Governments in Dilemma - A Game Theoretic Model for the Conclusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties

Christoph EngelSSRN 2007

Abstract

In the official rhetoric of industrialised countries, for developing countries the conclusion of a bilateral investment treaty is a win-win solution. Empirical work has cast doubt on this. Do developing countries only agree since, otherwise, all the capital is siphoned off to other developing countries who have given in to Western pressure? In game theoretic terms, this holds if developing countries, among themselves, face a prisoner's dilemma. Whether this is true depends on the distribution of payoffs. Those who decide on the conclusion of a treaty derive utility from the expected effect of foreign direct investment on political support within their respective countries. On plausible assumptions, the actors governing developing countries play a chicken game. In pure strategies, or if one country can go first, only the first country concludes a treaty, whereas the second mover abstains. This equilibrium is particularly likely if governments of developing countries do not hold symmetric preferences.
BibTeX
@misc{engel2007governments,
  author = {Christoph Engel},
  title = {{Governments in Dilemma - A Game Theoretic Model for the Conclusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties}},
  year = {2007},
  howpublished = {SSRN},
}

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