Introduction
Modern radar systems are increasingly threatened by Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) jammers. These sophisticated devices intercept radar signals and retransmit them with slight modifications to create convincing "false targets" or decoys. A particularly difficult scenario occurs when these jammers are located within the radar's main lobe. In such cases, traditional spatial filtering techniques (like beamforming) fail because they cannot suppress the jammer without also suppressing the legitimate target signal.
This paper proposes a novel solution by leveraging polarization diversity within a Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) radar framework. By treating the interaction between the radar and the jammer as a strategic game, the authors demonstrate how transmit polarization can be optimized to distinguish real targets from deceptive ones.
System Architecture and Methods
The proposed system utilizes a co-located polarization MIMO radar. Unlike conventional radars, this setup employs polarization diversity in the transmit array and 2-D vector sensors in the receive array. This allows the system to separately measure the horizontal and vertical components of received signals, providing an extra dimension—polarization—to identify interference.
The core of the suppression strategy is a Two-Player Zero-Sum (TPZS) game framework. In this model, the radar aims to maximize the Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR), while the jammer aims to minimize it. The authors address two specific jammer profiles:
- Unilateral Game (Dumb Jammers): For jammers using a fixed or predictable strategy, the radar performs a straightforward optimization of its transmit polarization to minimize jamming power.
- Strategic Game (Smart Jammers): For adaptive jammers that react to radar changes, the authors seek a Nash Equilibrium. This is a stable state where neither the radar nor the jammer can improve their position by changing their strategy unilaterally.
Key Insights: Polarization as a "Secret Handshake"
The fundamental insight is that by varying the polarization of each transmit element, the radar creates a complex signal structure. Because a jammer may not perfectly replicate the polarization scattering characteristics of a real target, this "mismatch" becomes a filterable feature. Even if the jammer is spatially aligned with the target, its polarization signature often betrays it.
In the "smart jammer" scenario, the Nash Equilibrium provides a robust "mixed strategy." By choosing a probability distribution over different polarization states, the radar ensures a guaranteed level of performance regardless of the jammer's specific tactics.
Performance and Results
The effectiveness of this approach was validated through extensive numerical simulations involving a 3x3 antenna array. Key findings include:
- Enhanced SINR: The polarization MIMO radar maintained high SINR levels even in high Jamming-to-Noise Ratio (JNR) environments where conventional systems failed.
- Target Discrimination: Range-bin analysis showed that optimized beamforming could suppress false targets down to the noise floor, leaving the true target clearly visible.
- Main Lobe Success: The method successfully suppressed jamming within the spatial main lobe without the beam distortion or side-lobe increases typical of traditional spatial-only methods.
Conclusion and Future Directions
This research demonstrates that game theory combined with polarization diversity offers a powerful defense against deceptive jamming. By moving beyond spatial filtering, radars can maintain operational effectiveness even against sophisticated DRFM threats in their primary field of view.
Future work may explore more complex game models, such as Stackelberg games (where the radar or jammer moves first), and the challenges of estimating target parameters (like the Polarization Scattering Matrix) in real-time under noisy conditions.
Summary updated