliefs and quality estimations.
The mathematical challenge arises from the non-convex and non-monotonic nature of the sellers' objective functions. To address this, the authors decompose the market equilibria into tractable subproblems, identifying four distinct behavior patterns based on the prevalence of full versus zero disclosure.
Key Insights: The Disclosure Paradox
The study reveals several counter-intuitive findings regarding market transparency:
- The Transparency Trap: Full disclosure by all sellers is almost never an equilibrium. Perfect transparency commoditizes products, triggering "race-to-the-bottom" price wars that erode profits, especially when privacy costs are non-zero.
- Bias as a Buffer: Contrary to intuition, buyer uncertainty (estimation bias) can actually promote disclosure. By softening the "winner-takes-all" nature of price competition, uncertainty allows sellers to reveal more information without immediate profit loss.
- Capacity and Honesty: Limited seller capacity (e.g., having only one room to rent) encourages higher levels of transparency. When sellers are not competing for every single buyer, the pressure to hide information to maintain a price advantage is reduced.
Equilibrium Patterns
The researchers characterized the market equilibria into different patterns based on the marginal privacy costs ($c_1, c_2$) of the sellers. For instance, the "All-Achievable" pattern illustrates how different cost regimes lead to varying disclosure outcomes across four distinct regions (I, II, III, and IV).
Results and Implications
The theoretical analysis and numerical simulations yield several key results:
- Capacity-Disclosure Hierarchy: The number of sellers disclosing information increases as seller capacity becomes more constrained. Specifically, disclosure is lowest under unlimited capacity and highest in single-capacity scenarios.
- Winner-Take-All in Disclosure: In markets with unlimited capacity, at most one seller—typically the one with the highest quality-to-cost ratio—will choose to disclose information at equilibrium.
- The Quality Threshold: Low-quality sellers are disincentivized from disclosing information regardless of cost, as revealing poor quality directly reduces their competitiveness.
Conclusion
This research provides a rigorous foundation for understanding information disclosure in competitive sharing systems. By highlighting the roles of privacy costs, buyer bias, and capacity limits, it explains the empirical observation of "hidden" information in these markets. Future work may extend this static model to dynamic settings, incorporating long-term reputation effects and buyer reviews.
Summary updated