In-Situ Hardware Error Detection Using Specification-Derived Petri Net Models and Behavior-Derived State Sequences

Tomonari Tanaka, Takumi Uezono, Kohei Suenaga, Masanori HashimotoarXiv 2025 · DOI · arXiv

Introduction

As hardware accelerators become integral to data centers and safety-critical applications like autonomous driving, ensuring their reliability is paramount. A significant threat to these systems is the "soft error"—transient faults typically caused by cosmic radiation or electrical noise that result in bit-flips within registers. When these occur in control logic, they can lead to Silent Data Corruption (SDC) or catastrophic system hangs.

While traditional solutions like Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) provide high reliability, they incur substantial silicon area overhead. Moreover, TMR is often blind to errors originating from faulty upstream inputs, as all redundant modules process the same corrupted data. This research proposes a more area-efficient, "in-situ" monitoring approach capable of detecting both internal bit-flips and propagated input errors.

Methodology: On-Chip Monitoring

The researchers developed a three-step framework for implementing hardware monitors, focusing on two distinct but complementary approaches: Specification-Derived Petri Nets and Behavior-Derived State Sequences.

The three-step workflow for generating and implementing Petri net-based hardware monitors.

1. Specification-Derived Petri Nets

Petri nets are formal mathematical models used to describe discrete event systems. In this approach, "event sets" are manually extracted from hardware specifications (e.g., the sequence of "Initiate processing" to "Complete calculation"). These are then translated into small, dedicated hardware circuits that monitor control signals in real-time.

Basic Petri net operation showing the transition (T1) firing and moving a token from Place 1 to Place 2.

If the monitored hardware attempts a transition that violates the logic defined by the Petri net, a fault flag is immediately raised. This method is highly precise for well-documented control flows and extremely area-efficient.

2. Behavior-Derived State Sequences

For complex designs where formal specifications may be incomplete, the authors propose a behavior-learned approach. This method "learns" valid operational sequences from error-free RTL simulations, recording valid combinations of control signals. A "sequence checker" circuit then compares live hardware transitions against a lookup table of known-good sequences. This approach is more automated and adaptable to non-deterministic behaviors.

Experimental Evaluation

The proposed monitors were validated across four hardware benchmarks:

  • CNN Accelerator: A quantized LeNet-5 convolutional layer.
  • Gaussian Blur: An image processing pipeline.
  • AES Encryption: A standard security primitive.
  • Network-on-Chip (NoC) Router: A 4x4 mesh router handling complex traffic patterns.

The evaluation involved thousands of fault injection simulations, targeting both internal control registers and primary control inputs.

Key Results and Insights

The study yielded several critical findings regarding the efficiency and efficacy of in-situ monitoring:

  • Detection Performance: The monitors achieved error detection rates between 48% and 100%. Notably, in the CNN accelerator, a mere 1% area overhead was sufficient to reach a 93.7% detection rate for internal faults.
  • Low Latency: Errors were detected rapidly, often within 1 to 4 clock cycles for the AES implementation.
  • Input Vulnerability: A major advantage of these sequence-based monitors is their ability to catch errors stemming from faulty inputs—a scenario where traditional TMR often fails. By checking if the behavior is logical, the monitors remain effective regardless of the error's source.
  • Scalability and Complexity: While Petri nets excel in area-constrained environments with clear specs, state sequences are better suited for complex behaviors, such as the multicast patterns in NoC routers, which required a higher area overhead (~12.5%) to achieve a 94.5% detection rate.

Conclusion

This work demonstrates that specification-derived and behavior-derived monitors provide a robust, low-overhead alternative to traditional redundancy for hardware error detection. By focusing on control-flow logic and hierarchical monitoring, designers can achieve high reliability with minimal silicon cost. Future work will look toward automating the Petri net generation process using Large Language Models and exploring hybrid monitoring systems.

Summary updated

Abstract

In hardware accelerators used in data centers and safety-critical applications, soft errors and resultant silent data corruption significantly compromise reliability, particularly when upsets occur in control-flow operations, leading to severe failures. To address this, we introduce two methods for monitoring control flows: using specification-derived Petri nets and using behavior-derived state transitions. We validated our method across four designs: convolutional layer operation, Gaussian blur, AES encryption, and a router in Network-on-Chip. Our fault injection campaign targeting the control registers and primary control inputs demonstrated high error detection rates in both datapath and control logic. Synthesis results show that a maximum detection rate is achieved with a few to around 10% area overhead in most cases. The proposed detectors quickly detect 48% to 100% of failures resulting from upsets in internal control registers and perturbations in primary control inputs. The two proposed methods were compared in terms of area overhead and error detection rate. By selectively applying these two methods, a wide range of area constraints can be accommodated, enabling practical implementation and effectively enhancing error detection capabilities.
BibTeX
@misc{tanaka2025situ,
  author = {Tomonari Tanaka and Takumi Uezono and Kohei Suenaga and Masanori Hashimoto},
  title = {{In-Situ Hardware Error Detection Using Specification-Derived Petri Net Models and Behavior-Derived State Sequences}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2505.04108},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.04108},
}
Figure