Honeypots for employee information security awareness and education training: A conceptual EASY training model

Lek Christopher, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Ali DehghantanhaarXiv 2017 · arXiv

Introduction

In the landscape of modern cybersecurity, human behavior remains the most significant vulnerability. Despite the deployment of advanced technical defenses, social engineering and simple negligence continue to serve as primary entry points for attackers. Traditional Information Security Awareness and Education Training (ISAET) programs often struggle to change behavior because they are perceived as generic, unengaging, and disconnected from the actual threats an organization faces. This paper proposes the EASY model (Engaging Stakeholders, Acceptable Behavior, Simple Teaching, Yardstick), a framework that utilizes real-time data from honeypots to create dynamic, relevant, and impactful security training.

Methodology: Low-Cost Threat Intelligence

To bridge the gap between abstract threats and organizational reality, the researchers deployed honeypots—decoy systems designed to attract and log unauthorized activity. These were hosted on low-cost Raspberry Pi Model B devices within a university environment. The hardware specifications for these deployment nodes are detailed in Figure 1.

Raspberry Pi Model B Specifications

Two specific honeypot types were utilized to gather diverse threat data:

  1. Dionaea: A low-interaction honeypot that emulates common protocols (SMB, HTTP, FTP) to capture malware samples.
  2. Kippo: A medium-interaction honeypot that logs SSH brute-force attempts and records the specific commands executed by attackers post-intrusion.

The EASY Training Model

The EASY model is grounded in Routine Activity Theory (RAT), a criminology framework which posits that a crime requires a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian. The goal of EASY is to transform employees into those "capable guardians" through four pillars:

  • Engaging Stakeholders: Involving everyone from executives to vendors to ensure organizational buy-in.
  • Acceptable Behavior: Clearly defining and rewarding positive security hygiene.
  • Simple Teaching: Using interactive visualizations and live data playbacks rather than static presentations.
  • Yardstick: Implementing continuous measurement to track the effectiveness of the training.

Empirical Insights and Results

Data collection yielded significant insights into attacker behavior. The Dionaea dataset captured over 115,000 connections, while Kippo logged over a million login attempts.

Analysis revealed a "workday" attack cycle, with activity peaking during business hours (9 AM to 5 PM GMT+8). This suggests that many attacks are either automated scripts running on office networks or are timed to blend in with legitimate traffic. Furthermore, geographic analysis showed a wide distribution of connection sources, as illustrated in the connection logs in Figure 2.

Geographic Distribution of Honeypot Connections

While the UK appeared as a major source in the Dionaea set, the authors clarify that these likely represent compromised "zombie" machines rather than the actual location of the human threat actors.

Attack Vectors and Tactics

  • Port Targeting: Port 445 (SMB) was the target of 77.52% of hits, confirming its status as a primary vector for automated exploitation.
  • Malware Persistence: The 2008 Conficker worm remained the most captured malware, highlighting the longevity of unpatched vulnerabilities in the wild.
  • Credential Brute-Forcing: Attackers frequently used "admin" as a username and simple passwords like "123456" or common names. Over half of the attempted passwords were only six to nine characters long.

Conclusion

By integrating live honeypot data into the EASY framework, organizations can move away from "one-size-fits-all" training. Showing employees real-time playbacks of attackers navigating a system or guessing passwords provides a visceral understanding of risk that static materials cannot replicate. This approach not only increases the perceived risk for offenders but also empowers employees to become proactive guardians of the corporate network.

Summary updated

Abstract

The increasing pervasiveness of internet-connected systems means that such systems will continue to be exploited for criminal purposes by cybercriminals (including malicious insiders such as employees and vendors). The importance of protecting corporate system and intellectual property, and the escalating complexities of the online environment underscore the need for ongoing information security awareness and education training and the promotion of a culture of security among employees. Two honeypots were deployed at a private university based in Singapore. Findings from the analysis of the honeypot data are presented in this paper. This paper then examines how analysis of honeypot data can be used in employee information security awareness and education training. Adapting the Routine Activity Theory, a criminology theory widely used in the study of cybercrime, this paper proposes a conceptual Engaging Stakeholders, Acceptable Behavior, Simple Teaching method, Yardstick (EASY) training model, and explains how the model can be used to design employee information security awareness and education training. Future research directions are also outlined in this paper.
BibTeX
@misc{christopher2017honeypots,
  author = {Lek Christopher and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo and Ali Dehghantanha},
  title = {{Honeypots for employee information security awareness and education training: A conceptual EASY training model}},
  year = {2017},
  eprint = {1706.08043},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.08043},
}
Figure