How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies?

Yalin Wang, Liping Qi, Shaoshuo CaiFrontiers in Public Health 2024 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper applies evolutionary game theory to model the "triadic" interaction between regulators, whistleblowers, and involved parties (PIPHE) during public health rumor crises. It identifies the conditions necessary to reach an ideal stable state of proactive rumor management and demonstrates how policy levers—like fines, rewards, and cost-reduction—can steer stakeholders toward transparency and social stability.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Public health emergencies (PHEs), such as the COVID-19 pandemic or the Fukushima nuclear leak, are often accompanied by "infodemics." Rumors spread faster than facts on social media, leading to social panic, "salt rushes," and distrust in public institutions.

Traditional rumor management often relies on reactive "whack-a-mole" strategies like deleting posts. However, these fail to account for the complex, self-interested motivations of key stakeholders. The authors address the lack of a comprehensive framework that explains why regulators might be passive, why involved parties might hide the truth, and how whistleblowers can be effectively integrated into a collaborative governance model to maintain public order.

Methods

The researchers utilized Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). Unlike classical game theory, which assumes players are perfectly rational and reach a static equilibrium, EGT acknowledges that players (regulators, PIPHE, and whistleblowers) learn, adapt, and change their strategies over time based on payoffs.

  1. Model Construction: A three-player game was built where each player has two strategies:
  2. Regulators: Proactive vs. Passive regulation.
  3. PIPHE: Open disclosure vs. Concealing facts.
  4. Whistleblowers: Active vs. Negative participation.
  5. Replication Dynamics: The authors derived differential equations to describe how the proportion of players choosing a specific strategy evolves.
  6. Stability Analysis: They used the Jacobian matrix and Lyapunov theory to identify eight potential equilibrium points and determined which ones are "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies" (ESS) under different cost-benefit scenarios.
  7. Numerical Simulation: Using Matlab, they simulated how changing specific parameters (like regulatory costs or whistleblower rewards) affects the speed and direction of the system’s evolution.

Datasets

The paper does not use a primary empirical dataset for training. Instead, it uses:

  • Numerical Simulations: Hypothesized parameter values based on theoretical assumptions to validate the mathematical model.
  • Qualitative Case Studies: The model's findings are cross-referenced with real-world events, including the 2011 Fukushima nuclear leak, the 2015 Tianjin Port explosion, and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, to demonstrate the model's "congruence with empirical cases."

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The Whistleblower as a Catalyst: Whistleblowers serve as a critical "check and balance." Their active participation reduces the "information asymmetry" that PIPHE often exploit to hide facts. When whistleblowers are active, regulators are forced to be more proactive to avoid reputation loss.
  • The Cost-Motivation Trade-off: Regulatory "laziness" is often a rational response to high fixed and variable costs ($C_o$ and $H$). If the cost of monitoring is higher than the potential reputation damage ($T$), regulators will naturally drift toward passivity.
  • The Transparency Paradox: If the "image loss" ($D$) from admitting a mistake is too high, PIPHE will choose to conceal facts even if they face moderate fines. To fix this, the "reputation gain" ($B$) for being honest must be amplified.
  • Systemic Sensitivity to Rumor Severity: As the hazard level ($k$) or the extent of rumor spread ($g$) increases, the system naturally gravitates toward the "Ideal ESS" because the potential losses for all parties become too high to ignore.

Key Results

The "Ideal ESS" is the state where regulators are proactive, PIPHE disclose facts, and whistleblowers participate actively. The simulations show:

  • Fines vs. Disclosure: Increasing the penalty ($R$) on PIPHE for concealing facts is one of the most effective ways to drive them toward disclosure.
  • Rewards vs. Responsibility: While "social responsibility" ($U$) motivates whistleblowers, the simulation shows that tangible regulatory rewards ($A$) are more effective at sustaining long-term active participation.
  • Tech as a Lever: Reducing regulatory costs through digital technology (AI, big data for rumor detection) is essential. When costs are low, the system reaches a stable "proactive" state much faster.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Binary Strategies: The model assumes players only have two choices (e.g., all-in or all-out). In reality, there are degrees of regulation and disclosure.
  • Exogenous Public: The general public is treated as an external factor influenced by the three main players, rather than an active player with its own strategic evolution.
  • Platform Accountability: The role of social media platforms (as the "venue" for rumors) is not explicitly modeled as a strategic player.
  • Future Directions: The authors suggest incorporating more strategy variables and expanding the model to include media outlets and digital platforms as active stakeholders.

Summary updated

Abstract

To effectively address the mental health risks associated with public health emergencies, it is crucial to actively manage rumors. This study explores the dynamic evolutionary process of rumor diffusion and its collaborative governance in public health emergencies. A game-theoretic model is constructed, involving three main actors: regulators, parties involved in public health emergencies (PIPHE), and whistle-blowers. The behaviors and game outcomes of each party are analyzed, and the effectiveness and feasibility of the model are validated through numerical simulations. The findings of this study reveal that various factors, such as regulatory costs, penalty income, reputation damage for regulators; image loss, reputation enhancement, penalty expenditure for PIPHE; and time costs, social responsibility, and reward income for whistle-blowers, all influence the behavioral choices and game equilibrium of each party. Optimization strategies for rumor governance are proposed in this study, including enhancing the sense of responsibility and capability among regulators, increasing transparency and credibility among PIPHE, and encouraging and protecting the participation of whistle-blowers. This study provides a comprehensive analytical framework for rumor governance in public health emergencies, contributing to improving the governance of public health emergencies and maintaining online public health orders for social sustainability.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{wang2024how,
  author = {Yalin Wang and Liping Qi and Shaoshuo Cai},
  title = {{How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies?}},
  booktitle = {Frontiers in Public Health},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.3389/fpubh.2023.1290841},
}
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