How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? aligning system's optimum with users' equilibrium

Andrés Fielbaum, Rafal Kucharski, Oded Cats, Javier Alonso-MoraEur. J. Oper. Res 2022 · OpenReview

Abstract

Highlights•Forming stable groups for users sharing rides can lead to suboptimal results•We model the problem as a game, where strategies are groups to share the ride with•No sharing is Nash Equilibrium. Whether a Strong Equilibrium exists is NP-Complete•We define three equilibrium notions, stronger than Nash and weaker than Strong•We propose cost-sharing protocols that make optimal solutions also equilibria
BibTeX
@article{fielbaum2022how,
  author = {Andrés Fielbaum and Rafal Kucharski and Oded Cats and Javier Alonso-Mora},
  title = {{How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? aligning system's optimum with users' equilibrium}},
  journal = {Eur. J. Oper. Res.},
  year = {2022},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=iCMS5rrBbm},
}
Figure