How does the Quantity of Disclosed Information Provided by Insurers Affect Entity Behaviors in Internet Insurance Market?: A Study Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis between Government, Insurance Companies and Consumers

Jie ShaoInternational Review of Financial Consumers 2019 · DOI

Abstract

The emergence of internet insurance provides a new consumption pattern for insurance consumers in the e-commerce era. However, without insurers fulfilling the duty of disclosure, consumers’ interests cannot be guaranteed. This paper analyzes the costs and benefits of three parties—government, insurance companies, and consumers—and their strategies regarding information disclosure. Using an evolutionary game model under bounded rationality assumptions, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) of the system are explored. The results show that (Disclosing, not Regulating, not Complain) is the best ESS and it is consumers’ buying decision, not regulation, that ultimately compels insurers to disclose enough information.

Introduction

In the traditional insurance market, face-to-face interactions with agents help bridge the gap between complex policy language and consumer understanding. In the internet insurance market, this interaction is absent, creating significant information asymmetry. Insurers often face a trade-off: disclosing more information can increase trust but also raises operational costs and may reveal competitive secrets. Conversely, withholding information can lead to consumer dissatisfaction and regulatory penalties. This study utilizes tripartite evolutionary game theory to model these dynamics and identify the conditions for a stable, efficient market.

Methodology

The study adopts an evolutionary game approach, which assumes players have bounded rationality and adapt their strategies through a process of trial and error. The model considers three populations: the Government (Regulating vs. Not Regulating), Insurance Companies (Disclosing vs. Not Disclosing), and Consumers (Complaining vs. Not Complaining).

Table 1: Variables and their meanings in the tripartite evolutionary game model.

By constructing a payoff matrix based on these variables, the research derives replicator dynamic equations to describe the evolution of strategy frequencies. The stability of the system is then analyzed using the Jacobian matrix and Lyapunov’s indirect method to identify Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS).

Key Insights: The Power of the Consumer

A central finding is that the market's equilibrium is highly sensitive to the cost of disclosure ($C_i$) relative to the potential revenue loss ($S$) from consumer dissatisfaction. While government penalties ($F_c$) provide a necessary nudge, they are often insufficient on their own if the cost of compliance is prohibitively high. The most effective driver for transparency is the consumer's "exit" option—the threat of lost sales due to a lack of trust. If $S > C_i$, the market naturally moves toward disclosure.

Results and Stability Analysis

The model identifies 11 potential equilibrium points. However, the long-term stability of these points depends on the relative values of costs, benefits, and penalties within the specific market context.

Table 2: Stability of balancing points categorized by the cost of disclosure ($C_i$).

Three primary Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) emerge from the analysis:

  1. (Not Disclosing, Regulating, Complaining): Typical of early-stage or high-friction markets.
  2. (Not Disclosing, Regulating, Not Complaining): A state where regulation is present but fails to effectively change insurer behavior.
  3. (Disclosing, Not Regulating, Not Complaining): The optimal market state where transparency is self-sustaining through market incentives.

Quantitative data from 2017 highlights the different trajectories of major markets. China, with 175.6 complaints per billion-dollar premium, reflected an unstable, high-growth phase. Japan, with only 18.8 complaints, showed a more stable but potentially over-regulated environment that might hinder the flexibility of digital insurance products.

Limitations and Future Directions

The current model focuses on the quantity of information disclosed rather than its quality or clarity. Future research should incorporate the "understandability" of disclosures. Additionally, the model assumes information asymmetry favors the insurer; future iterations could account for consumer moral hazard, such as the withholding of personal risk data from the insurer.

Conclusion

The study concludes that while government regulation is a necessary catalyst in immature markets, the ultimate goal should be a market where consumer power drives transparency. Policymakers should focus on reducing disclosure costs for firms and enhancing consumer awareness to foster a self-regulating, transparent internet insurance ecosystem.

Summary updated

Abstract

The emergence of internet insurance provides a new consumption pattern for insurance consumers in the e-commerce era. However, without insurers fulfilling duty of disclosure, consumers’ interests cannot be guaranteed. This paper will analyze the costs and benefits of three parties (i.e. government, insurance companies and consumers) and their strategies regarding information disclosure of insurance products on the internet. Using an evolutionary game model under bounded rationality assumptions, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) of the system are explored. The results show that (Disclosing, not Regulating, not Complain) is the best ESS and it is consumers’ buying decision not regulation that ultimately compels insurers to disclose enough information. The different current situations in China and Japan are discussed in light of the model, and some measures are suggested to promote the development of internet insurance markets in both countries.
BibTeX
@article{shao2019how,
  author = {Jie Shao},
  title = {{How does the Quantity of Disclosed Information Provided by Insurers Affect Entity Behaviors in Internet Insurance Market?: A Study Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis between Government, Insurance Companies and Consumers}},
  journal = {International Review of Financial Consumers},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.36544/irfc.2019.1-2.3},
}
Figure