How to Distribute Green Products in Competition with Brown Products? Direct Selling versus Agent Selling?

Hanli Hu, Yu Cao, Dan Yi, Qingsong LiSustainability 2023 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper investigates how manufacturers can best distribute green products when they compete with their traditional brown counterparts. Using a game theory model, it reveals that the optimal distribution strategy (direct selling vs. agent selling) hinges on factors like direct selling costs, consumer preferences, and the proportion of green consumers, sometimes even leading manufacturers to strategically price green products high to boost brown product sales.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

As consumer interest in "green" products grows, companies are introducing eco-friendly versions of their existing brown products. However, this creates a challenge: how to distribute these competing product lines without them cannibalizing each other's sales. Manufacturers need to decide whether to sell green products directly to consumers or through retailers (agent selling), while also considering how brown products are sold. This paper aims to answer this by exploring optimal pricing and channel strategies for manufacturers facing this dual-product market.

Methods

The authors employ a Stackelberg game model, where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. This model allows them to analyze the decision-making process and profit optimization under two distinct distribution scenarios for green products:

  • Direct Selling: The manufacturer sells green products directly to consumers, while brown products are sold through a retailer.
  • Agent Selling: Both green and brown products are sold through the same retailer.

The model incorporates consumer types (brown-only consumers and green consumers who may buy either), their preferences, and various cost parameters (production, direct selling). Mathematical analysis, including backward induction and comparative statics, is used to derive optimal pricing and channel choices.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The study relies on a theoretical game-theoretic model and numerical simulations rather than empirical datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Strategic Ambiguity of Direct Selling: Direct selling green products isn't always about maximizing green sales. Manufacturers might strategically set high green product prices in direct channels to discourage green purchases and push consumers towards brown products, thereby maximizing brown product market share.
  • Consumer Preferences are Key: The degree to which consumers prefer green over brown products, and the overall proportion of green consumers, significantly influence the manufacturer's channel choice.
  • Cost Matters, Especially for Green: Direct selling costs for green products play a crucial role. When these costs are low or zero, direct selling is often favored. However, as these costs rise, agent selling becomes more attractive, especially if consumers have a strong preference for one product type over the other.
  • Profit Dynamics Differ by Channel: Under agent selling, higher green consumer market share generally benefits the manufacturer's profits. In contrast, direct selling shows an "inverted U" profit trend with increasing green consumer market share, suggesting a point beyond which further growth in green consumers might not be beneficial for the manufacturer.

Key Results

  • Channel Choice Drivers: The manufacturer's optimal channel choice (direct vs. agent selling) is determined by a complex interplay of direct selling costs ($c_v$), green consumer market share ($\gamma$), and consumer preference differences ($\alpha_1, \alpha_2$).
  • Preference Impact: When green consumers have a large preference difference for green vs. brown products, the manufacturer leans towards agent selling. Conversely, if preferences are similar, direct selling might be preferred.
  • Profitability: Retailers generally achieve higher profits in the agent selling model. For manufacturers, direct selling can be more profitable when direct selling costs are low or when consumers have similar preferences for both product types. However, when only brown products are the optimal strategy, direct selling still yields higher profits for the manufacturer.
  • Pricing Strategies: Pricing is heavily influenced by costs and consumer behavior. For instance, in direct selling, higher green costs can lead to manufacturers only selling brown products.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge several limitations:

  • Simplified Direct Selling Model: The direct selling model primarily considers direct sales by the manufacturer, not incorporating more complex scenarios involving intermediaries in direct channels.
  • Lack of Coordination Contracts: The study did not explore cooperation or coordination contracts between manufacturers and retailers.
  • Product Design Ignored: The focus is on distribution and pricing, not on the green product design itself.

Future research directions suggested include:

  • Investigating more complex direct selling models and competition scenarios.
  • Exploring the design of contracts in different channel models.
  • Considering the interplay of green product design with distribution and pricing strategies.
  • Incorporating the impact of e-commerce and information technology on channel complexity.

Summary updated

Abstract

In order to respond to and take advantage of consumers’ growing interest in green products, an increasing number of firms are expanding their market share by introducing green versions of their brown products. However, firms are faced with the challenge of how to distribute green products to avoid mutual encroachment with brown products. To solve this problem, this paper constructs a Stackelberg game model consisting of a manufacturer (leader) and a retailer (follower), in which the manufacturer provides brown and green products, and then develops two channel structures for green products to be sold through the manufacturer (direct selling) and the retailer (agent selling). The results show that the manufacturer’s choice of green product distribution channels is affected by the direct selling costs and the market share of green consumers and their product preferences. When the direct selling cost is zero or consumers are green, the manufacturer always chooses direct selling. However, with an increase in the direct selling costs, if green consumers have a large difference in their preference for green and brown products, the manufacturer chooses agent selling, and vice versa. In particular, the impact of the market share of green consumers on the profits of the manufacturer is different in the two channel structures. The higher the market share of green consumers under agent selling, the more beneficial it is for the manufacturer. However, under direct selling, the profits of the manufacturer show an “inverted U” trend with the increase in the market share of green consumers. In addition, under certain conditions, the direct selling channels opened by the manufacturer are not necessarily to sell green products, but to maximize the market share of brown products. The strategy is to set high prices for green products in direct selling channels to stimulate consumers to buy brown products. These findings can provide insights for manufacturers to design appropriate green product distribution strategies.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{hu2023how,
  author = {Hanli Hu and Yu Cao and Dan Yi and Qingsong Li},
  title = {{How to Distribute Green Products in Competition with Brown Products? Direct Selling versus Agent Selling?}},
  booktitle = {Sustainability},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.3390/su151410961},
}
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