Influence of Different Coupling Modes on the Robustness of Smart Grid under Targeted Attack

Wenjie Kang, Gang Hu, Peidong Zhu, Qiang Liu, Zhi Hong Hang, Xin LiuSensors 2018 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper investigates how different ways of connecting power grids and communication networks (coupling modes) affect the smart grid's resilience to attacks. They found that specific coupling strategies, like "Disassortative Coupling in Subnets" for top-down links and "Assortative Coupling in Subnets" for bottom-up links, significantly improve robustness, along with increasing the system's tolerance to load fluctuations.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Modern smart grids are complex, interdependent systems comprising power grids and communication networks. While previous research has explored cascading failures in simpler, one-to-one network structures, the dual-coupling nature of smart grids and the impact of local coupling within geographically defined subnets have been less understood. This gap is critical because conclusions drawn from simpler models might not accurately reflect the behavior of real-world smart grids, potentially leading to flawed resilience strategies. The paper aims to address this by analyzing how different coupling modes between localized power and communication subnets influence the smart grid's ability to withstand targeted attacks and subsequent cascading failures.

Methods

The authors propose a novel framework for analyzing smart grid robustness. Key methodological contributions include:

  • Dual Coupling Model: The smart grid is modeled as a two-layer network with both "top-down" (cyber to physical) and "bottom-up" (physical to cyber) coupling links.
  • Subnet Division: Both the power grid and communication network are divided into smaller subnets based on geographical proximity. Local coupling is then applied only between corresponding subnets (e.g., subnet A1 in the power grid couples with subnet B1 in the communication network). This approach aims to reduce costs and improve practicality compared to global coupling.
  • Node Importance (NI) Calculation: A new metric, Node Importance (NI), is introduced to quantify the impact of a node on its respective network. This metric considers factors like the number of failed nodes after its removal and its degree within the network. For physical nodes, voltage is used as the initial load, and for cyber nodes, degree and the NI of coupled physical nodes are considered.
  • Coupling Modes: Three coupling modes are defined based on the calculated NI:
  • Assortative Coupling in Subnets (ACIS): High-NI nodes in one subnet are coupled with high-NI nodes in the corresponding subnet of the other network.
  • Disassortative Coupling in Subnets (DCIS): High-NI nodes in one subnet are coupled with low-NI nodes in the corresponding subnet of the other network.
  • Random Coupling in Subnets (RCIS): Nodes are coupled randomly.
  • Cascading Failure Model: A model simulating overload-induced failures is developed. When a node fails, its load is redistributed to its neighbors. If a neighbor's capacity is exceeded, it also fails, triggering further redistribution. The model accounts for both physical and cyber node failures and their interdependencies.
  • Robustness Metric: The survival rate of functional nodes (P) is used to assess the smart grid's robustness. A higher survival rate indicates greater resilience.

Datasets

The paper uses two real-world datasets for validation:

  • IEEE 118-Bus System: A simulated power grid network.
  • Italian High-Voltage Electrical Transmission Network (HVIET): A real-world power grid network.

For both datasets, corresponding communication networks were constructed based on the power grid topology and geographical considerations.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Local Coupling is Key: The paper highlights that focusing on local coupling within geographically defined subnets is a more practical and cost-effective approach to enhancing smart grid robustness than global coupling.
  • DCIS for Top-Down Links: Disassortative coupling (DCIS) for top-down links (cyber controlling physical) is surprisingly effective. It pairs critical cyber nodes with less critical physical nodes, meaning failures in important cyber components don't immediately cascade to the most vital physical infrastructure.
  • ACIS for Bottom-Up Links: Conversely, assortative coupling (ACIS) for bottom-up links (physical supporting cyber) proves beneficial. This strategy connects robust physical nodes with critical cyber nodes, ensuring that the essential power supply to the communication network is maintained by the most resilient components.
  • Tolerance is Crucial: The "tolerance" parameter ($\alpha$), representing a node's ability to withstand load fluctuations, has a direct and significant positive impact on the smart grid's overall robustness. Higher tolerance means better resilience.
  • Dual Coupling Matters: The distinction between top-down and bottom-up coupling is not just academic; it fundamentally influences which coupling strategy is optimal for each direction of dependency.

