Incentive Compatible Queues Without Money

Isaac Grosof, Michael MitzenmacherarXiv 2022 · arXiv

Abstract

In high-performance computing (HPC) environments, schedulers rely on user-provided runtime estimates to optimize job prioritization. However, without proper incentives, users often misreport these estimates to gain priority, leading to system-wide inefficiencies. This paper proposes a novel framework for achieving incentive compatibility (IC) without monetary transactions. By utilizing deprioritization as a "punishment" for exceeding estimates, we introduce two policies—BlindTrust and MeasuredTrust. Using the SOAP (Schedule Ordered by Age-based Priority) framework, we prove that these policies can be tuned to make honesty the mathematically optimal strategy for users, significantly improving overall queue performance compared to traditional non-preemptive scheduling.

Introduction

Resource management in shared computing clusters, such as those managed by SLURM, often faces a "tragedy of the commons." Schedulers prioritize shorter jobs to minimize average response times, but this creates a perverse incentive: users may claim their jobs are very short to jump to the front of the queue. Conversely, if the penalty for exceeding an estimate is too severe (e.g., immediate job termination), users provide overly conservative, large estimates, which prevents the scheduler from effectively prioritizing small tasks.

While mechanism design often relies on monetary auctions to ensure truth-telling, money is rarely a practical tool for internal corporate or academic clusters. This research seeks a "money-free" way to achieve incentive compatibility, where a user's best move is to report their true internal estimate of a job's runtime.

Methods and Modeling

The authors model the system as an M/G/1 queue with Poisson arrivals and a single server. Jobs are categorized into discrete "types" representing their actual runtimes. To enforce honesty, the authors introduce a punishment parameter $b \in [0, 1]$, representing the probability of deprioritization.

Two specific scheduling policies are analyzed:

  • BlindTrust: Jobs are prioritized based on their estimates. If a job exceeds its estimate, it is moved to the lowest possible priority with probability $b$. Otherwise, it continues at its current priority.
  • MeasuredTrust: A more granular approach where, if a job is not immediately punished to the lowest priority, its priority is incrementally lowered to the next size class as it continues to run.

To calculate expected response times and analyze these policies, the authors leverage the SOAP framework, which allows for the unified analysis of age-based scheduling policies by transforming stochastic optimization problems into the task of finding roots of constant-degree rational polynomials.

Modeling User Beliefs

To evaluate these policies, the researchers use synthetic joint probability distribution matrices to model the relationship between a job's true size ($S$) and a user's internal estimate ($E$). This allows for the simulation of varying levels of "noise" or uncertainty in user beliefs.

Example of a joint probability distribution matrix representing the correlation between true job sizes and user estimates.

Key Results

The Single Interval Property

A primary contribution of the paper is the proof of the Single Interval Property for the MeasuredTrust policy. The authors demonstrate that the set of punishment probabilities $b$ that result in an incentive-compatible system always forms a single, connected interval. This property is crucial for system administrators, as it makes it computationally straightforward to find the "Goldilocks zone" of punishment that ensures honesty.

Robustness and Efficiency

The study finds that as user estimates become more accurate (lower noise), the range of incentive-compatible punishment probabilities for MeasuredTrust expands. Furthermore, MeasuredTrust is shown to be significantly more robust than BlindTrust, remaining incentive-compatible under much noisier conditions.

Empirical simulations indicate that these trust-based policies achieve substantially lower mean response times than "blind" policies like First-Come-First-Served (FCFS) or Smallest Class First (SCF), even when user estimates are imperfect.

Discussion and Limitations

While the paper provides a strong theoretical foundation for money-free IC queues, several limitations remain for future work:

  1. Finite Types: The current model assumes a finite number of job sizes and estimate types. Generalizing this to continuous distributions remains a technical challenge.
  2. Single Server Constraints: The analysis is limited to M/G/1 environments, whereas real-world clusters are typically multi-server (M/G/k) and handle malleable jobs.
  3. User Knowledge: The model assumes users have well-defined probabilistic beliefs about their jobs, which may not always hold true in practice.

In conclusion, this work demonstrates that by carefully calibrating deprioritization penalties, system administrators can align individual user incentives with social welfare, leading to more efficient and fair resource allocation in non-monetary environments.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@misc{grosof2022incentive,
  author = {Isaac Grosof and Michael Mitzenmacher},
  title = {{Incentive Compatible Queues Without Money}},
  year = {2022},
  eprint = {2202.05747},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.05747},
}
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