Healthcare Supply Chain Resilience Investment Strategy Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game

Chaoling Li, Youan Ke, Lin Lu, Ke XuSymmetry 2024 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper uses evolutionary game theory to model the strategic decisions of healthcare supply chain manufacturers and retailers regarding resilience investments. It reveals how factors like disruption losses, free-rider benefits, and government subsidies influence their choices, ultimately aiming to identify optimal strategies for building more resilient healthcare supply chains.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The COVID-19 pandemic starkly highlighted the vulnerability of healthcare supply chains (HCSCs), leading to critical shortages of essential medical supplies and threatening patient care. While the importance of HCSC resilience is recognized, there's a lack of understanding regarding the strategic interactions and decision-making processes of key players like manufacturers and retailers when it comes to investing in resilience. This paper addresses this gap by analyzing how these entities make investment decisions, considering their differing interests, potential for "free-riding," and the impact of disruptions, to understand how to foster greater collective investment in resilience.

Methods

The core of this research is an evolutionary game theory model. The authors construct two main scenarios: one for a non-disruption situation and another for a disruption scenario within the HCSC. They model the interactions between a medical supply manufacturer (MSM) and a medical supply retailer (MSR) as a two-player game where each player can choose between a "resilience investment" strategy or a "resilience non-investment" strategy.

The model uses Malthusian dynamic equations to simulate how the probabilities of adopting each strategy evolve over time based on the expected payoffs. By analyzing the stability of these evolutionary dynamics, the authors identify evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), which represent the long-term equilibrium states of the system. To further explore the impact of various factors, they employ numerical simulations using Matlab, systematically varying parameters to observe their influence on the evolutionary outcomes.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The "Free-Rider" Dilemma is Real: Retailers can benefit from manufacturers' resilience investments without incurring costs themselves, creating a disincentive for individual investment. This "free-rider" behavior is a significant barrier to collective resilience.
  • Disruptions Drive Investment (But Not Always): While disruptions increase the perceived need for resilience, the actual investment decision depends on a complex interplay of costs, potential losses, and the effectiveness of mitigation strategies.
  • Government Intervention is Crucial: Subsidies and penalty mechanisms are identified as key tools for governments to incentivize resilience investment and curb free-riding, shifting the balance towards collective action.
  • Information is Power: Enhanced information technology and big data analytics can improve supply chain visibility, enabling better demand forecasting and response, which in turn can bolster resilience investment incentives.
  • Strategic Partnerships Matter: Reconfiguring SC structures and fostering cooperative relationships among partners can lead to better overall HCSC performance and resilience.

Key Results

The study's evolutionary game model and simulations reveal that:

  • Non-Disruption Scenario: In the absence of disruptions, factors like the additional benefits from resilience investment for the MSM (rm) and MSR (rr), and the costs of investment (Cim, Cir) significantly influence decisions. Higher rm and rr generally encourage investment, while higher costs deter it. The model predicts that under certain conditions, both parties will converge to a "resilience investment" strategy (1,1).
  • Disruption Scenario: When disruptions occur, the model incorporates losses (Rm, Rr) and costs of additional products (C2m, C2r). The results show that higher disruption losses (Rm, Rr) increase the motivation for both parties to invest in resilience. Coefficients related to disruption loss reduction (d, f) and market encroachment revenue (k, j) also positively influence investment decisions.
  • Parameter Sensitivity: Numerical simulations demonstrate that parameters such as "free-rider" benefits (θ), disruption losses (Rm, Rr), and the effectiveness of resilience investment in reducing costs (s, δ) have a substantial impact on the evolutionary outcomes, often pushing the system towards mutual resilience investment.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge several limitations:

  • Micro-Entity Focus: The study primarily focuses on the game between manufacturers and retailers, neglecting the potential impact of government regulations, broader SC infrastructure, and the role of other stakeholders.
  • Information Asymmetry: While the model touches upon information, it doesn't deeply explore the complexities of information asymmetry and its impact on coordination and trust.
  • Simplified Scenarios: The analysis considers symmetric scenarios (non-disruption and disruption) and a simplified two-player game.

Future research directions suggested include:

  • Government Policy Integration: Exploring the impact of specific government policies (incentives, penalties, infrastructure development) on HCSC resilience.
  • Information Technology's Role: Investigating how advanced technologies like blockchain and AI can enhance HCSC resilience and reduce costs.
  • Contractual Mechanisms: Designing rational contracts that incentivize cooperation and risk-sharing among SC partners to mitigate opportunistic behavior.
  • Broader Network Analysis: Expanding the model to include more players and more complex network structures within the HCSC.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{li2024healthcare,
  author = {Chaoling Li and Youan Ke and Lin Lu and Ke Xu},
  title = {{Healthcare Supply Chain Resilience Investment Strategy Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game}},
  journal = {Symmetry},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.3390/sym16070787},
}
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