Key Results

The study's main findings, consistently observed across both case studies, are:

  • Top-Down Coupling: DCIS significantly enhances smart grid robustness against targeted attacks compared to RCIS and ACIS.
  • Bottom-Up Coupling: ACIS significantly enhances smart grid robustness against targeted attacks compared to RCIS and DCIS.
  • Tolerance Impact: Increasing the tolerance parameter ($\alpha$) consistently improves the smart grid's robustness, regardless of the coupling mode or link direction. For instance, in the HVIET network, a tolerance of 0.05 provided better robustness than 0.01 or 0.005.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Limitations:
    • The paper acknowledges that while the model considers load redistribution in both power and communication networks, the cyber network's load redistribution is based on assumptions (e.g., degree as a proxy for data flow) due to the difficulty of simulating real-time data flow experimentally.
  • The NI calculation for cyber nodes relies on the NI of physical nodes, creating a dependency that might be simplified.
  • Future Work:
    • The authors suggest exploring more complex models that incorporate dynamic cross-layer attacks, coordinated detection mechanisms, and network attack/defense confrontations.
  • Investigating the three-layer social-cyber-physical coupling relationship is proposed as a crucial next step for protecting critical infrastructures.
  • Further research into the failure mechanisms of asymmetric networks and the impact of global vs. local coupling on different network types is recommended.

Summary updated

Abstract

Many previous works only focused on the cascading failure of global coupling of one-to-one structures in interdependent networks, but the local coupling of dual coupling structures has rarely been studied due to its complex structure. This will result in a serious consequence that many conclusions of the one-to-one structure may be incorrect in the dual coupling network and do not apply to the smart grid. Therefore, it is very necessary to subdivide the dual coupling link into a top-down coupling link and a bottom-up coupling link in order to study their influence on network robustness by combining with different coupling modes. Additionally, the power flow of the power grid can cause the load of a failed node to be allocated to its neighboring nodes and trigger a new round of load distribution when the load of these nodes exceeds their capacity. This means that the robustness of smart grids may be affected by four factors, i.e., load redistribution, local coupling, dual coupling link and coupling mode; however, the research on the influence of those factors on the network robustness is missing. In this paper, firstly, we construct the smart grid as a two-layer network with a dual coupling link and divide the power grid and communication network into many subnets based on the geographical location of their nodes. Secondly, we define node importance ( N I ) as an evaluation index to access the impact of nodes on the cyber or physical network and propose three types of coupling modes based on N I of nodes in the cyber and physical subnets, i.e., Assortative Coupling in Subnets (ACIS), Disassortative Coupling in Subnets (DCIS), and Random Coupling in Subnets (RCIS). Thirdly, a cascading failure model is proposed for studying the effect of local coupling of dual coupling link in combination with ACIS, DCIS, and RCIS on the robustness of the smart grid against a targeted attack, and the survival rate of functional nodes is used to assess the robustness of the smart grid. Finally, we use the IEEE 118-Bus System and the Italian High-Voltage Electrical Transmission Network to verify our model and obtain the same conclusions: (I) DCIS applied to the top-down coupling link is better able to enhance the robustness of the smart grid against a targeted attack than RCIS or ACIS, (II) ACIS applied to a bottom-up coupling link is better able to enhance the robustness of the smart grid against a targeted attack than RCIS or DCIS, and (III) the robustness of the smart grid can be improved by increasing the tolerance α . This paper provides some guidelines for slowing down the speed of the cascading failures in the design of architecture and optimization of interdependent networks, such as a top-down link with DCIS, a bottom-up link with ACIS, and an increased tolerance α .
BibTeX
@inproceedings{kang2018influence,
  author = {Wenjie Kang and Gang Hu and Peidong Zhu and Qiang Liu and Zhi Hong Hang and Xin Liu},
  title = {{Influence of Different Coupling Modes on the Robustness of Smart Grid under Targeted Attack}},
  booktitle = {Sensors},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.3390/s18061699},
}
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