Information Disclosure under Competition in Sharing Systems

Ningning Ding, Zhixuan Fang, Jianwei HuangarXiv 2023 · DOI · arXiv

Introduction

In the burgeoning sharing economy, platforms like Airbnb and TaskRabbit rely on individual sellers to provide assets or services. A critical decision for these sellers is how much information to disclose. While detailed photos and descriptions can attract buyers, they also incur privacy costs and expose sellers to intense price competition. This paper presents the first analytical framework to model this strategic tension, uncovering why full transparency is rarely an equilibrium and how factors like buyer uncertainty and seller capacity influence disclosure strategies.

Methodology: A Two-Stage Game

The authors model the market interaction as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In the first stage, sellers act as leaders, simultaneously determining their information disclosure levels ($\alpha$) and prices ($p$) to maximize expected profits. In the second stage, buyers act as followers, observing these signals and choosing the seller that maximizes their expected payoff based on their prior beliefs and quality estimations.

The two-stage Stackelberg game modeling seller and buyer decisions.

The mathematical challenge arises from the non-convex and non-monotonic nature of the sellers' objective functions. To address this, the authors decompose the market equilibria into tractable subproblems, identifying four distinct behavior patterns based on the prevalence of full versus zero disclosure.

Key Insights: The Disclosure Paradox

The study reveals several counter-intuitive findings regarding market transparency:

  • The Transparency Trap: Full disclosure by all sellers is almost never an equilibrium. Perfect transparency commoditizes products, triggering "race-to-the-bottom" price wars that erode profits, especially when privacy costs are non-zero.
  • Bias as a Buffer: Contrary to intuition, buyer uncertainty (estimation bias) can actually promote disclosure. By softening the "winner-takes-all" nature of price competition, uncertainty allows sellers to reveal more information without immediate profit loss.
  • Capacity and Honesty: Limited seller capacity (e.g., having only one room to rent) encourages higher levels of transparency. When sellers are not competing for every single buyer, the pressure to hide information to maintain a price advantage is reduced.

Equilibrium Patterns

The researchers characterized the market equilibria into different patterns based on the marginal privacy costs ($c_1, c_2$) of the sellers. For instance, the "All-Achievable" pattern illustrates how different cost regimes lead to varying disclosure outcomes across four distinct regions (I, II, III, and IV).

Equilibrium regions for the 'All-Achievable' pattern based on privacy costs.

Results and Implications

The theoretical analysis and numerical simulations yield several key results:

  1. Capacity-Disclosure Hierarchy: The number of sellers disclosing information increases as seller capacity becomes more constrained. Specifically, disclosure is lowest under unlimited capacity and highest in single-capacity scenarios.
  2. Winner-Take-All in Disclosure: In markets with unlimited capacity, at most one seller—typically the one with the highest quality-to-cost ratio—will choose to disclose information at equilibrium.
  3. The Quality Threshold: Low-quality sellers are disincentivized from disclosing information regardless of cost, as revealing poor quality directly reduces their competitiveness.

Conclusion

This research provides a rigorous foundation for understanding information disclosure in competitive sharing systems. By highlighting the roles of privacy costs, buyer bias, and capacity limits, it explains the empirical observation of "hidden" information in these markets. Future work may extend this static model to dynamic settings, incorporating long-term reputation effects and buyer reviews.

Summary updated

Abstract

Sharing systems have facilitated the redistribution of underused resources by providing convenient online marketplaces for individual sellers and buyers. However, sellers in these systems may not fully disclose the information of their shared commodities, due to strategic behaviors or privacy concerns. Sellers' strategic information disclosure significantly affects buyers' user experiences and systems' reputation. This paper presents the first analytical study on information disclosure and pricing of competing sellers in sharing systems. In particular, we propose a two-stage game framework to capture sellers' strategic behaviors and buyers' decisions. Although the optimization problem is challenging due to sellers' non-convex and non-monotonic objectives, we completely characterize the complex market equilibria by decomposing it into several tractable subproblems. We demonstrate that full disclosure by all sellers or non-disclosure by all sellers will both lead to intense price competition. The former all-disclosure case is never an equilibrium even when all sellers have good commodity qualities and low privacy costs, while the latter non-disclosure case can be an equilibrium under which all sellers get zero profit. We also reveal several critical factors that affect sellers' information disclosure. Interestingly, sellers' sharing capacity limitation and buyers' estimation biases encourage information disclosure as they mitigate sellers' competition.
BibTeX
@misc{ding2023information,
  author = {Ningning Ding and Zhixuan Fang and Jianwei Huang},
  title = {{Information Disclosure under Competition in Sharing Systems}},
  year = {2023},
  eprint = {2308.16320},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.16320},
}
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