How Practical Are Fault Injection Attacks, Really?

Jakub Breier, Xiaolu HouIACR ePrint 2022 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper investigates the practical feasibility of fault injection attacks (FIAs) on modern hardware. The authors conclude that FIAs are indeed practical for a wide range of architectures and can be mounted with relatively inexpensive equipment, especially when physical access to the target device is available.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Fault injection attacks (FIAs) are a class of active physical attacks that can be used to compromise the security of integrated circuits. While numerous academic papers detail sophisticated FIA techniques, a crucial question often remains unanswered: how practical are these attacks in real-world scenarios? Specifically, can they be executed outside of expensive, specialized laboratory settings by individuals with limited resources? This paper aims to bridge this gap by analyzing the cost, accessibility, and effectiveness of various FIA techniques, providing a much-needed perspective on their current threat level.

Methods

The paper provides a comprehensive overview of common FIA techniques, categorizing them by their underlying principles and discussing their practicality. The authors analyze:

  • Voltage/Clock Glitching: This method involves manipulating the power supply or clock signal of a device to induce temporary malfunctions. It's highlighted as a low-cost technique, often achievable with basic electronics and readily available development boards.
  • Electromagnetic (EM) Fault Injection: This involves using electromagnetic pulses to disrupt circuit operation. The paper discusses both expensive, professional setups and more affordable, DIY approaches using off-the-shelf components.
  • Optical Fault Injection: This technique utilizes lasers or camera flashes to induce faults. While professional laser setups can be costly, the paper points to research demonstrating the feasibility of using inexpensive camera flashes and basic optics for certain attacks.
  • Rowhammer Attacks: This is a remote attack that exploits the physical characteristics of DRAM to flip bits in adjacent memory locations. It's noted as a particularly accessible remote attack, requiring only internet access and a computer.

For each technique, the authors review existing literature to identify the lowest reported costs for achieving specific fault models (e.g., bit flips, instruction skips) on various target architectures (ARM, Intel, AMD, FPGA, AVR).

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • "Low-cost" is relative, but increasingly accessible: While some advanced FIA setups can still be expensive (e.g., professional laser systems), the paper emphasizes that many effective techniques can be implemented with equipment costing a few hundred to a few thousand dollars, making them accessible to a wider range of attackers.
  • Physical access is a game-changer: For many techniques, particularly voltage/clock glitching and optical methods, physical access to the target device significantly reduces complexity and cost, making them highly practical.
  • Remote attacks are evolving: While historically less common and more expensive, remote attacks like Rowhammer are becoming more accessible and are a growing concern, especially for cloud environments and smartphones.
  • Architecture matters, but common targets are vulnerable: The paper demonstrates that FIAs are applicable to widely used architectures like ARM, Intel, and AMD, indicating broad vulnerability.
  • The "black box" nature of some attacks is key: Techniques that don't require deep knowledge of the internal chip design or extensive decapsulation (like EMFI and Rowhammer) are particularly practical.

Key Results

The paper's primary result is the conclusion that fault injection attacks are "practical in many scenarios." This is supported by:

  • Cost analysis: Table 1 in the paper provides a detailed overview of the lowest reported costs for various fault models and target devices. For instance, EM fault injection on AVR microcontrollers can be achieved for as low as $10 USD, and voltage glitching on ARM (embedded) can be "low" cost (requiring only a PC and wires).
  • Technique accessibility: The authors highlight that many techniques can be implemented using readily available development boards (e.g., Arduino, Teensy) and standard electronic components.
  • Remote attack feasibility: Rowhammer attacks are presented as a prime example of a remote FIA that requires minimal specialized equipment.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Limitations: The paper acknowledges that this is not a comprehensive survey and focuses on the lowest cost implementations found in the literature. It also notes that the practicality can depend on the specific implementation of the target device and the attacker's expertise. The paper also distinguishes between standalone and embedded ARM systems, noting that remote attacks often assume a complex operating system.
  • Future Work: The authors point to several emerging trends:
  • Breaking security enclaves: Attacks targeting Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone are highlighted as a growing area of research.
  • Low-cost FIA development: The trend towards affordable, DIY FIA equipment is expected to continue, making these attacks more accessible.
  • Advancing remote attacks: There's a significant push to develop more remote FIA techniques, as these are often overlooked in security assessments.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{breier2022how,
  author = {Jakub Breier and Xiaolu Hou},
  title = {{How Practical Are Fault Injection Attacks, Really?}},
  journal = {IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.1109/access.2022.3217212},
}
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